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FOREWORD
This study takes on one of the most difficult strategic decisions the Army faces today:
how to plan for an uncertain and volatile future. In the context of Army force posture
in Europe, these decisions are complicated by limited resources and by an evolving
adversary that can employ asymmetric means to neutralize the impact of investments the
Army makes today. In an effort to ensure Army capabilities endure over the long term
and prevail in the event of conflict, the Army is implementing multidomain operations
(MDO), which describes how the Army can compete with or, if necessary, defeat, an
adversary across all domains, as part of the Joint Force. Conceived this way, MDO is
more than simply Joint operations. MDO describes how the Army will fight alongside
the other services in the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains.
To this end, the study avoids specifying a particular force posture. Much work has
already been done regarding the best course of action for defeating an adversary under
worst-case conditions. This study does not seek to recreate that analysis but to draw
on it to examine the kinds of strategic decisions that need to be made to account for the
various trade-offs any particular force posture would entail.
Moreover, this study tries to avoid the bottom-up approach described in other
studies. For example, rather than reviewing whether the Army should consider the
Polish offer to station US forces, the study seeks to determine top-down frameworks
that would illustrate the various tradeoffs making such a decision would entail. In this
way, the study’s authors seek to provide a map to navigate these decisions to provide
an effective deterrent and, failing that, a response to potential Russian aggression, while
preserving global flexibility to respond to what might be greater threats to the security of
the United States, its Allies, and its partners in other regions.w
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish what should be an informative
and useful study for leaders across the government and other entities with an interest or
responsibility in this subject.

DR. CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE CHALLENGE
In August 2018, then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper directed the US Army War
College to make recommendations regarding what US Army force posture, capabilities,
footprint, and command and control structure in Europe were necessary to meet the
objectives identified in the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) by 2028. The study also drew on key documents such as the Army Vision, Army
Strategy, Army Modernization Strategy, and The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028.
The ideal force posture needs to accomplish a range of ongoing and contingency
missions and also be adaptive enough to remain viable despite any number of potential
swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. Put differently,
the challenge of developing force posture is to develop one solution that might be put to
the test by a range of different possible futures. Preparing for a range of possible futures
leads the team to favor adaptability and resilience along with strategic and operational
effect. In an era of upheaval, the US Army cannot afford to stake its utility to the nation
on a force posture that can be rendered obsolete by a single budget, new technology, or
foreign election.
Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best
navigates the tensions between three priorities identified in the unclassified summary of
the NDS (any future reference to the NDS in this executive summary will be a reference
to the unclassified summary of the NDS, referenced above): deterring or defeating armed
conflict at acceptable cost, successfully competing below armed conflict, and maintaining
global responsiveness and institutional flexibility through the global operating model
and dynamic force employment. Any acceptable solution must fall within the bounds of
all three—none can simply be disregarded as unimportant—but there is scope for hard
decisions as to which elements should be emphasized over the others.
POLITICAL AND OPERATIONAL CONTEXT: RUSSIA AND EUROPE
Russia
Like any country, Russia seeks security, prosperity, and influence. Russia’s sense
of security—or perhaps more accurately sense of insecurity—is deeply rooted in its
historical exposure to outside invasion, and has been reinforced by NATO expansion
and the emergence of “color revolutions” that threaten Moscow’s influence in its near
abroad. As a result, Russia will continue to perceive its neighbors’ political and economic
ties with the West as a threat. Moreover, Moscow seeks to maintain its status as a “global
player with global influence.” These two overarching interests combined necessarily
entail minimizing the influence of the United States and other Western powers, especially
in Russia’s near abroad, and elsewhere, like Syria, where Russia also has interests. Russia
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also faces a growing Islamic threat from abroad and within, which it sometimes accuses
the West of exacerbating.
Based on this analysis, the following general principles will likely guide Russian
behavior over the foreseeable future.
• Russia will seek to maintain “escalatory dominance” over NATO. Part of that dominance will include efforts to undermine Alliance consensus on how to respond to
Russian provocations.
• Because of dwindling resources, Russia desires de-escalation and armament
reduction. A decrease in oil revenues will negatively impact Moscow’s military
modernization and capacity building efforts.
• Russia is unlikely to conduct further offensive conventional military attacks into
neighboring states unless Kremlin leaders perceive a competitive buildup of US
or international NATO forces that threatens Russian conventional defensive overmatch or the persecution of ethnic Russians in border areas.
• Russia desires removal of sanctions and greater economic inclusion with the West.
• Russia will not return Crimea to Ukraine and will continue support to separatists
in Georgia and the Donets Basin.
• Moscow will continue influence operations below the threshold of armed conflict
to destabilize NATO relationships and protect Russia’s economic interests.
• Russia will try to increase engagement with the United States and will assume the
worst if faced with an unpredictable large-scale NATO buildup on its periphery.
• Future admissions to NATO for states in Russia’s near abroad will likely be met
with aggression.
The evolution of Russian military capabilities through 2028 will largely depend on
how the Kremlin addresses the impact of the country’s limited economy and dwindling
manpower pool on military readiness. Although it has largely retained Soviet-era nuclear
capabilities, which will primarily be used for escalation management, the Russian
military struggles with conducting sustained global power projection operations. But
Russia’s investment and development of new military capabilities, specifically cyber
and integrated combined arms operations, do provide them with a wide aperture for
competing below the level of armed conflict, as well as conducting limited offensive
military operations. Should Russia continue to refine its military capabilities, it will
become a more dynamic adversary, capable of effectively challenging NATO and the
United States at levels below armed conflict while providing scalable opportunities at
levels above.
Europe
Determining the optimal US Army force posture requires a solid contextual
understanding of European partners and Allies and their anticipated future defense
requirements. The US Army must consider Allies and partners’ perceived major
threats and the forces and capabilities the Allies and partners will deploy to confront
these threats. Unlike during the Cold War, Allies and partners do not share a common
xii
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view of the threat Russia could represent. While most see Russia as a threat, there are
varying degrees to which they view Russia as a partner. As a result, willingness to
invest in their own defense varies considerably. Some will opt for higher-end combat
platform modernization, others for enhanced border security to deal with immigration
issues, while others are more concerned with social resilience programs to hedge against
Russian gray-zone activities.
These options are, of course, not exclusive and any particular partner will likely
pursue something in all three depending on their threat perceptions, which in turn are
driven by geography. In general, however, Eastern European governments are focused
on Russia as a military threat to territorial sovereignty, while Western European threat
perceptions tend to focus on terrorism and Russia’s role in actively destabilizing their
political and social institutions. The southern flank of Europe has been too busy dealing
with waves of migrants filtering in from North Africa and the Levant to worry much
about Russian threats.
The posture and capabilities of European Allies and partners will directly affect how
the US Army postures forces in 2028. Trends in NATO and the EU indicate that Europe’s
military strength is on the rebound after the decades of downsizing following the Cold
War. Increased defense spending, interoperability, and new organizational structures
driven by European threat perceptions will provide more effective and efficient defense
capabilities among US partners and Allies. Political trends and demographics are likely
to be a drag on defense capability improvements but are unlikely to negate the positive
trends in these capabilities. US Army leaders should plan a posture that reinforces
Allied and partner capabilities and avoid the temptation to build a force structure in
Europe designed to win military conflicts for them. Strategic communications plans for
any national posture decisions should take into account potential international politicalmilitary impacts—in arms control and other realms.
BUILDING BLOCKS OF FORCE POSTURE: LEVERS
Force posture is not just units and places but also the ability to move and the effects
of activity, even if transitory. Force posture is determined by a number of related factors
that function more or less as levers that can be set in combination relative to desired
outcome, cost, and risks. Combined, these levers provide theater design, forces and
capabilities, footprint and presence, authorities and permissions, and mission command
relationships. This study considers seven different force posture levers, including
• multidomain command and control (MDC2) (field army or corps headquarters);
• long-range fires capability;
• brigade combat team location and status (forward-stationed or prepositioned stocks);
• the geographic “footprint” of training and other activities within Europe;
• investments with high implementation costs (munitions stockpiles, lines of communications improvements, dispersal, and hardening);
• investments with year-to-year costs (deployment exercises, enhanced status for
prepositioned stocks, and building and maintaining regional expertise); and
xiii
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• increases in high-demand units (logistics and mobility, special forces, and theater
air and missile defense).
ORGANIZING THE LEVERS: PROPOSED STRATEGIC APPROACHES
In a world of limitless resources, the US Army would want to select some or all of
these levers. All would have some benefit. But because resources are scarce and some
of these levers go together naturally, the levers must be assembled into packages of
complementary options reflecting a coherent, top-down, strategic approach. The study
team initially created three strategic approaches: privilege dynamic force employment,
privilege global competition, and privilege armed conflict. Choosing the verb privilege was
an acknowledgment that although one element can be considered more important, an
acceptable force posture would strike an appropriate balance among all three. Upon
further study, the team realized that privilege armed conflict posed such significant
challenges in implementation that less ambitious approaches should be offered.
Therefore, the team essentially developed two additional strategic approaches that each
offer just one of the two major elements of that option: invest in a multidomain alliance and
build visible presence.
Privilege dynamic force employment. The NDS places an emphasis on an active but
relatively thin contact layer to resource robust blunt and surge forces. This approach
hinges upon the ability to project these blunt and surge forces quickly and reliably
despite an adversary’s ability to contest strategic lines of communication.
Privilege global competition. This strategic approach offers visible reassurance to
Allies, reflecting the insight that political will more than military capability is the center
of gravity for NATO. This approach also accounts for continued competition below
armed conflict—a far more likely scenario than armed conflict—while also providing
the Army institutional maneuver space to respond in case of crises elsewhere or to
adjust to changes in budget. Yet in contrast to the strict NDS approach, this approach
recognizes that the meaning of dynamic force employment is quite different for largescale, sustained ground operations than for air or naval forces.
Privilege armed conflict. The threat of a fait accompli attack stems not from an
overwhelming Russian superiority but the unique combination of geography and force
ratios in the Baltic region. This approach narrowly focuses force posture to reduce that
specific area of Russian superiority. The approach most closely matches the requirements
identified during MDO concept development.
Invest in a multidomain alliance. This strategic approach implements only the
multidomain package of privilege armed conflict to increase the chance of successful
implementation. The package consists of MDC2, long-range fires units, and munitions.
This package best enables the Joint Force by setting the conditions for gaining air freedom
of maneuver and Allies by creating a framework by which they can leverage some of the
specific multidomain capabilities that only the United States can provide. This package
accepts the risk that sufficient maneuver combat power will not be available to deter or
defeat a Russian fait accompli.
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Build visible presence. This strategic approach implements only the “maneuver presence
package” of privilege armed conflict to increase the chance of successful implementation.
The package consists of three armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) ready for instant
employment and a narrow geographic focus on northeastern NATO Allies, which, for
the purposes of this discussion, includes the Baltic states and Poland. As opposed to the
multidomain package, which enables Joint and Allied forces, this package improves the
Army’s ability to conduct large-scale ground operations. It accepts the risk that Russian
anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) will be able to isolate ground forces.
ASSESSING THE STRATEGIC APPROACHES: DECISION CRITERIA AND RISK
FACTORS
To evaluate these different strategic approaches, the study team analyzed each against
a range of criteria and risk factors. The study developed three categories of criteria and
risk factors.
• Strategic and operational factors relate to the impact of the various strategic
approaches on the ability of the Joint Force to achieve military and strategic
objectives.
• Institutional factors assess the impact of the various strategic approaches on the
Army across the entire force, not just in Europe.
• Environmental factors assess the sensitivity of the various strategic approaches to
possible changes in the operational, strategic, and political environment.
Within these categories, the study team developed 17 criteria and risk factors intended
to provide a comprehensive assessment that includes the strategic (S), operational (O),
institutional (I), and environmental factors (E) of any given force posture. Eight of these
criteria and risk factors were selected to influence the force posture recommendation.
S1. The ability to defeat, and thereby credibly deter, Russian armed conflict directed
against a NATO ally at acceptable cost. This achieves policy aim while avoiding
Pyrrhic victory.
S2. The ability to effectively compete below armed conflict with Russia.
S3. The extent to which force posture provides escalation advantage and stability in
a crisis by allowing decisionmakers on both sides the opportunity and time for
restraint but does not force them into making escalatory decisions early in a crisis,
and avoids the 1914 syndrome.
S4. The extent to which force posture provokes Russian political and military reactions
without the ability for policymakers to adjust subsequently as necessary.
S5. The extent to which the force posture enhances the overall political cohesion
of NATO and leads to increased political will and military capabilities of
individual Allies.
I1. The degree to which the force posture impacts Army global readiness and
force generation.
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I2. The likely response from the various components, other services, the Department
of Defense (DoD), Congress, or Allies and the degree to which negative responses
can prevent successful implementation.
E1. The extent to which the force posture is vulnerable to a significant reduction in
future defense budgets, forcing a future Secretary of the Army to choose between
breaking the strategy and breaking the army.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal investigators recommend invest in a multidomain alliance. As the name
suggests, this strategic approach enables the Joint Force and multinational partners to
maximize their capabilities. It makes best use of the Army’s top modernization priority
(long-range fires) in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially
catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this
strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in
having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension.
As opposed to build visible presence, it also incentivizes allies to invest more by showing
US resolve but in a manner that does not replicate capabilities that they can provide.
Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later buildup of
heavy forces if conditions still warrant.
Three alternative conditions worth noting would lead to the adoption of the other
strategic approaches.
1. If the combination of the other 1+3 threats (China, North Korea, Iran, violent
extremist organizations) far outweigh that of Russia. In this instance, privilege
global competition provides maximum flexibility to respond to those other threats.
This strategic approach competed so well because it is the closest to the current
force posture, which is the product of an array of pressures, most of which still
exist. This “status quo plus” option places a higher emphasis on institutional
sustainability and satisfying multiple demands.
2. If there is a high likelihood that defense budgets will significantly decline
in the next several years. Privilege armed conflict was eliminated as an option
because it was deemed too difficult to implement so much in a short time. But
this strategic approach becomes viable if there is only a short window to achieve
(or at least initiate) significant change. In that case, the Army loses nothing by
trying to accomplish as much as possible. Moreover, as the option with the lowest
sustaining cost, it would continue to provide the greatest strategic and operational
effect over time.
3. If there is a high likelihood of war with China. Invest in a multidomain alliance is
a multidomain solution that seeks to enable the remainder of the Joint Force. But
there would be little air and naval capability to enable in case of a war with China.
In that scenario, it would be best to have the strongest possible presence of ground
maneuver forces to maintain a credible deterrent against Russian opportunism.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
SCOPE AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
In August 2018, then-Secretary of the Army Mark Esper directed the US Army War
College to make recommendations regarding what US Army force posture, capabilities,
footprint, and command and control structure in Europe were necessary to meet the
objectives identified in the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) by 2028. In addition to aligning this study with key documents such as the Army
Vision, Army Strategy, Army Modernization Strategy, and The US Army in Multi-Domain
Operations, 2028, the decade-long time horizon had two principal benefits. The first was
to focus the study on specific, actionable recommendations. Overseas force posture is
one of the most enduring—and difficult to alter—elements of Army structure; for results
to be realized by 2028, work must begin now.
Yet at the same time, a great deal can change within nine years. If one looks back over
the previous 10 years, much has changed in terms of US policy, the outlook of allies,
the actions of competitors, and the trajectory of military developments. The aim point
of 2028 forced the team to grapple with the implications of a wide range of plausible
futures in the geostrategic, political, military, and technological environment. The ideal
force posture needs to be adaptive enough to remain viable despite these potential
swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. Put differently,
the challenge of developing force posture is to develop one solution that might
be put to the test by a range of different possible futures. Preparing for a range of
possible futures led the team to favor adaptability and resilience along with strategic
and operational effect. In an era of upheaval, the Army cannot afford to stake its utility
to the nation on a force posture that can be rendered obsolete by a single budget, new
technology, or foreign election.
By taking this conceptual approach, the group consciously adopted the metaphor
of a projected storm track of a hurricane; the focus on 2028 forced the team to deal
with a large cone of unpredictability. This approach is in contrast to the alternative
approach of forecasting a single future and then designing a force posture optimized
to that prediction. In an era of political and technological upheaval, others might feel
confident enough to commit billions of dollars, thousands of troops, and, perhaps most
importantly, the credibility of the United States on the accuracy of their foresight. Our
group did not. If anything, the “stickiness” of force posture—commitments tend to
persist for decades, long past their initial rationale—suggests that, if anything, 2028 is
too close a time horizon. The study team, therefore, sought to account for a range of
future possibilities.
STRATEGIC FOUNDATION: NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY
The task of accounting for an uncertain future was made easier by the solid
foundation of unusually specific strategies and concepts, genres that all too often default
to amorphous generality. Though, undoubtedly, US policy and the US way of war
will change with time, current plans at least provide a fixed point from which to shift.
1

The starting point for this study is the unclassified summary of the NDS (any future
reference to the NDS in this report will be a reference to the unclassified summary of
the NDS, referenced above). As outlined in the unclassified summary of that document,
the Department of Defense (DoD) is reorienting toward long-term strategic competition
with China and Russia. One central element of this shift is the development of a lethal,
agile, and resilient force posture capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating armed
aggression, while also enabling effective competition below armed conflict.
European force posture, however, cannot be viewed in isolation. The NDS also
states the need for increased global strategic flexibility and freedom of action through
dynamic force employment. The first assumption of this report is that these three
imperatives—roughly stated as the ability to fight wars, the ability to provide useful
options for policymakers outside of traditional armed conflict, and the need to preserve
institutional flexibility—will all continue to be valid nonnegotiable requirements. These
trade-offs, of course, have been the case throughout the history of the United States, and
will likely continue. Past attempts to simplify strategic calculations by disavowing one
of these imperatives has always proved untenable in the end. Typically, this mistake
has featured a desire to withdraw solely into conventional state-on-state conflict, though
calls to concentrate solely on counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, coercive diplomacy,
or some other “war of the future” type are equally misguided. Conventional force is too
tightly bound into the fabric of US diplomatic and informational power, and the risks
of failure too great for any policymaker to accept. Similarly, however urgent any threat
seems in the moment, policymakers must hedge against a range of threats as well as
preserve long-term institutional health; both of these requirements favor retaining forces
in the United States.
To visualize the requirement to account for all three imperatives, the study team
developed the triangular graphic depicted in figure 1. To be acceptable, any strategic
approach must fall within the boundaries, yet there is room for variation within that
space. One strategic approach might privilege one apex or axis over another.
Competition below
Armed Conflict

Armed Conflict

Global Operating Model/
Dynamic Force Employment

Figure 1. Conceptual diagram of strategic trade-offs
To emphasize this last point, figure 1 is not meant to imply that the three imperatives
are mutually exclusive. In fact, given sufficient resources, all are equally achievable. But
the study found no time in the past when national priorities did not require some tradeoff. Thus, the ability to rapidly deploy forces, for instance, is the essence of dynamic
2

force employment but it also has significant benefits for the ability to conduct armed
conflict or competition below armed conflict. Two factors, however, do necessitate some
strategic trade-offs between these imperatives.
The first factor is the nature of the Russian threat. As we will discuss at greater length
in the next chapter, the most likely geographic area for armed conflict is the Baltic region
while the most likely areas for competition below armed conflict are the Balkan, Black
Sea, and Caucasus regions. These probabilities do not, of course, preclude competition
in the Balkans, Black Sea, and Caucasus from escalating into conflict or assume no
competition below armed conflict in the Baltic states. Any posture will require investment
in infrastructure to permit Army forces to respond where required, whether in response
to conflict or competition below armed conflict. Included in that investment should be
command and control relationships that allow a US Army headquarters to incorporate
Allied and partner forces.
Thus, depending on how one weights the importance and likelihood of those missions,
it will naturally lead to a different balance of geographic emphasis. Furthermore, there
is a tension in the types of forces that are necessary. Armored brigade combat teams
(ABCTs) have a role in competition below armed conflict and special operations forces
have a role in armed conflict. But neither is the most critical capability for each respective
mission set. When combined with the downward pressure on overseas force posture
exerted by dynamic force employment, there are some difficult decisions to be made
between the two.
The second factor is the nature of ground forces. Though air and maritime forces are
certainly not immune from the tyranny of geography, in a mature theater like Europe,
air forces in particular can quickly redeploy from elsewhere. Army forces are far more
difficult and time-consuming to deploy. Consequently, the Army faces the most acute
tensions between positioning forces where they are combat credible and maintaining
strategic flexibility.
OPERATIONAL FOUNDATION: MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS AND
ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE CONCEPTS
By necessity, any recommendations for force posture in 2028 require a firm grasp
of Army capabilities and methods at that time, plus some idea of the relative strengths
and weaknesses of this future force in comparison to adversaries. Fortunately, the
Army recently published two concepts that provide such a foundation: The US Army in
Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 and the Echelons above Brigade Concept. As concepts, they
are neither policy nor doctrine. Some of the organizations and capabilities described
within those documents will emerge in different form, while others might never be
fielded. Nonetheless, both concepts were based on extensive analysis, wargaming, and
experimentation. Thus, not only are they the most authoritative statements about how
the US Army will look in 2028, they are also some of the best grounded.
Both Multi-Domain Operations and Echelons above Brigade Concept were published
in late 2018, which allowed them to incorporate the strategic direction given in the
NDS and the Army Vision. Indeed, they can be regarded as the Army’s first draft of an
operational vision to realize the NDS. This nesting is essential for this study because
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the use of multidomain operations (MDO) as a basis ensures that any recommendations
are complementary to the line of direction being pursued by the other services and also
ensures the findings fit within the policy framework governing the US relationships
with Allies and partners. It is a simple truth that any recommendations regarding US
Army posture that do not take into account the Joint and multinational context would be
entirely useless. Undoubtedly, US policy will evolve over the next decade. Nonetheless,
the NDS provides an anchoring point to describe the framework within which the Army
must work to achieve strategic objectives. For the reasons described above, this study
will assess the various options in light of their vulnerability to change, but those “what
ifs” will proceed from the common basis of the NDS.
For the purposes of this study, one of the most important ideas contained in MDO is
calibrated force posture, a broad term that goes far beyond the mere matching of units to
installations. Instead, calibrated force posture is the combination of capacity, capability,
position, and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances. As such, it necessarily
includes consideration of such elements as authorities and access, the balance of
capabilities across the Total Army, unit readiness, and strategic transportation networks
and an enemy’s ability to interdict them. Thus, the question directed by the Secretary of
the Army is essentially to define calibrated force posture in greater detail and within the
specific context of Europe in 2028.
Though compliant with the NDS and explicitly written to address the challenges of
China and Russia, MDO is also the Army Operating Concept. Its purpose is to provide
a generalized description of future operational methods and structures to guide force
development. It therefore does not incorporate some considerations that are outside of
the purview of concepts but that are essential to strategy, such as shocks that would
alter its underlying assumptions, the reactions of adversaries, long-term institutional
sustainability, the domestic political concerns of allies, or the effect of the concept on
crisis stability. Concept writers deliberately exclude these considerations from their
processes so they might develop the optimal operational solution to a problem.
The US Army War College is the right institution to build upon that operational
analysis, filtering it through the lenses of policy and strategy to determine in what ways
purely military solutions must be modified to achieve national aims in a real-world
setting. Therefore, this study is a link in a larger dialogue between the DoD and the
US Army. The Army took the NDS and developed MDO as a description of how that
strategic guidance would translate into operational approaches. This study examines
those solutions to make recommendations regarding European force posture; to inform
the Army’s input to DoD on how the NDS might need to be modified and its input to the
other services to give them further details regarding the Army’s path; and to inform the
continued evolution of the Army’s MDO concept.
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
The study team drew on a wide array of sources. The literature review included
official documents, classified and unclassified, as well as a large and diverse sample
of the considerable open-source commentary on various aspects of future Army force
structure. The team consulted with relevant offices within the Office of the Secretary of
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Defense, the Joint Staff, the Department of the Army, US European Command (EUCOM),
and US Army Europe. Additionally, team members drew on a number of external experts
from think tanks in Washington, DC, and London, as well as many allies. Naturally, the
findings and recommendations in this work are the sole responsibility of the study team.
No entity outside of the US Army War College was asked to endorse or sanction any
part of this study.
The study is organized in six chapters, including this introduction. The second and
third chapters provide an overview of political and military trends in Russia and the
remainder of Europe, respectively. The fourth chapter examines the likely state of US
military capabilities in 2028, paying particular attention to the most important elements
of force posture. These discrete elements (called force posture levers within this study)
can be arranged in many different combinations. The fifth chapter is the heart of the
study: It begins by identifying five different strategic approaches that combine these
levers into internally coherent packages. The fifth chapter then offers a list of potential
decision criteria and risk factors by which the strategic approaches can be evaluated. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the study team’s recommendation, but we do not
regard this bottom-line answer as the most important element of the study. Instead, the
real value is the identification of the difficult trade-offs within the strategic approaches
combined with the framework for decision embodied within the decision criteria and
risk factors. The sixth chapter offers some final thoughts on immediate consequences
and suggestions for further work. Appendices one through four provide a detailed
explanation of the strategic approaches and criteria so that others can better assess, and
hopefully improve upon, the study team’s work. Lastly, the final appendix provides a
background of the principal investigators and the contributing researchers of this study.
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CHAPTER 2. A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA IN 2028
The year 2019 may mark the lowest point for Russo-American relations since the fall
of the Soviet Union. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, ongoing support to secessionists in
the Donets Basin region of Ukraine, disruptive cyber activities, support for President
Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and recent military posturing have made talk of a
“reset” in Russo-American relations seem at best naïve. Russia appears to be rejecting
the post-World War II order in favor of a “great-power politics” that emphasizes—
echoing Thucydides—”fear, honor, and interest.”1 One should not be surprised then that
the United States’ 2017 National Security Strategy labels Russia a “revisionist power” and
a “rival” determined to “shift regional balances of power in their favor.”2 Moreover, the
2018 NDS states that Russia and China “want to shape a world consistent with their
authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic,
and security decisions.”3 In 2018, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, then-commander of
EUCOM, described Russia as determined to “destabilize regional security and disregard
international norms.”4
Russia’s revisionism, however, does not fully account for its aggressive behavior.
Like any country, Russia seeks security, prosperity, and influence. Russia’s sense of
security—or perhaps more accurately sense of insecurity—is deeply rooted in its historical exposure to outside invasion, and has been reinforced by NATO expansion and
the emergence of color revolutions5 that threaten Moscow’s influence in its near abroad.
See appendix 4 for a more comprehensive account of Russian history’s influence on
its foreign policy.6 These physical security concerns threaten Russia’s sense of its own
civilization and plays on cultural notions of honor that are deeply felt by the Russian
population. As a result, political assassination attempts, reckless military flybys, declarations to protect the Russian diaspora, inter-theater missile launches, and other micro-aggressions are often welcomed by Russian citizens and serve to bolster President Putin’s
domestic standing.
1. Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard
Crawley, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free Press, 1996), 43.
2. Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The
White House, 2017).
3. James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary
of Defense, 2018).
4. Hearing to Receive Testimony on the United States European Command in Review of the Defense Authorization
Request for Fiscal Year 2019 and the Future Years Defense Program, before the United States Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 115th Cong. (March 8, 2018) (statement of General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA).
5. Darya Korsunskaya, “Putin Says Russia Must Prevent ‘Color Revolution,’” Reuters, November
20, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-security-idUSKCN0J41J620141120; and Neil
MacFarquhar, “Vladimir Putin, in First Remarks on Russian Protests, Warns of Potential Chaos,” New York
Times, March 30, 2017.
6. Korsunskaya, “Putin Says.”
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Such actions, of course, are not simply for public consumption, but also serve specific interests. Prime among those is the establishment of an exclusive military, political,
and economic sphere of influence that includes the former Soviet states.7 This exclusion
means Russia will perceive political and economic ties with the West as a threat. Moreover, Moscow seeks to maintain its status as a “global player with global influence.”8
These two overarching interests combined necessarily entail minimizing the influence
of the United States and other Western powers, especially in Russia’s near abroad, and
elsewhere, like Syria, where Russia also has interests.9
Russia’s perspective is in large part a reaction to perceived encroachment by the
West, especially the United States. In the mind of Putin’s Secretary of the Security
Council, the United States attempted to “redesign the post-Soviet space in America’s
interests.” In Russia’s worldview, “the US created the conditions and pretexts for the
color revolutions and financed them lavishly,” with Secretary of the Security Council
of Russia Nikolai Patrushev listing US Agency for International Development (USAID),
Department of State, and Pentagon contributions to Ukraine totaling $5 billion over the
last two decades.10 Of course, this view ignores the fact these revolutions and the spread
of Western influence is also a function of Russia’s oppressive history. Despite this blind
spot, Russia’s pursuit of its interests is in general “fundamentally rational and devoid of
eccentricity.”11 Russian military expert and Center for a New American Security analyst
Michael Kofman describes Russian strategy as “reasonable sufficiency,” investing minimum power to achieve maximum strategic goals. Russia’s recent history in Afghanistan
and the collapse of the Soviet Union drives a “healthy fear of commitment that could
result in overextension, quagmires, and offer opportunities for opponents to counter.”12
The fact that Russia prefers to measure its responses should not obscure the seriousness with which they view the West as a threat. Responding to “democratization”
initiatives that are funded by the USAID, US Department of State, and pro-democracy
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the 2016 Russian National Security Strategy
accused the United States of hubris and ill-intended consequences: “instead of democracy and progress, there is now violence, poverty, social disasters, and total disregard
7. Robert Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” in “Russian Strategic Intentions”
(white paper, US Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], September 25, 2019), 8; and Raphael
S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 5–8.
8. Person, “Russian Grand Strategy,” 9.
9. Person, “Russian Grand Strategy,” 11.
10. Nikolai Patrushev, “Ukraine Crisis—The View from Russia,” Guardian, October 25, 2014, https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war, quoted in Matthew Olson,
Deterrence and Reassurance in the Baltics—A Balanced Approach, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: US Army War College, April 1, 2018), 15, http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3586.pdf;
and Peter Conradi, Who Lost Russia?: How the World Entered a New Cold War (London: Oneworld, 2017), 167.
11. Gleb Pavlovsky, “Russian Politics under Putin,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2016, 10.
12. Michael Kofman, “A Comparative Guide to Russia’s Use of Force: Measure Twice, Invade
Once,” War on the Rocks, February 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/a-comparative
-guide-to-russias-use-of-force-measure-twice-invade-once/.
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for human rights.”13 In each case—not to mention the 2003 Iraq invasion—Putin and
many other Russian statesmen believe the American role in bringing down sovereign
governments as a form of either malign statecraft or ignorant blunders. Seventeen years
removed from the 9/11 attacks, Russia sees Western attempts to spread its version of liberal democracy and free market principles as actions that undermine Russia’s economic
and security interests within its historical sphere of influence and, more importantly, its
own domestic context.14
General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation
Armed Forces, has described this kind of “hybrid warfare” as a US and NATO strategy of using military force to promote economic interests “under the slogan of protecting democracy or instilling democratic values in some country.” Gerasimov further
described “nonmilitary forms” of confrontation “shifting in the direction of extensive
employment of political, economic, diplomatic, information, and other nonmilitary
measures, implemented with the involvement of the protest potential of a population.”
Gerasimov proposed that Russia implement “new-type warfare” (now known as the
“Gerasimov doctrine” by Western analysts) as a response to US confrontations below the
threshold of armed conflict.15
Russia also faces a growing Islamic threat from abroad and within, which it sometimes accuses the West of exacerbating. In his 2015 UN speech, Putin acknowledged the
mistakes of past Soviet dogma, stating, “We remember examples from our Soviet past,
when the Soviet Union exported social experiments, pushing for changes in other countries for ideological reasons, and this often led to tragic consequences and caused degradation instead of progress” and then noted the United States was “equally irresponsible”
for manipulating Islamic extremist groups to achieve political goals.16
From Moscow’s perspective, radical Islam threatens “the very integrity of the Russian state.”17 This sentiment is of course exacerbated by the secessionist movement in
largely Muslim Chechnya, where between 10,000 and 15,000 Russians have died fighting
two wars since 1994. Moreover, through immigration (both legal and illegal) and a high
birthrate (relative to Slavs), Russia’s Muslim population has grown 40 percent since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, now representing 15 percent of the total Russian population. In 1990, Russia had 500 mosques, compared to 8,000 in 2008. By some estimates,

13. Vladimir Putin, Russian National Security Strategy (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, December 31,
2015).
14. Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy” (speech, Munich Security
Conference, Munich, February 10, 2007).
15. Valery Gerasimov, “Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country,”
trans. Harold Orenstein, Military Review 97, no. 6 (November–December 2017).
16. Vladimir Putin, “Address to the UN General Assembly” (speech, UN Headquarters, New York,
NY, September 28, 2015).
17. Ilan Berman, Implosion: The End of Russia and What it Means for America (Washington, DC: Regnery,
2013), 39, quoted in George Michael, “Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?,” Military Review 95, no. 1 (January–
February 2015): 105.
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Russia is on a glide path to be a majority Muslim state by the middle of the century with
significant domestic and geopolitical implications.18
Today, more than 2.5 million Muslims live in Moscow alone, more than any European city other than Istanbul, Turkey, and more than in any other non-Islamic country.19
Fueled by economic stagnation and ethnic isolation, more than a thousand domestic terrorist attacks have occurred in Russia since 2001, which accounts for more than 3,067
civilian deaths.20 In this light, Russia has a vested interest in countering the rise of the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other terrorist groups, and the future of Afghanistan
and Syria (given regional interests, terrorist movements, and refugee migrations that
influence Russia’s border countries and domestic Muslim population).
Based on this analysis, the following general principles will likely guide Russian
behavior over the foreseeable future.
• Russia will seek to maintain “escalatory dominance” over NATO. Part of that dominance will include efforts to undermine Alliance consensus on how to respond to
Russian provocations.
• Because of dwindling resources, Russia desires de-escalation and armament
reduction. A decrease in oil revenues will negatively impact Moscow’s military
modernization and capacity building efforts.
• Russia is unlikely to conduct further offensive conventional military attacks into
neighboring states unless Kremlin leaders perceive a competitive buildup of US
or international NATO forces that threatens Russian conventional defensive overmatch or the persecution of ethnic Russians in border areas.
• Russia desires removal of sanctions and greater economic inclusion with the West.
• Russia will not return Crimea to Ukraine and will continue support to separatists
in Georgia and the Donets Basin.
• Moscow will continue influence operations below the threshold of armed conflict
to destabilize NATO relationships and protect Russia’s economic interests.
• Russia will try to increase engagement with the United States and will assume the
worst if faced with an unpredictable large-scale NATO buildup on its periphery.
• Future admissions to NATO for states in Russia’s near abroad will likely be met
with aggression.
EVOLUTION OF RUSSIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES
The evolution of Russian military capabilities through 2028 will largely depend on
how the Kremlin addresses the impact of the country’s limited economy and dwindling
manpower pool on military readiness. The Russian military today is a fragment of the
armed forces of the former Soviet Union and is unlikely to return to such a status in the
next decade. Although it has largely retained Soviet-era nuclear capabilities, the Russian

18. Michael, “Greater Russia,” 104.
19. Michael, “Greater Russia,” 104.
20. “Russian Terrorism Database,” Global Terrorism Tracker online, CHC Global & Start, accessed
January 4, 2019, http://globalterrorismdatabase.com/rf/rfexcel.html.
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military struggles with conducting sustained global power projection operations.21 But
Russia’s investment and development of new military capabilities, specifically cyber and
integrated combined arms operations, do provide it with a wide aperture for competing
below the level of armed conflict as well as conducting limited offensive military operations. Should Russia continue to refine its military capabilities, it will become a more
dynamic adversary, capable of effectively challenging NATO and the United States at
levels below armed conflict while providing scalable opportunities at levels above.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FUTURE RUSSIAN FORCE
Russia’s economic limitations will restrict what capabilities it will be able to develop
and field. Domestically, Russia is a nation in relative economic decline.22 In 2016, Russian defense spending was 4.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) or $60.83 billion
(USD). But the impact of Western sanctions and low oil prices forced Russian leaders to
reduce defense spending to 3.1 percent or $42.28 billion (USD).23 In comparison, the US
spent $600 billion in 2016 and China $228 billion (both USD); for China, that represented
1.9 percent of GDP.24
The impact of US and EU sanctions and Russia’s current economic conditions are
much debated. Russia is financially and politically isolated from EU and Western markets, limiting foreign capital investment opportunities abroad. Oil and gas exports were
temporarily disrupted due to Western companies pulling out of shared development
plans and denied extraction equipment and parts that were being imported from the
West. Despite an overall 24 percent decline in energy infrastructure investments due to
the drop in oil prices, imports of specialized extraction equipment from Western companies dropped by 50 percent, while Chinese imports rose by 8 percent.25 This disruption represented a loss for both Russia and those companies, which were responsible
for more than 26 percent of extraction.26 Some indicators suggest the country’s economic
plight, specifically price increases and unemployment, rank far higher as a concern for
the Russian public than restricted political freedoms. A recent Levada Center Poll indicated that economic concerns ranked highest among the population, specifically, price
increases (62 percent), poverty (44 percent), and unemployment (36 percent). Civil rights
21. Adam Taylor, “How Scary is Putin’s Russia Compared to the Soviet Union? This Chart Has some
Answers,” Washington Post, March 14, 2014.
22. Andrew Movchan, Decline, Not Collapse: The Bleak Prospects for Russia’s Economy (Moscow, Russia:
Carnegie Moscow Center, February 2017), 1–2.
23. “Russian Military Budget,” GlobalSecurity, updated February 12, 2019, https://www
.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-budget.htm.
24. “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?,” ChinaPower, October 9, 2018, https://
chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/.
25. Richard Connolly, “The Empire Strikes Back: Economic Statecraft and the Securitisation of Political
Economy in Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 4 (June 2016): 750–773; and Robert Blackwill and Jennifer
M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016), 167.
26. Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference.”
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and democratic freedoms were comparatively low at 6 percent.27 Most tellingly, Russia’s
growth rate in 2017 measured 173rd in the world. Russia’s growth rate plummeted from
its 7 percent, 10-year spike, to a negative 0.2 percent growth rate in 2016 before inching
back into a positive 1.5 percent growth rate in 2017.28 Russia’s GDP growth for 2019 is
1.2 percent.29 Military spending appears to be in comparable decline from its 2015 peak
of 5.4 percent of GDP, notably with 60.5 percent of that dedicated to procurement and
research and development.30
Though it is currently stagnant, Russia’s economy appears stable. Russia’s GDP purchasing power parity ranks 6th in the world and Russia’s $35 billion current account
balance is 11th in the world, on this measure, the United States ranks dead last given its
deficit of $449 billion.31 In 2017, Russia’s national debt as a percentage of GDP was 12.6
percent with a $103 billion trade surplus compared to an EU average debt percentage of
81.6 percent.32 Russia’s two largest income earners have been largely unaffected. Oil revenue accounts for over half of Russia’s economy, with 20 percent of its budget originating from European oil and natural gas sales, and Russian energy exports remain critical
to Europe with Germany importing half of its gas from Russia.33 Russia continues to be
the world’s second largest arms and munitions exporter.34
Ironically, the long-term effect of Western imposed economic sanctions could potentially strengthen Russia’s domestic economy and drive it closer to China. Russia has
turned east for Western import substitutions and has made modest improvements in its
domestic agricultural and manufacturing industries.35 Additionally, the sanctions have
provided Putin a convenient and timely external scapegoat. As noted by Richard Connolly, a British expert on Russia’s political economy, “Instead of causing elite dissatisfaction, elite cohesion appeared to have strengthened. And instead of imposing significant
economic pain, sanctions merely gave the leadership a convenient alibi for what was
already a poorly performing economy.”36
27. “The Most Alarming Problems,” Yuri Levada Analytical Center, March 14, 2019, https://www
.levada.ru/en/2019/03/14/the-most-alarming-problems-2/.
28. “Russia,” The World Factbook, CIA, accessed March 3, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library
/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
29. World Bank Group, Russia Economic Report: Weaker Global Outlook Sharpens Focus on Domestic
Reforms, 42nd ed. (Washington, DC: World Bank, December 2019), https://www.worldbank.org
/en/country/russia/publication/rer.
30. Connolly, “Empire Strikes Back,” 756.
31. “Russia,” The World Factbook.
32. Allen C. Lynch, “What Russia Will Be,” American Interest, October 25, 2018.
33. Connolly, “Empire Strikes Back”; Lynch, “What Russia Will Be”; and Andrew Holland, “What
Trump Should Have Told Germany about Russian Gas,” Politico, July 11, 2018.
34. Connolly, “Empire Strikes Back,” 756.
35. Connolly, “Empire Strikes Back,” 762.
36. Connolly, “Empire Strikes Back,” 769.
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In summary, Russia’s economy has gone through multiple phases, generally aligned
with the last three decades: a near collapse from 1989 to 1998, unprecedented growth
from 1998 to 2008, a relative slowdown toward decline during the years 2009 through
2014, and a stable but fragile existence since 2014. Currently, Russia works to diversify
its import economy, strengthen its domestic agricultural and manufacturing base, and
diversify from an overreliance on the volatile energy and defense sectors. Health care,
infrastructure, and information technologies continue to sag, and inflation and unemployment are slowly increasing. Russia’s economy has trended positively and negatively
with oil prices, but a domestic budget surplus and state reserves have given Putin monetary tools to keep inflation under control. Russia is weaker and less apt to enact export
bans, and Putin most likely cannot absorb much more economic pressure without considerable domestic unrest. Military investments have likely plateaued, leaving Russia
challenged to maintain its current military capacity and unlikely to expand it. Declining
oil prices forced Russia to shelve plans for a long-term expansion of its armed forces in
2014.37 Kofman has observed that Russia is not creating a large reserve of the type that
would be necessary for a foreign occupation.38 What’s more, Russian advancements in
ground force systems have not materialized in large-scale production. Despite proclamations in 2016 to purchase 2,300 T-14 Armata main battle tanks, the tank is just past
prototype development, and the Russian industrial base will most likely not be able to
produce the desired numbers. In fact, Russia’s “New Look” reform is focused on optimizing the Russian army for local and limited conflicts in post-Soviet space, not largescale conflict against NATO.39
If it continues along its current trajectory, Russia’s economic decline will negatively
impact military reforms in the next 10 years, despite serious and significant efforts to
modernize the force. On the land component, the Russian military has been working to
modernize its force with the intent of increasing its lethality and survivability. By developing better long-range conventional strike capabilities, integrated fire control systems,
and better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, Russia seeks to
acquire a faster, more lethal “kill chain.”40 Russia has also been addressing command and
control shortfalls, seeking a Unified Information Space (defined as “enhanced military
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (C4ISR) to enable centralized command and control within a military
37. Lynch, “What Russia Will Be.”
38. Michael Kofman, “Permanently Stationing US Forces in Poland Is a Bad Idea, but One
Worth Debating,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10
/permanently-stationing-u-s-forces-in-poland-is-a-bad-idea-but-one-worth-debating/.
39. Dave Majumdar, “Russia’s Armata: The Super Tank Coming in Tiny Numbers
with No Real Enemy to Fight,” National Interest, November 14, 2017, https://
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-armata-the-super-tank-coming-tiny-numbers
-no-real-23195; and Andrew Osborn, “Despite Putin’s Swagger, Russia Struggles to Modernize
Its Navy,” Reuters, February 21, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military
-insight/despite-putins-swagger-russia-struggles-to-modernize-its-navy-idUSKCN1QA0U7?utm
_source=applenews.
40. Scott Boston and Dara Massicot, The Russian Way of Warfare: A Primer (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation, 2017), 6–7.
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‘unified space’ integrated into a larger government ‘unified information space’”),41 and
has increased integration of air defense systems within its formations.42 Directly related
to landpower, Russia has begun to develop new-generation armored systems, such as
the T-14 Armata, which are superior in a number of ways to current versions of the
American M1 tank.43
Moreover, the current projection for land component manpower available to Russia
in 2028 also indicates the potential decline in human capital available for military service.
According to the Finnish Defence Research Agency, “The lack and quality of human
resources are among the key problems facing the Russian armed forces. It is expected
that the number of working age males in the population aged 15–59 will gradually
decline from 44 million in 2014 to under 37 million in 2035.”44 Russia is working diligently on improving the image of the armed forces as well as adjusting age and fitness
standards to address the predicted shortfalls in available military manpower.45 Russian
estimates vary widely, but there were approximately 425,000 contracted soldiers in 2018
as opposed to only 300,000 in 2015.46
Maintaining a larger number of contract soldiers will require a significant sustained
investment in personnel that will also detract resources from its already shrinking military budget. Priority, however, will be likely given to the Western Military District,
though at the expense of units in other districts where the perceived threat is lower.
To overcome some of these manpower concerns, the Military Industrial Commission of Russia (MICR) is trying to leverage artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and
intends to have 30 percent of its combat power be remote-controlled or autonomous by
2030.47 Russia spends $12.5 million a year in AI research compared to $7.4 billion for the
United States and China’s $3 billion.48 Although Russia has a limited ability to invest
in AI, Moscow will likely pursue selective conventional military and defense technologies where they could hold a competitive advantage over the United States and low-cost
41. Dave Johnson, Russia’s Approach to Conflict–Implications for NATO’s Deterrence and Defence, NDC
Research Papers Series, no. 111 (Rome: NATO Defence College, April 2015), 4.
42. Boston and Massicot, Russian Way of Warfare, 7.
43. Kris Osborn, “Tank Fight: Russia’s Killer T-14 Armata Tank vs. America’s M1 Abrams
(Who Wins?),” Buzz (blog), National Interest, October 13, 2018, https://nationalinterest
.org/blog/buzz/tank-fight-russias-killer-t-14-armata-tank-vs-americas-m1-abrams-who-wins-33431.
44. Arseniy Svynarenko, The Russian Demography Problem and the Armed Forces: Trends and Challenges
until 2035 [in Finnish], Publication 6/2016 (Riihimäki, Finland: Finnish Defence Research Agency, 2016), 76.
45. Svynarenko, Russian Demography Problem, 79–80.
46. Scott Boston et al., Preparing for Near-Peer Conflict on the Ground: Comparing US and Russian
Conventional Ground Combat Capability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 154.
47. Greg Allen and Taniel Chang, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, 2017), 21.
48. Julian E. Barnes and Josh Ching, “The New Arms Race in AI,” Wall Street Journal,
March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; and Alina
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asymmetric warfare to correct the imbalance between Russia and the West in the conventional domain. Much of this technology will support low-cost asymmetric measures
associated with information operations, as well as intelligence collection and analysis,
for which the United States and NATO are not well-prepared.49 What is not clear is, even
if they can acquire the technology, the Russian military will not be able to field it over
the next 10 years.
These points suggest that while the Russians will be able to concentrate highly capable forces in relatively small areas as well as compensate for conventional shortcomings, they will be challenged to sustain long-term operations across a broad front or
respond to geographically dispersed threats. Given the combination of economic and
demographic factors, we expect the following five trends will impact the development of
Russian landpower.
• First, the land component will be approximately the same size as today, which is
about 771,000 active personnel, or perhaps slightly smaller.50
• Second, if current economic conditions remain, Russia’s plan for military modernization will be frustrated. Russia may field improved combat systems, such as the
T-14 or S-400 upgrades, etc.; however, they may not field their desired quantity.
• Third, lack of investment in logistics and mobility systems on the scale required
will leave the Russian army challenged in sustaining combat operations greater
than a few weeks, less in a contested environment.
• Fourth, Russia will adapt to shortcomings in funding by relying on asymmetric
capabilities as well as proxy forces, including contractors. Their nuclear arsenal
will also serve as a means of escalation management, so we would expect them to
consider first use conditions.
• Fifth, Russia will avoid military operations that involve direct armed conflict with
the West. Instead, Russia will focus on informational activities to discredit NATO,
the EU, and member organizations and governments. Examples of these information-based operations include election interference, malign cyber activities, propaganda, and exploiting internal differences.
These limitations will continue to limit Russian adventurism to short-duration events
based on deception and speed in hopes of accomplishing a fait accompli to achieve
national objectives.51 Although Russia is improving its military transportation and infrastructure, the authors estimate that this improvement is unlikely to progress to a point
that allows Russian forces to conduct sustained and prolonged offensive and defensive
operations longer than 8 to 12 weeks against a strong peer competitor, based upon the
buildup for the 7-day Vostok 2018 exercise, the volume of operations, and the conduct

49. Polyakova, Weapons of the Weak.
50. “Russian Armed Forces,” ArmedForces.eu, n.d., https://armedforces.eu/Russia.
51. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
116th Cong. (January 29, 2019) (statement of Elbridge A. Colby, Director of the Defense Program, Center
for a New American Security).
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of the exercise in a permissive environment.52 Russia will maintain a capacity to conduct
limited expeditionary operations on a regional basis, though operations conducted further from Russia are more likely to include Spetsnaz advisors, mercenaries, air support,
and other high-yield/low-density capabilities vice traditional ground troops. Russian
investment in long-range strategic conventional weaponry such as the 9K720 Iskander
with the 9M728 cruise missile, the S-300 with the 9M82MD missile and the S-400 with
the 40N6 missile will serve as a deterrent to offensive operations by an adversary. But
it is unlikely Russia will have the necessary quantity of these systems to prevent a
sustained response.53
HYBRID WAR: OVERCOMING CONVENTIONAL SHORTCOMINGS WITH
NONMILITARY MEANS
Because of these projected conventional military shortcomings, Russia will continue
to rely on and develop nonmilitary means capable of achieving (alone or in concert with
military force) its strategic objectives. These nonmilitary means fall into the broad categories of diplomatic, economic, and informational. The following paragraphs discuss
how Russia employs each of these means to coerce political behavior.
The Diplomatic Instrument of Russia’s National Power
Russian diplomacy is often described as hyperactive, tactically confrontational,
deceptive, and reliant on denial tactics through diplomatic channels.54 This diplomatic
engagement includes ruses and falsehoods, as well as deception campaigns directed at
any entities that can influence the outcome, regardless of whether the entities are directly
involved in the competition. Russia targets its adversaries with these tactics, as well as
sometimes targeting neutral countries and even its own allies.55
Across Eurasia, Russia relies heavily on diplomatic means to two broad ends. First,
it aims to gain influence among former Soviet republics (for example, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan). Second, Russia attempts to destabilize its near
abroad and create weak or failed states where its neighbors are attempting to align more
closely with the West. Through these tactics, Russia seeks to achieve political capture of
foreign governments through diplomatic channels.56 In doing so, the Kremlin erodes
democratic establishments, manipulates state entities, and appeals to corrupt officials in
52. “Breaking Down Russia’s Vostok Exercise,” War on the Rocks, September 25, 2018, https://
warontherocks.com/2018/09/breaking-down-russias-vostok-exercise/.
53. Boston and Massicot, Russian Way of Warfare, 4.
54. Hiski Haukkala and Nicu Popescu, “Introduction: Russian Futures,” in Russian Futures: Horizon
2025, ed. Haukkala and Popescu, Report no. 26 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, March
2016), 7.
55. Picard578, “Surprise and Deception in War (Carl von Clausewitz Expanded),” Defense Issues:
Military and General Security (blog), September 17, 2018, https://defenseissues.net/2018/09/17
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Europe (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2016), 2.
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influential positions. Collectively, these actions subvert national policies and decisions,
and challenge liberal systems from within.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies identified four drivers that foster
Russian political capture. First, Russia sponsors right wing political parties, individuals,
and NGOs to help the leaders of these organizations rise into positions of power and
influence. Second, Russia invests in the media sector to relay misinformation that weakens opponents, improves public sentiment toward the political parties it favors, and
inspires anti-Western sentiment. Third, Russia’s hybrid political regime, characterized
by democratic and predominantly authoritarian traits, inspires other leaders to emulate
it. Finally, the Kremlin backs pro-Russian businessmen to gain political offices.
The Economic Instrument of Russia’s National Power
Russia exerts economic influence over many countries to achieve lasting economic
capture. The Center for Strategic and International Studies analyses of economic data
from 2004 to 2014 show that Russia’s economic footprint in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia,
Serbia, and Slovakia was significant, ranging from 11 to 22 percent of GDP.57 Four factors
emerge that explain how Russia gains influence.
First, corruption is a key enabler. Russian companies thrive in opaque business environments with weak or loosely enforced regulations. All five countries in the Center
for Strategic and International Studies study finished in the bottom half among European countries rated in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2019.58
Second, Russia undermines public opinion and confidence among population segments
that have not benefited from globalization, and this fuels sentiments that Western democratic and economic systems are unviable.59 Third, Russia makes politically motivated
direct investments in key economic sectors such as finance, media, telecommunications,
transportation, and real estate. These investments increase Russian influence among the
policymakers who rely on media, for example, to communicate to the public. Finally,
massive multibillion-dollar Russian business deals offer promises of economic growth
and are powerful means to gain influence and expand corruption.
For example, over the last year the extent to which Russia has used European banks
to launder hundreds of billions of dollars has come to light.60 Baltic banks, particularly in
Estonia and Lithuania, were often the vehicles for deposits of illicit Russian money that
was then transmitted to other financial institutions across Europe. Deutsche Bank alone
has been accused of laundering €160 billion, having acted as a correspondent bank for
Danske Bank’s branch in Estonia from 2007 to 2015.61
57. Conley et al., Kremlin Playbook, xi–xii.
58. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 (Berlin, DE: Transparency
International, January 2020), https://www.transparency.org/cpi2019.
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60. Gregory L. White, “How Europe’s Banks Wound up Laundering Russia’s Money,” Washington
Post, March 6, 2019.
61. Olaf Storbeck, “Deutsche Bank Launches Second Probe into Danske Scandal,” Financial Times,
January 15, 2019.
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Russia also exploits its energy sector for political gain. The oil and natural gas industry is Russia’s biggest at an estimated 16 percent of GDP, and by far comprises its most
significant export.62 The sector is predominantly government-owned, and thus a massive source of government revenue. At the same time, overreliance on energy makes
the Russian economy vulnerable to fluctuating oil prices, as well as to consumer countries opting to purchase energy resources elsewhere if political disagreements culminate. Sanctions that target oil and gas hit Russia hard, at least in the short term, with the
industry rebounding by June 2018 and Moscow’s oil and gas index at an all-time high.63
Low-interest loans are also part of Russia’s economic toolkit. For example, in January 2012 Russia extended a $3.2 billion, below market rate, emergency loan to Cyprus
during its financial crisis when other international creditors refused. In exchange, Russia
apparently sought preferential consideration for rights to tap natural gas reserves off the
coast of Cyprus, enabling them to better control the global supply.64 A similar situation
recurred in 2014, when Greece looked for alternatives to European creditors by initiating
discussions with Russia; this was either a sign of true desperation or very savvy politics.
The move ignited concerns that Russia was incentivizing Greece to reject the EU. Others
considered it a Greek negotiating tactic against European creditors. Although Russian
aid was ultimately not forthcoming, global concerns expanded from focusing on Greek
debt to trepidation about greater Russian geostrategic influence through Greece to sow
EU discord.65
The Information Instrument of Russia’s National Power
In 2014, then-Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Philip Breedlove declared
that Russia was engaged in “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have
ever seen in the history of information warfare.”66 Russia uses disinformation extensively, with Russian meddling becoming a focus of debate in the United States after the
2016 presidential elections, as well as subsequent elections in Europe. Gerasimov himself
expounded the power of information warfare: “The information space opens wide asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy . . . It is necessary
to perfect activities in the information space, including the defense of our own objects.”67
Frequent targets include both NATO Allies and Russia’s neighbors, chiefly to the west.
62. “World Development Indicators: Contribution of Natural Resources to Gross Domestic Product,”
World Bank, 2010, https://databank.worldbank.org/2010Contribution-of-Natural-Resources-to-Gross
-Domestic-Product-of-Russia/id/386d7a9b.
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When Russia moves into a space, it utilizes information warfare and propaganda
to exploit Russian-speaking people and destabilize populations by stoking societal discord.68 The US National Security Strategy points out, “Russia uses information operations
. . . to influence public opinion across the globe. Its influence campaigns blend covert
intelligence operations and false online personas with state-funded media, third-party
intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls.’”69 Through these means, Russia
attacks and undermines views that counter its interests often in subtle ways that leave
people unaware that they are being manipulated.70
A recent RAND study highlighted four characteristics of Russian propaganda. First,
Russian propaganda is high-volume and multichannel. Flooding the internet overwhelms legitimate messages with false ones. This flooding increases the likelihood
that false messages reach people, while also raising perceptions that they are credible.
Second, Russian propaganda is rapid, continuous, and repetitive.71 These characteristics create opportunities for propagandists to form highly resilient first impressions on
people. Furthermore, repeating the same messages through multiple channels increases
people’s familiarity with it, making it appear substantiated. Third, people often misjudge
whether information is false, regularly forget if it is later disproven, are often persuaded
by fake evidence, or are duped by seemingly credible propaganda because it seems to be
communicated in objective ways. Finally, inconsistencies do not constrain Russian propaganda because people tend not to detect them.
The primary channels for Russia’s influence operations are the internet and social
media. Platforms like Facebook are particularly ideal because of the echo chamber effect,
in which users select sources that mirror and amplify their own prejudices.72 The Kremlin employs internet trolls to mass produce misinformation around the clock, spread fake
news, create faux political scandals, and interfere with political processes.73
Russian information warfare is incredibly difficult to counter. Messages consist of
outright fiction or partial truths, which enable Russian propagandists to create false narratives much faster than targets can counter them.74 Disinformation can be produced and
disseminated at great speed from anywhere with an internet connection, and is highly
effective relative to its low cost.
68. Kathleen Hicks et al., Evaluating Future US Army Force Posture in Europe: Phase II Report (Washington,
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For its part, the Kremlin firmly believes that the West, and particularly the United
States, targets Russia through the same means. Russia blames Western misinformation for inciting instability and revolution. Washington think tank the Atlantic Council
points out:
To the Kremlin, Western support of independent media and NGOs caused the revolutions in
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine (twice) as well as the Arab Spring. Especially in the case of
Russia’s near neighbors, pro-democratic revolts were considered anti-Russian at their core. In
other words, the Kremlin believes that but for Western meddling, those uprisings would not have
occurred and neighboring countries would not have pivoted away from Russia.75

These beliefs contribute to the Russian government viewing the US State Department
and USAID as major threats.76
Of course, these measures aren’t exclusively employed at levels below armed conflict. At levels above armed conflict they combine with military measures to overcome
conventional shortcomings and increase the lethality and speed of the force.
COMPETITION AT THE LEVEL OF ARMED CONFLICT: THE GRAY ZONE
Russia’s gray-zone strategies are typically characterized by three features: hybridity,
menace to convention, and risk confusion. Hybridity refers to unique combinations of
methods across instruments of national power and domains. Menace to convention refers
to the character of these hybrid methods that can achieve outcomes that are traditionally
reserved for war.77 Risk confusion then emerges when the hazards associated with action
or inaction appear equally disadvantageous.78 Essentially, effective gray-zone operations
create a security dilemma that transfers the risks of action from the belligerents to the
responder.79 The 2018 seizure of Ukrainian naval assets in the Sea of Azov demonstrates
this security dilemma. Although Russian actions violated international norms, those
actions compel Ukraine to either accept the seizure or risk armed conflict to regain its
personnel and equipment.
In the initial stages of armed conflict, diplomatic efforts and all other levers of
national power would be utilized to their fullest capacity to terminate the conflict as
quickly as possible. Russia will attempt to dominate the information domain for both
its domestic audience and their adversary’s public. Misinformation, deceit, and fiction
will be utilized to create confusion and doubt about the actual circumstances of the conflict to discredit NATO and to highlight how Western actions are violating international
norms. Ultimately, Russia will rely on its military to conduct effective combat operations
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76. Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January–February 2016): 33.
77. Nathan Freier, “The Darker Shade of Gray: A New War Unlike Any Other,” Center
for Strategic and International Studies, July 27, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis
/darker-shade-gray-new-war-unlike-any-other.
78. Freier, “Darker Shade of Gray.”
79. Freier, “Darker Shade of Gray.”
20

to deny Western objectives, while attaining time for the diplomatic, informational, and
economic efforts to influence or end the conflict.
Employing speed and deception will remain key characteristics of Russian warfare, with the goal of fait accompli in hopes of achieving many smaller successes vice a
large overwhelming decisive action. Russians continue to focus on air-ground integration capabilities, which both branches are currently developing. One lesson Russia took
away from the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia was the need for joint operations across the
air and land domains.80 Russia’s movement toward joint air-land operations does have
its limits, and at the tactical level, units will fight similar to today by enforcing speed
and deception.
While a fait accompli may be Russia’s best chance for military success, it is not the
only one. A number of factors, especially Allied political will and mobility, could allow
Russia to defeat NATO forces in combat. Multidomain operations (MDO) facilitate the
prevention of Russian military success by improving the US and participating Allies’
ability to provide a rapid, coordinated response that would buy time for additional US
and Allied forces to arrive. How MDO facilitates that response is considered in chapter 5
and varies by course of action.
At the operational level, Russia will seek to achieve objectives as quickly as possible.
Russia will rapidly emplace anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to shape operations and deter counteroffensives. During a ground combat scenario between Russia
and the West, one can expect Russia to tailor A2/AD systems against Western strengths
such as airpower and command and control capabilities first, and secondly to exploit
Russian advantages of indirect fires over Western forces. Russia will expect the West to
focus heavily on an aerial campaign. Although Russia will try to create parity between
their air forces and that of the West, the gap will remain significant in 2028. Combat
operations near Russian borders will present Western aviation planners with the most
challenging of scenarios. Russia will continue to maintain three significant air defense
rings (Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg, and Moscow), but it should be expected that they will
develop more capabilities in other areas as well, such as in Crimea. For example, in 2018,
the Russian military emplaced four battalions of S-400 systems in Crimea.81 These systems provide Russia with significant A2/AD capabilities that can target up to 36 aircraft
per missile.
Additionally, each S-400 battalion can provide anti-ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. Russia will most likely continue to upgrade its military capabilities in Crimea to
protect the Black Sea Fleet and its southern flank. The Russian goal for its A2/AD capabilities in air defense will be to protect population centers and critical military infrastructure, and to prevent or limit the West’s ability to use its preferred Joint doctrine.
After removing the air-ground integration superiority of the West, Russia will rely
heavily on indirect fires that can range tactical and operational depths. Comparing current organic indirect systems between an American ABCT and a Russian motor rifle
80. Boston and Massicot, Russian Way of Warfare, 3.
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brigade, Russia maintains a sizable overmatch to the United States.82 Russian strategic
fire systems, such as the 9K720 Iskander with cruise missiles, are capable of reaching
deep into the Western rear area with a range of up to 500 kilometers,83 but the number
of available systems will limit what Russia does with the missiles. Russian military commanders will need to be extremely selective in their targeting, focusing on power projection disruption, command and control, and other high value targets.84
Russia will also use electronic warfare to disrupt its adversary’s ability to communicate to disorient the force. Russia will use GPS jammers to disorient and degrade command and control networks and actively jam communication networks. By 2020, the
Russian military will most likely have reequipped and modernized 70 percent of its electronic warfare units.85 Russia will also use the cyber domain to shape the perceptions of
civilian populations, destroy power projection capabilities, target infrastructure, and disrupt network reliability. These activities can be expected to occur in areas inside and outside of contested areas, meaning Russia will target the adversaries’ homeland with these
operations. Scott Boston of RAND notes, “Russian units will not be expected to follow
the same rules in combat as those of Western countries. Their rules of engagement and
potentially their authorities to employ capabilities like offensive cyber tools will be different and likely more permissive to better empower their soldiers to gain an advantage
on the battlefield.”86 This expectation should be applied to nuclear weapons as well.
RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY
With the end of the Cold War in 1989, it is hard to imagine any scenario over the next
decade where either Russia or the United States would rely on nuclear weapons in any
particular conflict. Having said that, Russia’s nuclear arsenal is more diverse than the
United States’ and contains low-yield systems that could find a use if Moscow perceived
the stakes high enough. But the main role for Russia’s nuclear arsenal will be deterrence
and escalation management, which in part depends on there being credible scenarios
that would make their use “rational.” Russia views nuclear weapons as the top tier of
the escalation ladder and would reserve their use until it becomes critical to protect vital
Russian interests.
According to section 20 of the 2014 Russian Federation Military Doctrine, “Russia
reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a use of nuclear weapons or
other weapons of mass destruction against her and (or) her allies, and in a case of aggression against her with conventional weapons that would put in danger the existence of
the state.”87 Section 14 of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine provides some insight
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as to what Russia might perceive as a “danger” to the existence of the state.88 As this
section states, “impeding the operation of systems of state governance and military command and control of the Russian Federation, disruption [of] the functioning of its strategic nuclear forces, missile warning systems, systems of outer space monitoring, nuclear
munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy facilities, nuclear, chemical, pharmaceutical
and medical industry facilities and other potentially dangerous facilities.”89
Three plausible scenarios exist that would lead Russia to employ nuclear weapons.
First, and most obvious, is if Moscow believes a nuclear attack is imminent. In this case,
Russia would act in self-defense and conduct a preemptive nuclear strike. Second, is
the use of nuclear weapons as a tool of escalation management. In this scenario, Russia
may opt to use a low-yield nuclear weapon as a symbol of their resolve. Most likely
this weapon would be employed in a manner that limits the effect of nuclear weapons
such as detonating it in a remote, unpopulated location. More to the point, Russia would
avoid employing nuclear capabilities directly against Western forces or population centers, which risks nuclear escalation.
The third and perhaps most plausbile scenario would be the use of medium- to lowyield nuclear weapons to prevent defeat in an otherwise conventional clash of forces. As
Boston observes, should destruction of the integrated air defense layers arrayed around
Russia’s heartland or Kaliningrad coupled with critical losses, “could also be considered an existential threat to the state.”90 Of course, one cannot know for certain Russia’s
tolerance for collateral harm and risk of nuclear escalation; however, given their stated
policy, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons should not be ruled out.91
CONCLUSION
The following are key takeaways from this analysis:
First, Russia is seeking an alternative to a unipolar world order and the ability to have
privileged influence on its geographical periphery. Competing below the level of armed
conflict and within the gray zone provides Russia with the ability to achieve strategic
objectives without openly conducting warlike acts.92 To achieve its strategic objectives
during competition below armed conflict and gray-zone operations, Russia will have
refined its whole-of-government approach.
Second, the Russian Army is more of a border force than an expeditionary one. The
Russian Army is designed primarily for defensive operations but possesses limited
offensive capability to conduct short-term military operations if required.93 Military
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operations near its borders reduce the logistical requirements for Russia and allow its
armed forces to operate under their already established A2/AD canopy.
Third, Russia will attempt to avoid armed conflict with the West or other near-peer
competitors. If Russia becomes involved in an armed conflict with a peer or near-peer
competitor, the conflict will likely occur in the Russian near abroad, and Russia will seek
favorable war termination expeditiously.
Fourth, Kremlin leaders, based on lessons from the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia
and the 2014 Ukraine crisis, will emphasize the ability to integrate speed and deception into all characteristics of warfare to prevent a rapid collective military response
from the West.
Fifth, Russia will seek to employ capabilities that restrict the military advantages of
the West. Sophisticated and abundant air defense capabilities will limit the West’s ability
to employ our Joint doctrine and fundamentally change the way we fight. Disrupting
the West’s command and control capabilities will reduce their technological advantages.
Information operations will foment dissent and attempt to drive the narrative to break
coalitions and alliances and negatively impact political resolve in the West.
Finally, having a nuclear capability is better than employing it. All phases of competition and interactions with Russia will occur under the shadow of Russia’s nuclear saber
rattling. The ambiguity surrounding Russian nuclear doctrine intentionally leaves open
the potential for Russia to use nuclear weapons for nearly any reason in an armed conflict. Although Moscow would not likely be reckless in the application of nuclear weapons, Kremlin leaders may use these weapons if the conflict is progressing unfavorably
for them in such a way that could lead to an existential threat.
All these key points combined make the Russian military a formidable force when
operating near its borders; however, those advantages will reduce quickly during a sustained conflict or when Russian military forces are required to operate in areas far from
their borders. In 2028, Russia will continue to prefer to compete below armed conflict
and within the gray zone. In these phases, Russia has demonstrated the ability to achieve
objectives relating to national interests without creating an existential threat to itself.
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CHAPTER 3. A STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS
OF EUROPE IN 2028: DEFINING ALLIES AND PARTNERS
Determining the optimal US Army force posture requires a solid contextual understanding of European partners and Allies and their anticipated future defense requirements. The US Army must consider its Allies and partners’ perceived major threats and
the forces and capabilities Allies and partners will deploy to confront these threats. The
United States has three broad means for cooperating with European states on security
matters: NATO, EU partners, and NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). Of course, the
United States is committed to only defending NATO Allies; however, all of these organizations influence US posture and activity on the European continent. The following
paragraphs will describe the basic US relationship with each category of European partner states.
United States European Command (EUCOM) counts 51 countries and territories
inside its area of responsibility and has structured an exceedingly high level of engagement across the region. Through NATO or PfP, EUCOM engages directly with 45 countries, leaving only Cyprus, Israel, and a handful of territories that fall outside of NATO
programs, as displayed in figure 2.
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Figure 2. European engagement1
Generally considered the gold standard of military alliances, NATO has three core
tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security.2 Enshrined in article 5 of the founding treaty, collective defense has been considered the most important of
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/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm; and “Relations with the European Union,” NATO, updated March 23, 2020,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm?.
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the three core tasks for most of NATO’s history; however, from the end of the Cold War
until Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the perceived lack of a military threat to the
Alliance resulted in a shift away from collective defense and toward crisis management
(stability operations) and cooperative security (building partner capacity).
The shift away from collective defense significantly degraded NATO’s territorial
defense capabilities and the Alliance is now trying to reverse that trend. For more than
three decades, NATO’s forces adapted to become lighter, more deployable, and trained
for security and stabilization tasks as opposed to warfighting. The strategic forecast
for Europe predicted occasional terrorism and scattered regional instability, but indicated no chance for major combat operations on the continent. Member states reaped a
peace dividend, shedding defense capabilities and the costs associated with maintaining
Cold War military readiness. The number of countries under NATO’s security blanket
increased while their capabilities decreased, leaving the Alliance at risk, and Russia agitated by NATO’s expansion; this left the Alliance flat-footed when Russia finally acted in
Eastern Europe.
Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty leaves an open door to membership for any
invited European state, so the Alliance has not necessarily finished growing. The organization has officially recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine as potential future members.3 Of course, recognizing that potential does not entail membership
is inevitable. Allowing these potential members to join would both provoke Russia and
place the Alliance in situations where it has to defend an ally whose interests only marginally overlap with those of other Alliance members. Placing Allies in this situation will
increase reluctance to take reasonable, if provocative, steps to curb Russian aggression
and weaken the Alliance.4 As a result, further growth of the Alliance over the coming
decade is expected to be minimal.
The EU does not have an alliance with the United States, but formal relations have
existed since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1953.5 Twenty-one of 27 EU members are NATO Allies and 16 are NATO PfP participants. The Treaty
on European Union (article 42) codifies the EU’s security relationship with NATO, recognizing the collective security responsibilities of NATO members and requiring the EU’s
Common Defense and Security Policy to be compatible with NATO’s Article 5.6 As such,
one could reasonably expect that EU and NATO security goals will remain mutually
supportive, if not perfectly nested. Decisions about European defense and security capabilities made under the auspices of EU governance and leadership can steer the direction

3. “Enlargement,” NATO, updated April 6, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/
topics_49212.htm.
4. Matthew Cancian and Mark Cancian, “It Is Long Past Time to Stop Expanding NATO,” War on the
Rocks, March 1, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/it-is-long-past-time-to-stop-expanding-nato/.
5. “History of the U.S. and the EU,” US Mission to the European Union (EU), n.d., https://
useu.usmission.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/io/.
6. Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), B.G.-E.S.-C.S.-D.A.-D.E.-E.T.-E.L.-E.N.-F.R.G.A.-I.T.-L.V.-L.T.-H.U.-M.T.-N.L.-P.L.-P.T.-R.O.-S.K.-S.L.-F.I.-S.V., September 5, 2008, Article 42 T.E.U.
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of NATO posture and readiness, particularly as European leaders explore the concept of
“strategic autonomy.”7
Fortunately, the EU and NATO are currently well integrated and growing stronger.
The president of the European Council, the president of the European Commission, and
the secretary general of NATO signed a joint declaration of cooperation in 2016 targeting development and integration of operational capabilities.8 This partnership will be
valuable to NATO as a formal structure to build interoperability with highly capable EU
members like Finland, Sweden, and Austria. Sharing strategic goals between the organizations also means that the United States has opportunities to influence the EU security
agenda through the EU’s partnership with NATO.
Countries that participate in NATO’s PfP program can also impact US force posture. The program goals are to “increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build
strengthened security relationships between . . . partners and NATO.”9 The PfP program
provides a venue for strategic shaping activities in the region. Many PfP countries are
former Soviet states.
Georgia, a key PfP partner, committed significant forces to support NATO-led operations in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In turn, NATO and the US military devote a
steady rotation of units to conduct training with Georgian military forces and assisted
in opening the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Center. If this relationship continues, NATO could see a significant increase in troop presence in Georgia as
a prelude to offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP). At the 2008 Bucharest Summit,
NATO leadership stopped short of offering Georgia and Ukraine a MAP, but promised
that Georgia and Ukraine would become members one day.10 Prior to taking this political step, an increased NATO force presence would be required to maintain a security
environment that would ensure a successful transition to full membership for Georgia
and prevent Russian intervention.
Ukraine faces a more difficult road to membership. Ukraine was removed from
NATO’s list of aspiring member states in 2010, before being placed back on the list in
2018.11 Difficulties abound, not the least of which include an active civil war in its eastern

7. Daniel Fiott, Strategic Autonomy: Toward “European Sovereignty” in Defense? (Paris: European Union
Institute for Security Studies, November 30, 2018).
8. NATO, Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European
Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (July 8, 2016),
https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160708_160708-joint-NATO-EUdeclaration.pdf.
9. “The Partnership for Peace Programme,” NATO Science and Technology Organization, n.d.,
https://www.sto.nato.int/Pages/partnership-for-peace.aspx.
10.
Adrian Croft, “NATO Will Not Offer Georgia Membership Package, Avoiding
Russia Clash,” Reuters, June 25, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-enlargement
/nato-will-not-offer-georgia-membership-step-avoiding-russia-clash-idUSKBN0F00IJ20140625.
11. “NATO Officially Gives Ukraine Aspiring Member Status; Membership Action Plan Is Next
Ambition,” Euromaidan Press, March 10, 2018, http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/03/10/nato
-officially-gives-ukraine-aspiring-member-status-membership-action-plan-next-ambition/.
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territories. Jean-Claude Juncker, then-president of the European Commission, ventured
an estimate that Ukraine will take 20 to 25 years to join the EU and NATO.12
DIVIDED THREAT PERCEPTIONS
Unlike during the Cold War, Allies and partners do not share a common view of the
threat Russia could represent. Although most states see Russia as a threat, they differ
regarding the degree to which they view Russia as a partner. As a result, willingness to
invest in their own defense varies considerably. Some will opt for higher-end combat
platform modernization, others for border security plus-ups to deal with immigration
issues, while others are more concerned with social resilience programs to hedge against
Russian gray-zone activities. These options are, of course, not exclusive and any particular partner will likely pursue something in all three, depending on their threat perceptions, which in-turn are driven by geography.13 In general, however, Eastern European
governments are focused on Russia as a military threat to territorial sovereignty, while
for Western European governments, especially Germany, France, and Britain, threat
perceptions tend to focus on terrorism and Russia’s role in actively destabilizing their
political and social institutions. The southern flank of Europe, especially Italy, Spain,
and Portugal, has been too busy dealing with waves of migrants filtering in from North
Africa and the Levant or other concerns to worry much about Russian threats.
This geographical divide in threat perceptions is clearly illustrated by changes in
defense spending by NATO and EU states between 2015 and 2017, following the Russian
annexation of Crimea. Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
and Slovakia) collectively pushed through a 13 percent increase in defense spending, and
Northern Europe (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Sweden) managed
a 10 percent increase. On the other hand, Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK)) and southern Europe (Croatia, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increased defense spending by only 1 percent, suggesting
relative ambivalence toward Russia as a military threat.14
For the citizens of Eastern European nations with a history of Russian occupation and
domination, the Ukrainian crisis and years of massive Russian snap military exercises
near their borders have raised the specter of Russian expansionism. In a 2015 poll taken
in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 70 percent of Polish citizens described
Russia as a major military threat to its neighboring countries, as opposed to only 38 percent of Germans.15 This east–west divide in threat perceptions is critical because most of
the national wealth in NATO resides in Western Europe. If Western European countries
12. “Juncker Says Ukraine Not Likely to Join EU, NATO FOR 20–25 Years,” Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, March 4, 2016, https://www.rferl.org/a/juncker-says-ukraine-not-likely-join-eu-nato-for-20-25
-years/27588682.html.
13. Stephanie Pezard et al., European Relations with Russia: Threat Perceptions, Responses, and Strategies
in the Wake of the Ukrainian Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
14. Daniel Fiott and Jakob Bund, EUISS Yearbook of European Security (YES) 2018 (Paris: EU Institute for
Security Studies, June 26, 2018), 130–132.
15. Katie Simmons, Bruce Stokes, and Jacob Poushter, NATO Public Opinion: Wary of Russia, Leery of
Action on Ukraine (Washington, DC: Pew Research, 2015).
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do not perceive Russia as a military threat, they will not invest in building and sustaining the high-end defense capabilities necessary to provide a credible military deterrence.
Germany and France, as the economic powerhouses of continental Europe, have
an outsized influence on the arc of NATO-Europe’s military capability development.16
Western Europeans tend to focus on nonkinetic threats, as exhibited in a 2017 speech
to the EU Defence and Security Conference from Jean-Yves Le Drian. The French minister for Europe and foreign affairs and former minister of defence outlined the French
view of threats to Europe as terrorism, illegal trafficking, lack of resilience in the European security system, and cyber (espionage and crime) threats.17 Although Minister Le
Drian did highlight the need to expand defense capabilities in Europe, he made no direct
acknowledgment of a military threat to Europe.
Turkey’s relationship bears some mention here. Turkey’s recent purchase of Russian
S-400 air defense systems has created tensions among other NATO Allies, including the
United States, and has impacted Turkey’s ability to acquire Western weapon systems
like the F-35.18 Despite these tensions, no experts the research team engaged believed
Turkey had any plans to leave NATO. Even if it did, Turkey’s departure from NATO
would not affect Army force posture requirements in Europe. The country’s departure
would affect the US posture relative to Russia overall; however, other countries in other
areas of responsibility, like Iran and China, also affect the US posture relative to Russia.
Turkey’s departure would not change the requirements to prevent a fait accompli in the
Baltic states or increased competition in southeastern Europe.
Perceptions of Russia as a threat are not exclusive to NATO countries. The Finnish
threat perspective clearly acknowledges the possibility of Russian invasion. Formed by
a history of struggle against Russification, Finnish Defense Forces have always maintained territorial defense as their primary mission.19 Sweden, also feeling the Russian
threat, felt compelled to remilitarize Gotland in the Baltic Sea to defend against potential
Russian incursion.20
CURRENT NATO POSTURE AND CAPABILITIES
Despite NATO’s decreased force capabilities since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance still possesses a massive military capability in Europe. If required to muster all of
16. Jim Townsend, NATO’s Force Generation and Deployment, Policy Brief no. 029 (Washington, DC:
The German Marshall Fund of the United States, July 2018).
17. Jean-Yves Le Drian, “Closing speech by M. Jean-Yves Le Drian, Minister for Europe and Foreign
Affairs, at the European Defence and Security Conference” (speech, European Defence and Security
Conference, Prague, CZ, June 9, 2017).
18. Tim Lister, “Turkey Bought Russian S-400 Missiles Designed to Down NATO Planes. For
the US, That’s a Problem,” CNN, July 13, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/13/europe/turkey
-russia-missiles-nato-analysis-intl/index.html.
19. Jussi Niinistö, “Finland’s Defense Minister: Continuity and Change in Finnish Defense Policy,”
Defense News, December 9, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/finlands
-defense-minister-continuity-and-change-in-finnish-defense-policy/.
20. Associated Press, “Sweden to Re-establish Military Unit on Baltic Sea Island,” Defense
News, December 13, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/12/13/sweden
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its active ground forces in a conflict with Russia, NATO (even minus the United States
and Canada) would quantitatively overmatch Russian active forces in almost every conventional force category. The European NATO Allies boast a collective active duty land
force of more than 1.1 million troops, compared to Russia’s army of 430,000 active soldiers. NATO’s European countries maintain more than 7,500 active main battle tanks
and 5,800 artillery pieces, approximately double those of Russia’s active land forces.21
Also, NATO maintains a robust Land Component Command framework for operationalizing the Alliance’s landpower assets with eight standing multinational threestar commands located in the UK, Germany, France, Poland, Turkey, Greece, Italy, and
Spain. The joint-use EU and NATO headquarters, Eurocorps, provides a ninth available
three-star land force command headquarters.
Each headquarters is maintained as a High Readiness Force, meaning that they are
available to assume operational responsibilities in fewer than 90 days; when assigned as
the NATO Response Force Headquarters, they are ready to deploy within 30 days.22 The
treaty organization has fielded two division-level commands: Multinational Division
Headquarters Northeast (MND-NE) and Multinational Division Headquarters Southeast
(MND-SE). These two headquarters currently operate as the land component commands
under NATO Joint Force Commands Brunssum and Naples, respectively.
The mere possession of troops, equipment, and headquarters does not tell the whole
story, however. Physical proximity, levels of readiness, and interoperability are all
key factors to assessing the overall posture of NATO. The preponderance of NATO’s
combat forces is not located where they would provide an immediate deterrent to Russian military action, as demonstrated in Alliance wargames.23 The five NATO Allies that
share borders with Russia possess only 7 percent of NATO’s Europe-based active duty
ground forces. Conversely, NATO’s five largest European land armies (Turkey, France,
Greece, Italy, and Germany), comprising nearly 70 percent of continental land component strength, would require major military movement operations to confront Russia in
the land domain. As will be discussed later in this piece, the ability for Allies to move
military forces quickly across Europe is hampered by both poor infrastructure and slow
administrative approval processes, making Allied ground reinforcement a slow and
difficult process.
The readiness of personnel and equipment is also a significant factor. Although details
of military readiness are often classified, multiple media outlets have highlighted Germany’s poor military readiness over the past several years. The persistent under-funding of
the German military has resulted in abysmal equipment readiness rates.24 France and the
21. IHS Markit, Jane’s World Armies and Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment Databases, n.d., https://
my.ihs.com/Janes?th=JANES&callingurl=https://janes.ihs.com.
22. “The NATO Force Structure,” NATO, updated February 13, 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en
/natohq/topics_69718.htm.
23. David A Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank:
Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016); and Bryan Frederick et al.,
Assessing Russian Reactions to US and NATO Posture Enhancements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2017), 6–10.
24. John Vandiver, “As Germany Prepares for NATO Crisis-Response Role, Its Military Readiness Is
‘Abysmal,’” Stars and Stripes, May 16, 2018.
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UK, two of Europe’s best-resourced armies, also have difficulties rapidly deploying and
sustaining ground combat capabilities. In fact, a 2017 RAND study showed that France
and Britain would each require somewhere between a few weeks to more than a month
to marshal and sustain a single brigade-sized element for forward employment.25
Interoperability of equipment is a key weakness for NATO. The majority of combat
power in former Warsaw Pact allies is comprised of Russian-made equipment, armor,
infantry fighting vehicles, and aviation assets.26 The final declaration of the 2018 NATO
summit pointed out the ongoing efforts to reduce the dependence on Russian legacy
systems, but the procurement and sustainment costs of transitioning to NATO standard equipment is beyond the means of most of the former Warsaw Pact countries; this
puts newer NATO members in the dilemma of choosing between supporting NATO’s
interoperability goals and meeting their minimum capability targets. As modernization
decisions are made, it is likely that NATO members will need to sacrifice force structure
to pay for increased investments in combat platforms.
NATO TRENDS
Trends in NATO development have been positive since 2014, as evidenced in spending, interoperability and organizational adaptation efforts. These positive trends include
$40 billion in additional annual defense expenditures from European Allies, increased
participation in NATO exercises, and the successful employment of new multinational
NATO headquarters elements. The current trajectory will lead to a NATO Alliance with
greater qualitative capability, likely offset by decreased force structure.
Defense expenditures among NATO members were revitalized by the shock of the
Ukraine crisis and the recommitments of the 2014 Wales Summit. During the four years
following the summit, NATO Europe and Canada marked a cumulative increase in
spending of $87 billion and nearly every member has made positive moves toward the
2 percent goal (see figure 3). Moreover, 15 of the 29 members submitted plans to NATO
that outline how they intend to achieve the 2 percent benchmark by the year 2024.27
Since 2014, NATO Allies have also shifted how they spend their defense resources.
The percentage of funding allocated to research and development and the purchase of
combat platforms has increased across the board, while the proportion spent on personnel pay and allowances has decreased.28 These trends have particularly been true
of Allies in Eastern Europe, where equipment expenditures have increased between 20
and 50 percent, demonstrating the Allies’ commitment to equipment modernization by
rebalancing spending to make the modernization possible. These trends should improve
future NATO capabilities.
25. Michael Shurkin, The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain
Armored Brigades in the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 1.
26. Aaron Mehta, “Inside America’s Multimillion-Dollar Plan to Get Allies off Russian Equipment,”
Defense News, May 29, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2019/05/29/inside
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27. Kathleen Hicks et al., Counting Dollars or Measuring Value: Assessing NATO and Partner Burden
Sharing (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2018), 3.
28. Hicks et al., Counting Dollars, fig. 3.
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Figure 3. NATO defense expenditure as a share of GDP29
(Illustration from NATO)

INTEROPERABILITY
Another positive trend for the Alliance is the increased commitment to interoperability through participation in NATO exercises. These exercises are crucial to building the
connective tissue among Allied forces through joint training. A highlight of this renewed
focus was the 2018 Trident Juncture exercise with more than 40,000 troops from every
NATO member country and Sweden and Finland,30 making it the largest NATO exercise in two decades, with NATO planning to conduct more than 100 additional exercises
annually.31 With this high frequency and increased size of exercises, US force posture in
Europe has the potential to grow based solely on exercise participation requirements for
continental United States (CONUS)-based forces.
29. NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011–2018),” press release PR/CP(2018)091, July
10, 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180709_180710-pr2018
-91-en.pdf.
30. Edward Lundquist, “Trident Juncture 2018: JWC Creates Artificial Countries, Adversaries to Test
NATO and Partner Militaries,” Seapower Magazine, October 2018.
31. NATO, Key NATO and Allied Exercises in 2018, factsheet (Brussels: Press & Media Section,
Public Diplomacy Division (PDD), NATO, June 2018), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014
/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_04/20180425_1804-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf.
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INTEGRATION
In the past four years NATO has also made significant gains in operational capability
by establishing a Readiness Action Plan with two lines of effort. The first, Assurance, is
intended to increase military presence and activity in the eastern part of the Alliance.
The second, Adaptation, is intended to change long-term capabilities and optimize force
posture and allow for swifter response to emergencies.32
Assurance is accomplished through a comprehensive mix of increased air policing,
intensified maritime patrolling, and deployment of ground troops. The Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) program provides four battalion-sized multinational battlegroups,
each embedded with host nation forces in the three Baltic nations and Poland. These
rotational forces conduct heel-to-toe deployments to maintain a persistent forward presence and to provide a tripwire guarantee that NATO will defend its territory. As the US
Army determines the best way to posture forces in the future, the eFP program provides
a baseline for the minimum force strength required to raise Russia’s costs if they decide
to take military action in the Baltic states.
Although the assurance measures are successful in demonstrating commitment and
increasing interoperability, they do not necessarily provide a credible deterrence force.
The work of creating increased capability will be accomplished through NATO’s adaptation measures. To meet these goals, the NATO Response Force (NRF), which includes
more than just NATO Allies, was increased from 13,000 troops to 40,000 troops.33 The
NRF goes through a predeployment training and certification process each year to verify
the multinational force is ready to be utilized within 30 days of notification. Possibly
more important than the expansion of the NRF was the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2016, providing NATO with a more responsive force
comprised of approximately 5,000 troops. The first elements of VJTF can deploy in as
little as 48 hours, with the rest of the force ready to move in less than seven days to provide immediate response to warnings and indicators of a potential attack.34
Adaptation is accomplished through the fielding of eight NATO Force Integration
Units (NFIUs). These NFIUs are 40-person elements that work as deployment expediters, acting as links to the host nation to optimize movement of NATO troops and
equipment for training, exercises or operational deployments, reducing the need to keep
NATO forces permanently postured near Russia’s border.35 These small headquarters
units are permanently stationed in eastern and southern NATO member states.
In the same vein, NATO and the EU place great emphasis on improving cross-border
military mobility. In September 2019, NATO established the Joint Support and Enabling
32. NATO, NATO’s Readiness Action Plan, factsheet (Brussels: Press & Media Section, PDD, NATO,
July 2016), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheetrap-en.pdf.
33. NATO, “NATO Response Force (NRF) 2020,” fact sheet (Brunssum: Public Affairs Office,
Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters, NATO, January 2020), https://jfcbs.nato.int/systems
/file_download.ashx?pg=247&ver=19.
34. NATO, “NATO Response Force (NRF) 2020.”
35. “NATO Force Integration Unit (NFIU) Fact Sheet,” NATO, n.d., https://jfcbs.nato.int/page5725819
/nato-force-integration-units/nato-force-integration-units-fact-sheet.
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Command. The purpose of the command is to improve deterrence by speeding up,
coordinating, and safeguarding the movement of Allied combat forces across European
borders.36 The establishment of this command is a welcome development. Currently,
administrative impediments cause precrisis military movement around the continent
of Europe to be overly difficult. Long waits obtaining diplomatic clearances for ground
movements preclude responsive troop movements in reaction to warnings and indicators and severely limit application of the US concept of Dynamic Force Employment
with ground forces. Figure 4 shows the processing time for diplomatic clearances of military ground movements in each NATO or EU country.

Figure 4. Ground diplomatic clearance times
(Map by Pete McPhail)

Air mobility is similarly hampered by unnecessarily long wait periods to get
approval for overflight and landing. The EU and NATO have established the action plan
on military mobility that will enable a military Schengen protocol that will standardize processes and drastically reduce administrative wait times for movement of military
forces precrisis.37
European partners and Allies must also make infrastructure investments to optimize
the movement of military equipment by improving roads, bridges, and tunnels to support the weight of heavy armored vehicles. The EU is looking to complete these infrastructure upgrades as part of their action plan on military mobility coordinated through
36. “New NATO Command Declared Operational,” NATO, updated September 17, 2019, https://www
.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_168945.htm.
37. Franklin D. Kramer and Hans Binnendijk, Meeting the Russian Conventional Challenge (Washington,
DC: Atlantic Council, February 27, 2018), 9–10.
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Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Primary targets for upgrade will be along
Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) routes. The goal will be to complete dualuse transportation infrastructure projects that will support both military and civilian
requirements.38
The EU and NATO’s joint progress toward enabling efficient movement of forces is
an excellent indicator of the future strength and solidarity of Europe. The Action Plan on
Military Mobility will further reduce the need to forward posture forces as NATO will
be able to respond more rapidly to security threats by reinforcing with troop presence.
HYBRID AND CYBER CAPABILITIES
Russia’s use of hybrid warfare has presented NATO and the EU with another fundamental challenge. Most Western liberal democracies go to great pains to separate
their militaries from domestic political and civil life. Hybrid warfare attacks the seams
between military defense institutions and law enforcement institutions, upending traditional Western conceptions of how to organize and defend society, and thus fomenting
doubt about governments’ ability to defend their populations. European partners are
leading the charge by developing security capabilities to counter hybrid warfare threats,
and the US Army has the opportunity to garner valuable knowledge and experience at
minimal cost by simply embedding with European partners and Allies.
Finland stepped into a position of leadership by instituting the European Centre of
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki with participation open to EU
member states and NATO Allies. Initiated in 2016, the Hybrid Centre of Excellence aims
to develop an analytical framework for the assessment of current and future hybrid
warfare situations and their practical implication, resulting in joint and comprehensive
action in defense and response.39 The development of the Hybrid Centre of Excellence
is an important step forward for EU and NATO members as it provides an institutional
framework to cooperatively address vulnerabilities to hybrid threats.
Building a line of defense in the cyber domain has also kept NATO busy. Since
approving its first policy on cyber defense in 2008, NATO has continuously increased
its cyber defense capability, capacity, and cooperation with partners and industry. The
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia provides education,
consultation, lessons learned, and research and development. In addition, NATO has
also created cyber defense targets for member states and cooperates with the EU through
a technical arrangement on cyber defense signed in 2016 that strengthens ties through
information exchange, training, research, and exercises.40 If NATO and EU leaders are
able to keep momentum and resources flowing toward cooperative cyber operations,
defensive cyber capabilities will increase by orders of magnitude over the next decade
and the need to forward posture US Army Cyber Teams will decrease proportionally.
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While declaring that the Alliance will not conduct offensive cyberspace operations,
NATO has taken an aggressive stance on offensive cyber operations by declaring its willingness to integrate the effects of offensive cyber operations conducted by member states
in sovereign or multinational capacities.41 The treaty organization’s integration of cyber
effects will be conducted through its Cyber Operations Center, which officially stood up
in August 2018.
EUROPEAN UNION (EU) TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS
The EU has steadily increased its level of ambition toward building a European
security and defense capability that is less dependent on the United States for security.
This gradual development of military capability and self-organization toward strategic
autonomy is Europe’s hedge against a US-dominated NATO, though officials are quick
to state that the EU is not trying to replace NATO. Future EU gains in attaining strategic
autonomy should be a positive development from a US perspective, as it indicates stronger strategic partners and a reduced need to dedicate US troops to the region.
The EU already sees itself as a global security provider, as it deployed military forces
and civilians to 16 missions or operations in 2017.42 As a block, the EU spent $244 billion on defense in 2017. This spending level is second only to the United States, outpacing Russian defense spending by a factor of five, and exceeding China’s annual defense
spending by over $95 billion.43 In all, plenty of funds are available to build and maintain
a high level of defense capability, but the dispersion of these funds across 27 different
nations results in an output of military readiness and capability that does not justify the
monetary inputs. Increasing spending levels certainly will not harm military readiness,
but the EU leadership believes that the largest gains in military readiness will come from
greater efficiency rather than increased spending. Recognizing this, the EU has developed two new initiatives for improving the collective capabilities of member states; the
PESCO and the European Defence Fund. These two initiatives are important as they
promise to build the efficiency the EU desires as they seek to increase capability and
interoperability.
A voluntary framework, PESCO is aimed at increasing cooperation in capability
development and operations. If successful, PESCO will assist EU member states in raising their defense spending in a coordinated manner and allocating more military assets
for operations.44 A major goal of PESCO is to revive and sustain Europe’s military industrial base, making US policy analysts wary due to concerns over the potential for unfair
bias against US weapons manufacturers.
The European Defence Fund, Europe’s second initiative for improving the EU’s collective military capability, is essentially an EU bank account dedicated to support cooperative research and development of defense capabilities. This account is the first concrete
41.
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example of European pooling of monetary assets to address defense development shortfalls. The initial funding is modest, with €590 million allocated per year until 2020, later
increasing to €1.5 billion annually. Although it is too early to determine whether this
program will achieve its desired effects, it is promising to see the EU taking steps to fund
collective defense research and technology directly.45 Critics of the program claim that
the EU will prioritize capability development required for EU missions ahead of those
needed for NATO missions,46 but capability is capability, and as long as the goal of building a more secure Europe is being met, the United States should support the initiative.
HEADWINDS FOR THE EU
Not every trend in the EU is pointing toward a stronger union. The rise of populism and nationalism in politics throughout Europe will subject the EU to increased
scrutiny from its constituent populations. The UK’s internal political turmoil following
the Brexit referendum has been enough to steer European nationalist parties away from
staking political platforms on following suit in EU departure, but it has not deterred
these nationalists from continuing their steady effort to undermine the EU’s institutional
reputation.47 A strong EU is important to future US force posture because solidarity and
open borders in Europe are necessary for efficient employment of EUCOM troops. A
fractured or weak EU increases the possibility of a member state opting-out of future
military operations and potentially withholding critical military transit, overflight or
basing rights. Imagine the difficulty of moving forces from southern Europe to the Baltics if Austria and France decided to deny transit rights.
Donald Tusk, then-president of the European Council, gave a November 2018 speech
in which he outlined his fear that rising nationalism and anti-Europe sentiment would
disrupt the whole European order.48 The UK’s approved 2016 Brexit referendum to separate from the EU is seen by many as the first step in unraveling that European order.
The loss of such a wealthy and stable member state will significantly reduce the EU’s
resource pool and diminish its international political clout. Potentially, the most damaging factor is that the UK will have established a blueprint for other member states to
depart the EU when their political sentiments shift toward nationalism.
In addition, demographic trends in Europe are likely to result in decreased troop
strength across Allies and partners over the coming decade. In 2030, the European continent is expected to have the highest median population age on the planet at 45 years old,
and Europeans will find it more difficult to recruit as the pool of military-age citizens
45. Quentin Lopinot, “Why the European Defence Fund Is Good News for US Security Interests,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 26, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis
/why-european-defence-fund-good-news-us-security-interests.
46. Tomáš Valášek, “European Defense vs. NATO: Not the Right Fight,” Carnegie Europe, February
16, 2018, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/02/16/european-defense-vs.-nato-not-right-fight-pub-75563.
47. Vivienne Walt, “How Nationalists Are Joining Together to Tear Europe Apart,” Time, April 11,
2019, http://time.com/5568322/nationalism-in-europe/.
48. Donald Tusk, “November 11, 2018: Poland and Europe. Two Anniversaries, Two Lessons” (speech,
Freedom Games Conference, Lodz, Poland, November 10, 2018).
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shrinks.49 The European Defence Agency is already anticipating the requirement to
use human enhancement technology to help personnel serve longer, making up for the
declining force pool.50 A tacit acknowledgment of the demographic problem can also be
seen in national discussions throughout Europe about the reintroduction of conscription.51 The obvious downside of smaller European forces will be a reduced capacity to
meet rotational demands in Europe and abroad. The upside is that a reduced force structure will lead to a higher percentage of defense funding available for modernization
and readiness. As noted in the previous chapter, Russia is facing similar demographic
problems, and its pool of available recruits is expected to shrink faster than that of the
NATO Allies.52
RESTRAINTS ON US COURSES OF ACTION
A final consideration for how forces will be structured in Europe in the next decade
is how partners and Allies will observe treaties, conventions, and arms control restrictions. The United States’ force posture and capabilities in Europe are currently constrained by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Vienna
Document on Confidence-Building Measures (Vienna Document). Currently, US allocations negotiated within NATO for CFE “Flanks” holdings limit Black Sea regional force
deployment.53 Future developments concerning the United States’ withdrawal from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the potential for EU restrictions on
Autonomous Weapons Systems will guide future defense posture.54
Russia successfully uses arms control treaties as a tool to maintain and advocate
additional visibility on NATO and partner military activities on its borders and is masterful at exploiting the fact that European states, and to a lesser degree the United States,
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50. Marta Kepe et al., Exploring Europe’s Capability Requirements for 2035 and Beyond (Cambridge, UK:
RAND Europe, June 2018), 25.
51. Rick Noack, “The Military Draft is Making a Comeback in Europe,” Washington Post, October
19, 2018.
52. “Europe Population 2020,” World Population Review, accessed February 14, 2020, http://
worldpopulationreview.com/continents/europe-population/; and “Russia Population 2020,” World
Population Review, accessed February 14, 2020, https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/
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53. “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),” A.M.,-A.Z.,-B.E.,-B.G.,-B.Y.,-C.A.,C.Z.,-D.E.,-D.K.,-E.S.,-F.R.,-G.E.,-G.R.,-H.U.,-I.S.,-I.T.,-K.Z.,-L.U.,-M.D.,-N.L.,-N.O.,-P.L.,-P.T.,-R.O.,-R.U.,S.K.,-T.R.,-U.A.,-U.K.,-U.S., November 9, 1990; and “The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, last reviewed August 2017,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe.
54. European Parliament, Resolution of September 12, 2018, on Autonomous Weapons Systems,
2018/2752(RSP) (September 12, 2018). See also Michael T. Klare, “Autonomous Weapons Systems
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are committed to existing treaties as a foundation to maintain the rules-based order.55
Although the current US administration seems less willing to accept this state of affairs,
most European leaders have not wavered in their continued support of the Vienna Document and CFE. Russian gaming of Vienna Document loopholes and their “suspension
of implementing” CFE have placed them in a position of military advantage. Despite
European and NATO leader support for US actions and justifications on the INF Treaty,
European leaders would likely be more concerned about destabilizing effects of any US
move to withdraw from CFE or the Vienna Document. Although withdrawal from conventional arms control mechanisms would free the United States from these operational
constraints, European leaders see these mechanisms as important for the mitigation and
reciprocal transparency measures they provide.
Another serious consideration for European force posture in 2028 is a probable EU
prohibition on Autonomous Weapons Systems.56 Calls from EU leaders to create a global
ban are likely to get traction within European countries and smaller nations in the UN,
but unlikely to be heeded by Russia. Given the anticipated development of AI and robotics in the coming decade, Europe’s stance on this developing technology could mean
that it will be left with a significant military capabilities gap.
In sum, the EU will be instrumental in organizing and improving European force
structure over the next decade, but is unlikely to supplant NATO fully as the primary
defense structure. The degree to which European countries are willing to continue to
observe treaties and conventions that Russia either ignores or plays to its own advantage
will play a significant role in Europe’s comparative military defense capability and US
posture on the continent.
CONCLUSION
The posture and capabilities of European Allies and partners will directly affect how
the US Army postures forces in 2028. Trends in NATO and the EU indicate that Europe’s
military strength is on the rebound after the decades of downsizing after the Cold War.
Increased defense spending, interoperability, and new organizational structures driven
by European threat perceptions will provide more effective and efficient defense capabilities among US partners and Allies. Political trends and demographics are likely to
be a drag on capability improvements, but are unlikely to negate the positive trends in
defense capabilities. US Army leaders should plan a posture that reinforces Allied and
partner capabilities and avoid the temptation to build a force structure in Europe that
is designed to win military conflicts for them. Strategic communications plans for any
national posture decisions should take into account potential international political-military impacts—in arms control and other realms
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CHAPTER 4. US MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OPTIONS
Each element of US Army overseas force posture contributes to at least one of
several broad functions. The first and most intuitive function is the core for ground force
missions. Army units achieve Army tasks.
Second, the US Army enables the rest of the US Joint Force. In Europe, this has long
been the case for general theater support functions such as communications, logistics,
and medical support, but with the introduction of MDO and long-range ground fires, US
Army units will also have an essential operational role in enabling freedom of maneuver
for air forces.1 Army units enable others to achieve joint tasks.
Finally, Army forces enable allies. As with support to the Joint Force, US Army
logistics capabilities performing general theater support functions are critical to NATO
warfighting capability. But US Army headquarters also provide a framework for Allied
and partner military capabilities (as well as intelligence and law enforcement capabilities
in some cases) to connect with as a higher headquarters, a location for coordination,
liaison activities, and many other varieties of cooperative relationship. One recent
example is the US Army Europe and Seventh Army efforts to prepare and integrate
Allied and partner contingents into multinational forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.2 In
large-scale combat operations, this combined enabling function will be even more critical
to mission success. The possibility that NATO forces would initially have to fight at a
numerical disadvantage makes it necessary to have whatever combat forces would be
available as capable as possible. In practical terms, this requires developing mechanisms
by which some US-only or Five Eyes technical capabilities might, at least partially, be
used to make Allies and partners multidomain capable. Army units enable others to
achieve Alliance tasks.
Two factors make force posture even more complex. The first is that these three
functions cut across a variety of disparate mission types. A single force posture must
be flexible enough to accomplish a wide range of tasks. In Europe, the main purpose of
US Army force posture is to enable Army, Joint, and Alliance success in armed conflict
and in competition below armed conflict with Russia. Ideally, Army force posture
provides policymakers with options to expand the competitive space to counter Russian
aggression, overt or covert, against Allies and partners. Finally, if history is any guide,
Army forces in Europe will be called upon to achieve a number of other missions:
support diplomacy through military activity, project power into other theaters, assist
with other missions in theater, and prepare and integrate Allies and partners for out-oftheater operations.
The other complicating factor is that force posture is resistant to change. In part,
this problem is due to the expense and permanence of physical infrastructure, like
headquarters, warehouses, and motor pools. But even fewer tangible elements, such as
legal agreements, interoperability procedures, and other cooperative mechanisms, are
difficult to modify or replace once established. This enduring quality of force posture
1. National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), The Army for the Future (Arlington, VA:
NCFA, 2016), 7–8.
2. Robert Burnham, “JMTC Trains NATO, ISAF Partners in Counter Insurgency,” June 8, 2011, https://
www.army.mil/article/59161/jmtc_trains_nato_isaf_partners_in_counter_insurgency.
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means that it must be adaptable because most of it will persist even after present
conditions have changed: Russia will have different means, adopt new ways, and might
even alter its ends; US military budgets will increase or decrease, perhaps sharply;
requirements from other theaters will rise and fall; and the domestic political space
of Allies and partners will evolve with implications positive and negative for military
cooperation and activity.
The challenge, therefore, is to assemble a single set of the basic building blocks of
force posture in the way that best enables service, Joint, and coalition success across
the range of possible missions and an even wider array of potential futures. The next
chapter will explain how they might all be brought together into overarching strategic
approaches and provide a framework for selecting among those options. This chapter
will describe the current and future building blocks of force posture and some of the
specific considerations associated with each.
CURRENT US CAPABILITIES AND FORCE POSTURE
In 2020, there are approximately 65,000 US military personnel in Europe. The amount
of personnel has been reduced by 85 percent since the height of the Cold War.3 Of course,
as described in earlier chapters, Russia is also significantly diminished in capacity when
compared to the Soviet Union. The key point to be drawn from these then-and-now
figures is that with a greatly reduced posture, relatively small changes in force posture
can have an outsized effect.
The top service headquarters in theater is the United States Army Europe (USAREUR)
in Wiesbaden, Germany, a three-star command. Due to earlier rounds of reductions
among all of the Army Service Component Commands in the early 2010s, USAREUR has
limited capacity as an operational headquarters. The current headquarters would, until
augmented, have difficulty in managing the complexities of a theater in conflict with an
adversary that has the capability to threaten support areas with a mixture of long-range
strike, special operations forces, as well as the ability to strike using space, cyberspace,
and electromagnetic assets while conducting effective information warfare to undermine
the Alliance’s political cohesion and will. Furthermore, though USAREUR is clearly the
first among equals in terms of all national headquarters, it is not formally within the
NATO command structure.
In the worst case of a sudden Russian attack that leaves only days to react, USAREUR
would not have the NATO orders issuing authority so that, for instance, adjacent US
and Polish divisions could operate together. The current Alliance command structure
runs from Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe through one of the Joint Forces
Commands (Brunssum or Naples) to a designated corps (for example, Multinational
Corps Northeast). These commands will not have access to some of the advanced
capabilities that the MDO concepts suggests are necessary for success in large-scale
ground combat. More basically, there is widespread doubt throughout the Alliance as
to their suitability as operational headquarters in high-tempo operations for reasons
of both capacity and capability; they lack the suite of subordinate commands and
3. Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for Countering
Russian Local Superiority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 5.
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units that are as necessary for the success of a given echelon as the headquarters itself.
Simply put, there is a general realization that in case of war, the Alliance would have
to alter its command structure to make more use of American capacity and capability.
Unfortunately, the present USAREUR is not resourced to assume that role. Thus, even
with several weeks of warning of Russian aggression, there would likely be a costly
period of ad hoc adaptation to critical command systems under figurative and, quite
possibly, literal fire.4
Furthermore, it is important to note that the addition of a division headquarters, as
is apparently intended, would not rectify this gap. Both the MDO and echelons above
brigade concepts draw clear distinctions between the field army/corps level of command
and the division. Even with the welcome addition of a division headquarters, the
current command and control structure would fall short of providing full multidomain
capability.5
As a theater army, USAREUR has an array of subordinate elements assigned or
under operational command that provide the bulk of the horsepower that performs
the Joint and combined enabling functions described above. The 12th Combat Aviation
Brigade in Ansbach, Germany, is a headquarters for a reduced strength brigade made
up of both forward stationed and rotational forces. The 66th Military Intelligence, 598th
Transportation, and 2nd Signal Brigades provide support not just to Army forces but to
Joint and combined forces as well.
The 41st Field Artillery Brigade, which returned to Germany in 2018, provides
long-range fires. By 2020, the brigade will have two multiple rocket launch system
(MLRS) battalions.6 Even with current systems, the 41st Field Artillery can make some
important contributions to gaining joint freedom of maneuver by attacking high-value
targets critical to both the air and ground campaigns. The introduction of future longrange precision fires systems with ranges several times greater than the current MLRS
system would significantly expand the geographic area in which the Army can support
Joint maneuver, an important consideration as A2/AD system ranges increase. But the
problem is not simply weapons ranges. As The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028
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notes, current systems, organizations, and processes do not provide a sensor-analysisshooter linkage with the sufficient speed and capacity to reliably attack mobile targets.7
The 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command at Kaiserslautern commands
theater air and missile defenses in conjunction with NATO Allied Air Command and the
Area Air Defense Command in theater. As statements from senior US defense officials
make clear, theater air and missile defense is a significant weakness; decades have
passed since the United States last faced a potential adversary with large-scale deepstrike capability. Current systems are inadequate to meet the scale of the threat, and
they suffer from a ruinous cost curve in which adding more capacity leads to a one-stepforward, two-steps-back dynamic.8 The only thing worse than an ineffective defense is a
bankrupting ineffective defense.
Perhaps the most important element for the Joint and Allied efforts is the oftenunheralded 21st Theater Sustainment Command, headquartered in Kaiserslautern,
Germany. The peacetime strength of the 21st Theater Sustainment Command is far
below what would be required to sustain large-scale combined Joint operations. In
addition to a mission support command and military police brigade, at the time of this
writing the 21st Theater Sustainment Command assigned or controlled forces consist of
a single sustainment brigade, a medical brigade, a contracting support brigade, a field
support brigade, several reduced strength combat support units, one movement control
battalion, three Army truck companies, a theater movements branch in the Theater
Sustainment Command headquarters, a direct support German civil defense truck unit,
and the Theater Logistics Support Center—Europe, a civilian-run support organization.9
In case of war, these forces would need to be augmented by several additional support
brigades, truck battalions, and theater movement control agencies, most of which reside
within the reserve component.10 This augmentation would place the units necessary
to support early operations in competition for scarce strategic lift with the units they
would support.
But even correcting these deficiencies by filling out the forward-stationed logistics
and mobility structures would likely not be sufficient to sustain and move forces in a
large-scale conflict.11 The current sustainment force posture is designed to enable the
7. TRADOC, The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis,
VA: TRADOC, 2018), 33–34.
8. Carl Rehberg and Mark Gunzinger, Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads: New Concepts and Technologies
to Defend America’s Overseas Bases (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018),
2–13, 31–34; and Thomas Karako, “The Missile Defense Review: Insufficient for Complex and Integrated
Attack,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 6–13.
9. “Our Units and Partners,” 21st Theater Sustainment Command, n.d., https://www.21tsc.army.mil
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10. Scott Boston et al., Preparing for Near-Peer Conflict on the Ground: Comparing US and Russian Conventional
Ground Combat Capability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 141; and Davie Burgdorf, Army
Logistics Quick Reference (Fort Lee, VA: Force Development Directorate, US Army Combined Army Support
Command, February 18, 2014), 15.
11. Eric Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the
National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2018), 24; Ben Hodges et
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existing scheme of support. This posture falls short in three regards: it does not meet
the more aggressive timelines envisioned by the MDO concept; it does not account for
enemy attacks (physical and virtual) against lines of communications; and it is heavily
dependent on support from commercial and civilian sources that might not be able to
meet a sudden burst in demand from US and Allied militaries under crisis or wartime
conditions. This combination of factors creates a condition in which foreign public
sentiment can impact sustainment.
If widespread opposition to a crisis or conflict exists, private companies and Allied
governments might opt to minimize at least their visible support and cooperation.
Because Allied militaries have adopted similar approaches to logistics, there is already
some question as to how much capacity is available at full utilization. The effects of
a slowdown as a byproduct of lack of political cohesion would only exacerbate these
trends. Depending on the nature of the crisis and which direction European energy takes
over the next several years, Russia may have an opportunity to exploit the dependence of
Allies and partners on Russian oil and natural gas to impede operations directly through
a shutdown and indirectly through manipulation of public opinion.12
In terms of combat forces, USAREUR has a mixture of forward-stationed and
rotational forces on the ground. The component command has two forward-stationed
brigade combat teams (BCTs). The 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) is based in
Vilseck, Germany, a post adjacent to the Grafenwoehr Training Complex. The 173rd
BCT (Airborne) is based in Vicenza, Italy, a post with limited local training areas though
it is close to Aviano Air Base. Due to the limited capacity of Vicenza, the 173rd BCT
(Airborne) is one of only two BCTs that was not expanded to have a third maneuver
battalion during the reorganization in the early 2010s. The other brigade that was not
expanded was the 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division, at Fort Richardson,
Alaska, a post with capacity issues similar to that of Vicenza.
At present, the most significant rotational force is the enduring presence of ABCTs
brought through on heel-to-toe rotations. The bulk of the rotational ABCT is centered
at Żagań, Poland, but it has conducted dispersed operations along the entire eastern
periphery of NATO from Lithuania to Romania and Bulgaria. These forces, however, are
best kept within Poland. The USAREUR speed of assembly exercise in 2016 found that
it requires considerable time to bring even small forces back to the main operating area.
Perhaps even more critically, doing so requires the use of precious tank transporters
and tank-capable railcars that in a crisis would be better employed along the lines of
communications from Army prepositioned stocks (APS). Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania each have one battalion-sized multinational eFP battalion. The United States
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leads the unit in Poland. The political value of these units, some with up to seven
different nationalities represented, is far greater than their tactical capability.13
In a crisis or conflict, there would be two additional waves of ground forces. In the
nomenclature of the Global Operating Model, the first is the “blunt” layer, which can
arrive within weeks of notification to move. Theoretically, there are many Army units that
can be deployed in their entirety by air. But in a great-power conflict scenario, demand
for strategic lift across the Joint Force would be immense and lines of communications
including airfields would be contested. Under those conditions, only a small number
of high-priority units could realistically expect to deploy by air in the first weeks of a
conflict. Therefore, the bulk of the blunt layer would consist of units that can fall in on
equipment stored in APS already in Europe. US Army Europe (USAREUR) is currently
building an entire division’s worth of equipment, including two full ABCT equipment
sets, across European APS sites in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Poland,
Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria.14 As will be discussed in the next section, however,
even this APS equipment would take several months from initiation of movement until
fully formed and deployed. In the meantime, Russia would have substantial timedistance advantage in the initial days and weeks of a conventional ground campaign
against the Baltic states.15
The Army’s surge layer consists of all other forces; in other words, the remainder
of the Army subtracting those committed to other theaters or necessary for homeland
defense. This force, along with lower readiness Allied units taking considerable time to
mobilize, would enjoy a vast superiority over the Russian military that could only be
offset with nuclear weapons.16
Unfortunately, deploying the ground surge layer would take many months.17 One
of the major concerns of the congressionally appointed commission reviewing the NDS
was that DoD’s understandable desire to hold a set of capabilities where they can be
used against multiple threats, most particularly both China and Russia, might not be
achievable in practice.18 In a conflict with Russia, the friction of strategic movement
would be compounded by active disruption through cyberattacks against military and
13. Cathy Vandermaarel, “Initial EAS Forward Sites Announced,” US Army, December 1, 2015,
http://www.army.mil/article/159292/Initial_EAS_foward_sites_announce/; Ulrich Kühn, Preventing
Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2018), 26–28; Philip M. Breedlove and Alexander Vershbow, Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the US
Military Presence in North Central Europe (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018), 7–9; and Deni, “NATO’s
Enhanced Forward Presence,” 30–44.
14. Jen Judson, “Funding to Deter Russia Reaches $6.5B in FY19 Defense Budget Request,”
Defense News, December 2, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/02/12/funding-to
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15. Boston et al., Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance, 11.
16. Bryan Frederick et al., Assessing Russian Reactions to US and NATO Posture Enhancements (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 6–15.
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18. Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense, 21–22, 34–35, 41–42; and Lostumbo et al., Overseas
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civilian networks; information operations; special operations forces; and a combination
of air-, naval-, and ground-based fires for interdiction. The deployment of the surge force
would be strategically fraught, as a depleted Russian military trapped in a conflict that
it presumably would expect to have already ended due to a collapse of Western political
will would be desperate to avoid facing these reinforcements.19 The situation would
be roughly analogous to the German General Staff’s decision to employ unrestricted
submarine warfare in the spring of 1918, even though it knew this would bring the United
States into the war. A desperate power trapped in an unexpectedly long war can make
decisions that, from a dispassionate distance, seem illogical and reckless.20 Accordingly,
the chance of the employment of nuclear weapons against large targets, such as seaports,
becomes increasingly likely. Even if Russia opted not to employ nuclear weapons, the
United States and partners would have to account for the possibility, which would likely
lead to movement across multiple lines of communication in smaller, less efficient, and
therefore slower packages. The possibility of being a target might also cause some allies
to impose additional restrictions on movement, creating tensions within the Alliance.
The extended period to deploy ground surge elements, unfortunately, is out of sync
with the surge of air capability which would have occurred, peaked, and been used
up long before. This point suggests investments in sea and airlift capabilities, though
welcome, would close the surge window enough to bring the Army in line with the other
services. But doing so could improve restocking of ammunition whose stockpiles are
likely insufficient, especially if conflict with Russia were protracted because of a NATO
failure to respond quickly enough.
The United States has had difficulty in maintaining munitions stockpiles when
fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, a lightly armed force that never had more
than several tens of thousands of fighters and no air defense capability. In a conflict with
Russia, the expenditure of munitions would be exponentially greater.21 How quickly
would industry be able to ramp up the production of incredibly sophisticated systems
requiring complex and often only partially understood supply chains, with the additional
potential factor of Russian cyberattacks against any number of vendors?
By the time the ground surge assembled, the air component would have already
reverted to a poorer version of AirLand Battle. Fifth-generation aircraft dropping “dumb
bombs” would be both a reversion to the 1980s and a step back because the trade-off
toward fewer but more exquisite aircraft was based on the availability of munitions that
match the aircraft.
The frontline aircraft are smaller in number than they were in the 1980s, and each
aircraft carries a far more limited payload (particularly when operating in a clean, lowobservable configuration). The reduction in weight of munitions the aircraft can carry
is of little concern if they are precision munitions; however, if they are not precision
munitions, then this reduction will significantly impair the aircraft’s effectiveness. As a
result of this disparity in surge timelines between air and ground forces, coupled with
19. Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 5.
20. Hew Strachan, The First World War (New York: Viking Press, 2004), 216–230.
21. Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense, 41, 46; and TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations,
2028, C-8.
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the lack of munitions endurance, the ground surge force would likely not have the air
partner to conduct MDO. Indeed, the ground surge force would have, in relative terms,
the weakest air support against conventional opponents since World War I.22
CAPABILITIES REQUIRED FOR MULTIDOMAIN OPERATIONS IN 2028
The dangers and excessive cost of even a successful employment of the surge layer
are the underlying reason for the emphasis on the ability to quickly—within weeks—
defeat aggression in MDO.23 But achieving this goal with roughly the same amount
of forces currently in Europe is exceptionally difficult. Put simply, every aspect of the
combined Joint Force must be more effective than today. Or, in the terms identified at
the beginning of the chapter, a credible deterrent requires an all-of-the-above approach,
in which force posture simultaneously better enables the execution of Army, Joint, and
Allied tasks.
The starting point is with the Joint Force. As noted in chapter 2, the Russian
military’s prime concern in large-scale conventional operations is what they would
term as NATO aerospace operations, and with good reason.24 Air strike has long been
a significant asymmetric advantage for the United States. The natural by-product of
national strengths—economic wealth, technological innovation, and a global network
of supporting bases and infrastructure—is that no competitor comes close to matching.
Though air power cannot independently win a conflict, it is such a significant element of
the US Joint Force that no war, campaign, or battle against Russia can be won without it.
Being cognizant of the US dependence on air power, Russia has selectively invested
in A2/AD capabilities designed to neutralize NATO airpower through multiple means:
air defenses to counter fifth-generation fighters and other penetrating aircraft while
significantly pushing back the area in which tankers, command and control aircraft,
and legacy fighters, bombers, and ISR platforms can operate. These are complemented
by a long-range strike and reconnaissance complex capable of attacking bases with
munitions, maintenance, mission planning, and other essential support capabilities; and,
a multidomain capability to contest the varied communications that bind all elements
of air power. Therefore, the question is not whether the F-22 and F-35 will work as
advertised against Russian defenses. Fifth-generation aircraft are just the tip of the spear.
Russia is also positioned to execute a broad attack against multiple points of the entire
air power system. Under the cover of this air defense umbrella, Russia’s capable ground
forces, which are particularly strong in terms of ground fires, could isolate US Army
forces from the remainder of the Joint Force and defeat them in detail.
Though particularly designed to counter the United States, this system is brittle; it
lacks depth and Russia lacks the resources for a significant restructuring. The US Army’s
MDO concept proposes a solution to this problem by operating in ways that the Russian
military system is not equipped to handle. The essential first step that unlocks the puzzle
is the integration of Army long-range fires into the larger Joint effort against the keystone
22. Ochmanek et al., US Military Capabilities and Forces, 36–39.
23. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, 17, 24.
24. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations (Washington, DC: DIA, 2017), 32–34.
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Russian systems. The US Army Capabilities Integration Center analysis suggests longrange ground fires and a more efficient MDC2 unlock this Russian A2/AD because they
have the qualities of persistence and so can fire immediately upon an intelligence cue,
can be employed in greater numbers so as to overwhelm Russian point defenses, and
enable multiaxial attacks that further spread enemy defensive efforts.
Even with this additional capability, a complete rollback of Russian A2/AD is not
possible, but it will allow enough freedom of maneuver for air and ground forces—
everything from fourth-generation fighters and ISR aircraft to armored forces and
cannon artillery—to engage the enemy as a Joint combined arms team. The next chapter
will identify some of the additional investments necessary to support this new way
of fighting. Two of the most important are a logistics system capable of withstanding
Russian attacks against rear areas and command and control systems resilient to
interference with space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic networks. In sum, MDO—if
realized—completely alters the operational outlook within the European theater, altering
Russian decision calculations regarding potential advantage and escalation dominance.
This altered strategic balance, while not completely solving the problem of competition
below armed conflict, will have additional beneficial effects in that form of competition
as well. Once this fundamental condition is achieved, more capable ground forces and
allies can achieve their missions.
As a baseline for the operational capabilities required to defeat Russian aggression
against a NATO ally rapidly, this study will adopt an estimate derived from The US
Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 and a draft document prepared by the Joint and
Army Concepts Division writing team.25 This list of capabilities has not been officially
sanctioned and requires further analysis through detailed modeling and simulation,
but does at least provide a benchmark grounded in extensive experimentation and
wargaming.
The ability to degrade Russian A2/AD significantly as part of a combined Joint air
campaign from the first day of conflict through (1) a brigade of long-range ground based
fires, (2) three weeks of munitions, and (3) a multidomain command and control (MDC2)
system that incorporates ground-based fires into the larger Joint planning and execution
to include allowing cueing from a variety of sensors in the time required to hit highly
mobile high-value enemy systems.
The ability to prevail in ground maneuver through (1) the presence of a complete US
division northeast of Warsaw within several weeks of a cold-start invasion to operate
in conjunction with several Allied divisions and (2) an MDC2 structure that allows the
leveraging of space, cyberspace, and massed Joint fires in support of coalition ground
operations. Even with these forces, the relative strength of the two sides would require
an aggressive, maneuver-based approach.
The ability to cause Russian forces unexpected delays and to expose high-value
systems through an effective defense mounted by Allied conventional and unconventional
forces, quick response US and Allied light forces, and special operations forces.
The ability of resilient forces and systems to reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks
of all kinds against command and control systems, headquarters, sustainment nodes,
25. US Army Capabilities and Integration Center (ARCIC), “MDO in Application” (PowerPoint
presentation, ARCIC, Fort Eustis, VA, October 10, 2018).
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transportation networks, and prepositioned equipment through a combination of active
protection, dispersal, hardening, deception, and redundancy.
CALIBRATED FORCE POSTURE LEVERS
Changes to force posture cannot be viewed in isolation. US Army units in Europe
operate as part of a larger Joint combined system; alterations to one aspect often have
ripple effects for other elements within the system. For instance, a forward-deployed
fires brigade with long-range precision fires ready to target enemy A2/AD on the first
day of hostilities would significantly alter the operational dynamic within the theater.
The NATO air component would be able to achieve freedom of maneuver much sooner,
with less expenditure of munitions and attrition to aircraft. But that outsized benefit is
only realized if the deployment of firing units is matched with alterations to command
and control structures, the allocation of surveillance and reconnaissance assets to
provide targeting information, and investment in munitions and sustainment support.
Similarly, the basing of ABCTs in certain locations requires investment in transportation
and logistics infrastructure so the units can effectively maneuver.
To maintain clarity without losing sight of the importance of the interrelationships
and dependencies, this study presents the options for calibrated force posture in three
parts. First, the following section provides a summary of the various discrete levers
(grouped into five categories) and the underlying trade-offs that must be considered for
each. Second, the following chapter gives a top-down menu of strategic approaches that
group the discrete options into coherent packages accounting for the interrelationships
and dependencies. Finally, the appendices offer comprehensive, detailed descriptions of
each strategic approach.
The various force posture levers fall into the following categories: (1) MDC2, (2) Fires,
(3) BCTs, (4) Footprint, and (5) Other Investments. Of these, the first two categories have
the potential to yield the greatest strategic benefit to deterrence and crisis stability.
Multidomain Command and Control (MDC2)
To increase operational effectiveness and strategic effect, MDC2 is arguably the single
most important lever to pull. This category is also the most complex, uncertain, and
contentious. The fundamental problem is that command and control within the context
of a European armed conflict has two objectives: create the conditions for maximum
contribution by all allies and enhance the operational effectiveness of forces through
better multidomain integration.26 Unfortunately, the dynamics of coalition warfare and
the mechanics of MDO create a tension between mass and effectiveness. This problem
could be mitigated to a certain extent, but the methods to do so require the US Army
make a considerable investment with opportunity costs in terms of force generation
for missions elsewhere. (As noted earlier in this chapter, the announced division

26. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
116th Cong. (January 29, 2019) (statement of Elbridge A. Colby, Director of the Defense Program, Center
for a New American Security). See also Lacey, “Next Great Power Conflict.”
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headquarters would not provide full multidomain capability and so, if it does come to
fruition, the discussion in this section still pertains.)27
Mass requires inclusive command structures. Though all NATO members are
obligated to come to the defense of a member under attack, each retains the sovereign
ability to choose how to respond. The decision of how vigorously to respond to a Russian
attack—and, thus, how much political and military risk to accept—would almost certainly
be the most important decision the government of every Alliance member would make
during its time in office. The natural confusion of a crisis-turned-war situation would be
compounded by Russian information warfare targeting Allied political will.28
The threat of Russian kinetic and nonkinetic weapons, including nuclear weapons,
against the territory of any country responding to the attack might cause allies to retain
capabilities for sovereign defense (for example, combat aircraft, air defense units, and
even ground maneuver formations for contingency response or internal security) and
to restrict or deny access to critical routes, bases, sea, or airports. Many factors would
dictate the response of each Allied government in such a crisis, most of which are
outside of the control of the US military.29 But one important element that could mitigate
Russian efforts to weaken Alliance political and military cohesion is a unified command
structure. Governments are more likely to accept political and military risk when they
have the reassurance that there are officers in key coalition positions who are ultimately
accountable to them.30
Examples of this are Joint Force Command Brunssum, which currently has a German
commander, British deputy commander, and French chief of staff; or Multinational
Corps—Northeast, which alternates the command and deputy command positions
between Germany and Poland.31 Because any conflict with Russia would entail
considerable risk for all of those countries and require them to make exceptional
sacrifices, it is necessary they be fully invested in the operational command structures.
The consensus within the study team is that Russia would only attempt overt aggression
if it believed that Alliance cohesion had deteriorated to the point that NATO would
plausibly lack the political will to fulfill its commitments. This likely precondition for
war means that an inclusive command structure is not a trivial consideration.
As described by The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, the three-star (field
army or corps) echelon has primary responsibility for several critical missions: the
suppression of enemy air defenses (in conjunction with the air component), suppressing
long-range ground fires (a danger to both air and ground campaigns), and defeating
the large integrated fires complex that supports enemy maneuver forces. The first
two missions in particular require the convergence of sensitive capabilities—sensors
and analytical and decision-making technologies—that are and will likely be, at best,
restricted to Five Eyes and in many cases are (or, once fielded, will be) US-only. Yet, to
27. Myers, “It’s Not ‘Fort Trump.’”
28. DIA, Russia Military Power, 32.
29. Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing, 107–110.
30. Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 25–28.
31. “Leadership Staff,” Joint Forces Command Brunssum, NATO, accessed February 14, 2020, https://
jfcbs.nato.int/page582591.aspx.
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employ them effectively at the necessary pace and scale will not permit cumbersome,
time-consuming “tear-line” processes to pass critical information on to allies. Integrating
a mixture of Allies and partners with different levels of access—Five Eyes, other NATO,
and a few others, such as Sweden—by inserting a corps headquarters suddenly in the
midst of a crisis would be impossible. The technical and procedural architecture would
have to be established, trained, and refined far in advance.
To accommodate the necessity for both command inclusiveness and multidomain
effectiveness can be best achieved through the permanent stationing of a multidomain
headquarters in Europe that is integrated into the NATO command structure. A model
for this already exists: The commander of US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) is dualhatted as commander of NATO Air Command. The Air Force is a good analogy, as it has
long faced the challenge of integrating sensitive air, space, and cyber capabilities into
operations. Though coalition warfare will never be seamless, with time to plan, train,
and develop workaround procedures, building a multidomain coalition for land forces is
possible. For instance, a high-end US capability could perhaps cue a Polish BM-21 multiple
rocket launcher to destroy a high-value target within the exacting time constraints on the
first day of a campaign. This objective could be accomplished by mirroring the USAFE/
NATO Air Command structure through the creation of a field army with a commander
dual-hatted as the commanding general of NATO Land Command.
In a Baltic fait accompli scenario, this arrangement would reduce the dilemma
between Alliance mass and multidomain effectiveness. Allies would still have full
representation from the flag officer to action officer level at Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe, the Joint Force Command (Brunssum or Naples), NATO Land
Command, and Multinational Corps—Northeast. Allies and partners would also be
represented within the US field army through exchange and liaison officers. In a crisis,
senior European officers would figure prominently in the public face of the Alliance,
mitigating likely Russian information warfare attempts to cast the response as a concern
of only the Baltic states or the United States. Within the Alliance, having individuals
without American accents speaking to Allied governments and ministries to win support
in critical matters, like the granting of waivers and priority to military traffic, releasing
forces and supplies for Alliance use, and imposing necessary security measures along
lines of communications and sensitive sites, would be of considerable value. Conversely,
in the midst of a political-military crisis, whether inserting a US-only headquarters into
the operational chain of command would be possible or desirable is uncertain. Such
an insertion would entail replacing a headquarters led by German and Polish general
officers (Multinational Corps—Northeast) with an American general in the midst of a
crisis stoked by Russian disinformation and in which political cohesion is the most likely
center of gravity and when the full cooperation of those states is critical. The operational
gain would probably not offset the strategic loss.
To differentiate between the options of having a multidomain headquarters
integrated into NATO as opposed to one that is simply based in Europe, this study will
refer to the first as a field army and the second as a corps. This differentiation assumes the
implementation of the idea of a split between theater and field armies, as described in the
MDO and echelons above brigade concepts. If not, a far more robust US Army Europe
headquarters with an operational MDC2 capability could fulfill the same function.
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An additional consideration is that a Europe-based corps would not be entirely free
for out-of-theater deployment. In the instance of an extended period of heightened
tensions with Russia, deploying the corps to some other region would be a poor political
optic, even if doing so were part of a previously announced rotation of headquarters, as
in the case of Combined Joint Task Force—Operation Inherent Resolve. Ultimately, the
United States might decide to go forward with the deployment, though positioning a
globally available force in Europe would create a potential trap.
The operational and strategic benefits of a field army, however, must be weighed
against the institutional risk in force generation. Integrating a field army headquarters
into NATO means it cannot be employed elsewhere. Three-star headquarters do not
require a large amount of force structure, but they do consume a disproportionate
amount of critical talent and expertise. Though a Europe-based corps would not be
nearly so effective at the beginning of a conflict, it could be used elsewhere. A field army
would be fixed.
One final consideration that weighs against the field army is the uncertainty caused
by Alliance politics. Whatever proposal is put forward will have to go through a
torturous consultation program. Because command and control arrangements are so
important, they are also difficult to change. The current structure reflects an equilibrium
between many competing interests reached through hard-fought bureaucratic battle. The
same would occur with a new field army, so that it is virtually certain that the eventual
outcome would be some compromise from the initial proposal.
The creation of NATO Land Command is instructive. Conducted as part of a larger
Alliance-wide reorganization, several member states opposed the creation of a capable
headquarters; hence, NATO Land Command was limited to just 350 personnel, far too
small to serve its putative function as an operational headquarters. Therefore, the US
Army could pay the institutional price of creating a field army without any guarantee
the realized operational benefit would be equal to the cost. An additional risk is the cost
might rise. Allies may or may not accept a three-star field army placed over any of the
existing NATO corps. Bear in mind that USAFE is a four-star command. If another fourstar billet were not granted, then this would presumably require reduction of US Army
Pacific to a three-star command, putting the Army at odds with the direction of travel of
the remainder of the DoD.
The MDO concept describes a new operational fires command (OFC) headquarters
subordinate to either a field army or corps. The OFC plays a role similar to that of the
old corps artillery headquarters, in that there is a close relationship between the field
army or corps headquarters and the OFC as the planning and executive organizations
for the long-range fires fight, respectively. Because MDO assigns the field army or
corps responsibility for the suppression of enemy ground fires and assisting the air
component with the suppression of enemy air defenses—two fires-centric missions—
therefore, the OFC is the chief executor of that echelon’s primary assigned mission. In
Europe, this mission is even more critical as it makes the OFC organization the Army
organization with primary responsibility for executing operations against the two pillars
of the Russian military system. The suppression of enemy long-range ground fires and
air defenses is the catalyst to both ground maneuver and unleashing the full power of
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the air component. In sum, an OFC is an integral part of making a field army or corps a
multidomain headquarters.
Therefore, the OFC must match the force posture of its operational headquarters.
If it is a Europe-based corps, the OFC should also be available for global use. If it is a
Europe-stationed field army, the OFC should also be designed to work within or closely
alongside the NATO command structure. Building on the comparison with USAFE/
NATO Air Command, the OFC would be like the ground Combined Air Operations
Center. In the last several years, concept papers have circulated within NATO to create
a ground fires command, an increasingly important function with extended range
systems like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems recently acquired by Poland.32
If that concept were to go forward, then the OFC and the new NATO organization
could have a relationship similar to USAFE’s 603rd Air and Space Operations Center
and the NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Uedem. Whether that specific
course would be adopted or some other relationship, the objective would be to bring
necessary US capabilities into the suppression of Russian A2/AD and fires while also
making maximum use of Allied mid- and long-range capabilities. This convergence
of capabilities is particularly important because one problem identified within MDO
development is that the extension of ground fires systems’ ranges has outpaced the
growth of sensors. Even within the US Army, ground commanders will increasingly
find themselves able to shoot further than they can see, unless connected to the larger
Joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture. Allies will be even more
subject to this limitation. The OFC is the critical link in that chain.
Assuming the framework for headquarters proposed in the MDO and echelons
above brigade concepts, the three principal (and mutually exclusive) options for MDC2
in Europe are
• a Europe-based field army and operational fires command built with the intention
of full integration into the NATO operational command structure,
• a Europe-based corps and operational fires command primarily focused on Europe
but globally available, if necessary, and
• the status quo (no three-star multidomain headquarters or operational
fires command).
If the Army decided instead to build corps and division headquarters along the
modularity principle, with the capabilities of the two being essentially the same, then a
fourth option of forward deploying a division headquarters to provide MDC2 would be
worth considering. That option, however, would either limit other options—for example,
no additional fires brigade—or create significant span of control problems, as well as
undermine unity of command by putting a US division in command of capabilities meant
to be used across the area of responsibility of its superior headquarters, Multinational
Corps—Northeast, or some other NATO corps.

32. Former NATO planner, interview by the author, September 13, 2018.
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Long-Range Fires Capability
Ground-based long-range fires open possibilities for the Joint Force to fight in new
ways that would unlock Russian A2/AD systems. Thus, ground-based long-range fires
are a tactical capability that can transform the operational context in a manner that yields
strategic effect.33 This potential, however, brings challenges. Because this capability
can alter the balance of forces within Europe, it has the potential to be strategically
destabilizing, fatally escalatory in a crisis, and divisive among allies. As already noted,
the Army is in the process of creating the 41st Field Artillery Brigade with two battalions
of MLRS. This section assumes that force posture will occur as planned. Within this
study, long-range fires capability refers to the projected Precision Strike Missile (PrSM),
a part of the long-range precision fires modernization priority. Slated for early operating
capacity in 2023, this study assumes that there will be at least two battalions ready for
operational deployment by 2028.34
Regardless of the final form that PrSM takes and when it is available, the Army faces
a significant strategic question in where the first brigade should be positioned. Three
options exist: The unit can be placed in the CONUS and deployed as needed, based in the
Pacific, or based in Europe. To place this decision within context, this is the Army’s top
modernization priority and its most important, potentially transformative, contribution
to how the Joint Force will fight.
This study adopts no specific position on how these long-range fires should be
organized. The basic unit of action could be anywhere from two to four battalions with
or without a brigade headquarters. The Army might create a specialized long-range
field artillery brigade with a distinct organization. Alternatively, long-range battalions
could be incorporated into existing brigades, on a permanent or task-organized
basis, and operate alongside existing battalion types. Depending on the course of
PrSM program development, this might be particularly easy as the basic launcher for
the future PrSM is likely to be the same as the current Army Tactical Missile System
(ATACMS). Uncertainty remains regarding the modifications that might differentiate
the long-range launchers or the additional equipment or capabilities a long-rangecapable battalion would require compared to a typical ATACMS-firing MLRS battalion.
Within the context of Europe, this means that it could be very easy to add two
battalions of PrSM to the existing 41st Field Artillery Brigade. Therefore, the first longrangwe brigade might be either a truly new organization or an existing organization
augmented with long-range battalions.
From an institutional perspective, CONUS is likely the best choice. Fielding a new
capability is a difficult undertaking with inevitable teething pains. A CONUS location
33. TRADOC, Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, 22–25; Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 59–60; Ben
Hodges et al., Securing the Suwałki Corridor, 10; Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing US
Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-INF World (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis,
2019), 20–22, 24–25.
34. “Precision Strike Missile (PrSM),” Acquisition Support Center, US Army, n.d., https://asc.army
.mil/web/portfolio-item/ms-prsm/; Allen Cone, “US Army, Raytheon Complete Preliminary Design
Review of DeepStrike Missile,” UPI, March 26, 2019, https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2019/03/26
/US-Army-Raytheon-complete-preliminary-design-review-of-DeepStrike-missile/5281553615482/; and
Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field, 34–35.
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would generally make it easier to solve those problems, implement solutions, and
disseminate lessons learned. If this institutional learning and development consideration
is most important, then the first unit should be based in CONUS.
But if strategic effectiveness is the most important criterion, then the Army should
elect to place the first unit in either the Pacific or Europe. Superficially, a CONUS
location seems to offer the best of both worlds with the ability to deploy this critical
capability against either of the two major competitors. This seeming flexibility, however,
is illusory. The critical role for long-range fires as envisioned in the MDO concept comes
at the very beginning of the campaign. The capability, which includes not just the
launchers, soldiers, and supporting equipment but also munitions, must be in place to be
of use. Even with a deployment by air it would take several weeks from notification to
move to put a capability sufficient to achieve significant operational effect in place. This
timeline still might not be fast enough to meet operational requirements, and it would
also consume a tremendous portion of scarce strategic lift. A significant opportunity cost
is associated with all of the other capabilities that would otherwise be deployed. As one
recent report noted, an effective, sustained use of long-range missiles requires “a wellconceived support infrastructure.”35 From an operational perspective, therefore, relying
on deploying long-range fires units in time of crisis is a dubious proposition.
Yet, the strategic risk of placing the first long-range unit in CONUS is even
greater. If long-range fires are the truly transformative capability envisioned in
MDO, then relying on moving these forces in time of crisis creates a destabilizing
“1914-like” moment. At that time, the requirements of finely tuned plans to move
mass armies quickly meant that generals presented their governments with the
ultimatum of begin mobilization now or risk defeat. In a narrow sense, the World War
I generals were vindicated in that the easiest gains came early in the war. But World
War I also demonstrates the larger folly of subordinating diplomatic attempts to avoid
great-power conflict to military plans is madness.
For the United States today, the requirement to deploy an essential capability would
place policymakers in the position of having to make a pivotal, escalatory decision
very early in the crisis—perhaps as much as two months before the expected conflict.
Such a scenario would be the opposite of expanding the competitive space; it would
be foreclosing policy options rather than opening them. Moreover, one cannot assume
allies would acquiesce to such a deployment at a time when they would presumably be
seeking to lower tensions. These observations should not be misunderstood as implicit
criticisms of “weak-kneed politicians and diplomats” unwilling or unable to make the
hard choices required for national security. Both American and Allied governments
would have good reason to be reluctant to authorize escalatory actions such as an early
deployment of long-range fires systems. If the potential adversary also regarded the
long-range fires as a critical capability, then it would be under an immense first-strike
pressure to gain the upper hand.36
Thus, if the DoD regards quickly improving the capability to fight a great-power
conflict as an important asset in shaping the larger great-power competition, then the
35. Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field, 14.
36. Frederick et al., Assessing Russian Reactions, 42–44.
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first long-range capable firing unit should be committed either to the Pacific or Europe.
At least for long-range fires, dynamic force employment is not only operationally
unrealistic but strategically dangerous.37 A number of studies have discussed the
potential advantages and challenges of ground-based long-range fires in the Pacific.38
Undoubtedly, that capability would be of use there, but the impression of the study
team is that geopolitical factors and the relative magnitude of the threat mean that the
same size force would have a greater impact in Europe than in the Pacific, where the
biggest obstacle to long-range ground-based fires is the reluctance of partners to allow
access due to both domestic political and foreign policy concerns. No one is eager to
provoke Chinese ire in peace or invite attack in war, particularly in the two locations
where they would do the most good—the Philippines and Okinawa. Moreover, by 2028,
the estimated relative disparity between Russian and Chinese capacity means that it
is far more likely that the addition of Army long-range fires would be the difference
between successful and failed deterrence in Europe. If that rough estimate is correct, then
Army leadership will face a difficult decision: place the long-range fires capability in a
perceived secondary theater where it can have a transformative effect, or in the region
that is the main focus but where long-range fires capability is merely additive.
Though the difficulty of finding suitable basing in a location that actually provides
some operational benefit is more challenging in the Pacific, there would still be
challenges in Europe. A PrSM with a maximum range greater than 500 kilometers would
be associated with the United States’ withdrawal from the INF Treaty, which is very
popular in Europe. This PrSM would require the expenditure of political capital and
willing Allied governments to win acceptance.39 This task would likely be made more
difficult by Russian information and political warfare seeking to prevent deployment or,
at least, make the deployment a wedge issue between the host country and the United
States. Of all the force posture options, the forward stationing of a long-range fires
brigade is the one most likely to elicit the strongest Russian counteraction. This force
posture has the potential to exacerbate training and readiness problems; the training
environment is already restrictive in Europe and a government under public pressure
might impose particularly onerous restrictions on peacetime use. Two firing unit options
exist: (1) station the first long-range fires unit in Europe; or (2) station the first long-range
fires unit in CONUS or the Pacific and deploy to Europe in case of crisis.
Brigade Combat Teams
As described previously in this chapter, the benchmark derived from MDO
development is a full US division ready to conduct operations within several weeks of
the beginning of a cold-start invasion. The heart of the combat capability of a division
configured for Europe is its ABCTs. Militarily, these units provide the bulk of ground
37. Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense, 21–22.
38. Timothy M. Bonds et al., What Role Can Land-Based, Multi-Domain Anti-Access/Area Denial Forces Play
in Deterring or Defeating Aggression? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), xii–xix; and Thomas
G. Mahnken et al., Tightening the Chain: Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, 2019), 28–30.
39. Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 59–60; and Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field, 30–31.
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force combat power and are the fulcrum around which the remainder of the ground
campaign acts. In the words of RAND Corporation senior analyst David Ochmanek,
in a European scenario, “heavy ground forces—ABCTs available from the outset of the
conflict—appear to be the sine qua non of a successful defense,” a judgment borne out
during the development of the MDO concept.40 As the most visible element of ground
combat power, ABCTs might be even more pivotal in deterring an attack. Experienced
Allied military planners who fully understand the importance of enablers and logistics to
produce actual combat power still indicated a strong preference for ABCTs, even at the
expense of these other necessary capabilities. This position is not irrational. Intelligence
services struggle to gauge the degree of sufficiency in adversaries’ sustainment
capabilities. Armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) have an even greater political
salience with Allied policymakers and populations due to their easily understood
symbolic value. The typical newspaper, magazine, or other media infographic of
military strength usually depicts hopelessly simplistic but evocative comparisons of
numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and ships. So, for both political and military
purposes, the ability to deploy three ABCTs in northeastern Poland within a few weeks
of a cold start invasion is important. Significantly, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Elbridge Colby, one of the chief architects of the NDS, noted that one of the few
exceptions to the general trend toward reduction in forward presence should be heavy
forces in Europe.41
The current force posture of one ABCT through the persistent rotational presence
in Poland with eventually two more ABCT equipment sets in APS. This force posture
provides the necessary mass, but not in sufficient time. Unclassified estimates suggest
that it would take two to three months to bring the division together rather than two to
three weeks. This long period of potential vulnerability creates two chief operational and
strategic risks.
The first is a risk of destabilization in a crisis, similar to the 1914 syndrome described
in the fires section. If the United States requires several weeks to bring forces to bear,
then there is a strong incentive for Russia to strike early before its advantage erodes.42
The other risk is that a mission risk caused by the mismatch between the assembly
of the air and ground blunt layers puts the Joint Force commander into the dilemma of
either moderating the air campaign to ensure there are still munitions left for the Joint
counteroffensive, thereby allowing the enemy to consolidate gains and greatly increase
the cost of the conflict, or to accept even greater risk by going forward before forces are
fully formed. Using history as a guide, the latter is more likely; America’s first battles
have often been accompanied by intense political pressure to move more quickly than
has often been militarily sound.43 Russian information warfare is unlikely to make this
40. Ochmanek et al., US Military Capabilities and Forces, 39. See also Frederick et al., Assessing Russian
Reactions, 45–47.
41. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
42. Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 29.
43. John Shy, “First Battles in Retrospect,” in America’s First Battles, 1776–1965, ed. Charles E. Heller
and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 335–339; and Antulio J. Echevarria
II, Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington,
DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 164.
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situation better. The Army would take many months to recover from a failed offensive
with high equipment losses and casualties.44
Several ways to reduce this time gap exist. The most direct method is to forward
station ABCTs. Of note, one recommendation of the National Commission on the Future
of the Army was to forward station an ABCT in Europe.45 One assumption of this study
(see appendix 3) is that existing German bases could accommodate a second mounted
BCT (Stryker or armored) with only modest military construction costs. This assumption
is important because, historically, Congress has been skeptical of large expenditures on
foreign soil. The present administration’s insistence on Allies and partners providing
significant sums to support troops based overseas only sets an already difficult bar that
much higher.46 Moreover, even if DoD approved a significant expansion and Congress
appropriated the funds, the expenditure would come with a large opportunity cost
paid elsewhere.
All these factors suggest the practical limit of forward-stationed mounted troops is
one ABCT and one Stryker BCT (SBCT) or two ABCTs. The latter course, which assumes
reconfiguring the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment or swapping it with a CONUS-based
ABCT, would increase the warfighting combat power supporting Northeastern Allies
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), but would be more difficult and costly to
project into the area of Eastern Partners (Moldova and Ukraine) and Southeastern Allies
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
Romania, and Turkey).47 The consequence would be less US presence, potentially creating
doubts in the minds of those countries’ political and military elites that Russia could
exploit in competition below armed conflict. Other consequences would be significant
short-term implementation costs, as well as turmoil for individuals and units.
An additional difficulty is associated with a second ABCT. The study team also
assumed that the Army would not create an additional ABCT. One option would be
to move an ABCT from CONUS without a backfill. Obviously, the community and its
congressional delegation would fiercely resist this course of action. Perhaps this could
be overcome by repatriating the 173rd BCT (Airborne) from Italy. This move, however,
would not be a straight swap of units, because the garrison at Vicenza cannot support
a mounted unit. The ABCT would go to Germany rather than Italy. Thus, solving the
domestic political problem with a complex three-way move would create a diplomatic
problem. Italy is an important partner with which the United States has a complex web of
service, Joint, and national interactions and dependencies.48 With so many stakeholders,
it was impossible for the team to determine the feasibility or desirability of this course of
44. Lacey, “Next Great Power Conflict.”
45. NCFA, Army for the Future, 52–53.
46. Aaron Mehta, “Shanahan: Charging Allies to House US troops, Plus 50 Percent
Surcharge, Isn’t Happening,” Defense News, March 14, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com
/pentagon/2019/03/14/shanahan-charging-allies-cost-plus-50-percent-for-basing-not-happening/.
47. John R. Deni, Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve
Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army
War College, 2017).
48. Former US Army attaché to Italy, interview by the author, April 11, 2019.
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action. What was obvious was that it cannot be taken for granted that the Army would
be permitted to make the move and, if it did, it would require a considerable amount of
senior leader and staff effort.
One much discussed option for forward stationing is to place forces, including ABCTs,
in permanent bases in Poland.49 From a military perspective, the study team viewed this
option as a variant with few important factors to distinguish it from the same number
of ABCTs based in Germany. As discussed earlier, MDO wargaming suggests that it is
necessary to be able to bring three ABCTs into northeastern Poland several weeks into
a conflict. If the permanent base is at a location west of the Vistula, such as the current
base for rotational forces at Żagań, only a marginal gain would result in terms of the
ability to get to tactical assembly area because the main obstacle to military mobility is
still between the permanent base and conflict/wartime positions.
Even if the base were east of the Vistula, to achieve the essential mass would still
require bringing additional Allied and US forces across Poland; peacetime improvements
to and wartime protection of lines of communications across eastern Germany and
through Poland would still be necessary. Of course, having some forces essentially
already in position would be advantageous, but this would be somewhat lessened by the
exposure of bases (and service families) to mass enemy fires. Moreover, that vulnerability
would provide some measure of escalation advantage to the adversary. A deployed
ABCT is a difficult target; an ABCT in garrison is extremely vulnerable. As a general
rule, it would be prudent to have any permanent and critical static infrastructure outside
of the range of Russian 300mm MLRS. In short, there are some differences between a
German- and Polish-based maneuver force posture, but neither does much to change the
larger theater requirements to conduct a successful large-scale ground campaign.
Though the operational differences between forward stationing an ABCT in Germany
and doing so in Poland may be slight, significant strategic and policy implications are
associated with these options. Permanently stationed forces in Poland would have
greater reassurance value for the Poles.50 The shift might also reassure some other allies
by suggesting greater American commitment to the Alliance, if the move were portrayed
in that light. If the change was described as purely transactional and a shift in the
importance of two bilateral relations, then logically, other allies would feel that it had
little bearing on their own interests.
By far the greatest impact of such a shift would come in the sphere of policy. Russia,
and even many allies, would see permanent forces in Europe as a violation of both
informal agreements and ratified treaties, almost certainly leading to a situation like the
withdrawal of the INF Treaty with countering accusations as to whether the agreements
during the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and
1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and
49. Michael Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka, “Fort Trump: A Silly Name Masks a Good Idea,”
Defense One, September 21, 2018; and Michael Kofman, “Permanently Stationing US Forces in Poland Is a Bad
Idea, but One Worth Debating,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10
/permanently-stationing-u-s-forces-in-poland-is-a-bad-idea-but-one-worth-debating/.
50. Deni, Rotational Deployments, 31–32; and Grzegorz Kuczyński and Krzystof Kamiński, U.S. Permanent
Military Base in Poland: Favorable Solution for the NATO Alliance (Warsaw, Poland: Warsaw Institute, 2019),
20–22.
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the Russian Federation have been violated and by which side.51 Whether such a furor is
desirable is a question of policy beyond the scope of this study.
In terms of operational effectiveness, rotational brigades are virtually equivalent to
forward stationed brigades; both are ready in-place forces. In strategic effect, however,
there are differences due to the lack of permanence of the reversibility of the arrangement.
Rotational forces represent less commitment on the part of the United States and so have
less reassurance value from the perspective of the ally or partner.52 Nonetheless, as the
preceding discussion suggests, the practical alternative for allies like Poland is not a
forward-stationed ABCT, but an APS ABCT, or perhaps none at all. In that context, they
would undoubtedly prefer a rotational ABCT.
An open question within the study team is whether the US Army should or can
sustain the current model of rotational forces. Two main concerns are associated with
this question. The first is the potential impact on overall Army force generation and
morale. Limited evidence suggests morale in some of the first units to conduct rotations
suffered.53 Even if morale did suffer, the same effect might not continue in the future.
Morale reflects expectations met or unmet, and how soldiers in years past responded
to a new process tells us little about how those in the future will react to an established
practice. This observation is even more applicable because the Army is undergoing a
significant shift in operational patterns. Many captains of 2028 are still cadets, yet some
staff sergeants of 2028 are still just entering the service. Why that next generation joined
(or will join) and with what expectations, and what their experiences will be between
then and now are quite different than those of the study team. Will mid-career leaders,
officers and noncommissioned officers in 2028, particularly those in the branches and
Military Occupational Specialties that reside primarily within ABCTs tire of an extended
treadmill of rotational deployments (currently Europe, Korea, and Kuwait)?
Without foreknowledge of general service operations tempo over the next several
years, one cannot say whether an extended rotational posture would cause difficulties
or not. The US Marine Corps maintains an aggressive deployment tempo, but it also
has a rank structure designed for high turnover in first-term marines, a luxury because
of that service’s dependence on the Army and Navy for provision of many services
and functions that tend to be more rank-heavy. Additionally, the US Marine Corps is
smaller and does not have such a large recruiting demand. One cannot be certain the
Marine Corps’ model can be successfully scaled up to the Army; to an extent, the answer
depends on whether future economic conditions are favorable to recruiting.
One mitigating option discussed would be to include reserve component ABCTs in
deployments to Europe. Reserve component units are already used in similar fashion in
Korea and the Middle East. Perhaps the employer support seen in those other regions
51. “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces”; “Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance”; and “Official Text:
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation
signed in Paris, France,” NATO, updated October 12, 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/official_texts_25468.htm. See also Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, The 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act
Does Not Prohibit Permanent NATO Bases in Eastern Europe (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2016).
52. Deni, Rotational Deployments, 31–32; Kuczyński and Kamiński, U.S. Permanent Military Base in
Poland, 20–22.
53. Deni, Rotational Deployments, 32–34.
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would not carry over to missions to Europe. One scenario given was a small business
owner suffering through short-staffing problems who turns to social media to see a
picture of his or her National Guard employee sitting in civilian clothes and enjoying
a Polish meal and beer.54 Once again, one cannot predict the cost of sustaining a large
rotational presence for several more years—the answer depends on events that have not
yet occurred and decisions that have not yet been made—but the possibility that the
practice would cause some problems must be considered.
The other potential problem is the significant cost of deploying and redeploying an
ABCT’s worth of equipment every nine months. Earlier studies found that in absolute
terms, forward stationing is generally the less expensive option under most conditions.55
One of the great advantages of rotational forces, however, is that to this point, the greater
cost burden has fallen mainly upon funding from the European Deterrence Initiative
(formerly known as the European Reassurance Initiative).56 As the European Deterrence
Initiative transitions from the Overseas Contingency Operations account to the military
base budget, rotational presence will be placed in direct competition with other activities
paid for with service Operations and Maintenance Funds.57 Without knowledge of the
global demands of 2028, one cannot say whether such an expensive method of providing
rotational presence would continue to have a positive cost-benefit calculation. Costs
can be reduced by having units rotate through on a permanent set of equipment, but
that raises other issues of where an additional set of equipment would come from.
Maintaining a rotational ABCT with in-theater equipment essentially requires four sets
of equipment: the forward set and the home-station equipment sets of the three ABCTs
rotating through deployments. This trade-off of needing additional equipment sets to
maintain rotational forces was noted by the National Commission on the Future of the
Army, which in its recommendations 14 and 18 argued for either an ABCT forward
stationed in Europe or an increase in overall ABCT capacity.58
One advantage of using in-place equipment is that with the proper facilities and
sustainment contracts, the set in Poland could be employed as either a basis for APS or
rotational forces. The set being employed in such a way would provide some institutional
flexibility to adjust presence according to the situation. When the threat from Russia was
low and budgets were strained, or when operations elsewhere put severe operations
tempo strain on the Army, the set could be kept in APS status. When the threat increased
or money and units were available, the set could be used with a rotational unit.
The final option for providing ABCTs within weeks is APS. Though plans exist to
build up the APS in Europe to two ABCTs, they cannot meet the time requirements of
the MDO concept. One current estimate is drawing the first ABCT worth of equipment
would take 30 days, and then additional weeks for the unit to move across Europe and
54. Brad Striegel, “Maintaining the Operational Reserve,” Small Wars Journal, January 16, 2016,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/maintaining-operational-reserve; and former National Guard
Division G-2, interview by the author, January 10, 2019.
55. Deni, Rotational Deployments, 17–26; and Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing, 176–177, 223–224, 233.
56. Breedlove and Vershbow, Permanent Deterrence, 2.
57. NCFA, Army for the Future, 40.
58. NCFA, Army for the Future, 52–54.
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deploy into position.59 This time can be reduced, but doing so will require staff effort and
additional resources to address the several interrelated components of APS readiness.
Any force posture that depends on APS units concentrated in just a few sites creates
both an obvious vulnerability and a destabilizing “first-mover” incentive for Russia to
conduct a quick strike if it suspects war is imminent, as well as a dangerously inviting
target for low-yield nuclear weapons. These factors will be discussed later in the section
titled “Additional Investments.” All three options for providing ABCTs come with some
form of institutional cost.
Activity Footprint
In contrast to the earlier sections, which described the stationing of specific formations, the
activity footprint element refers to actions of all sorts (training, advisory visits, deployments)
conducted by any Army forces, regardless of whether they are permanently stationed in
Europe.The question is: How widely dispersed or how narrowly focused should that
activity be?
For the purposes of this study, activity is divided into four geographic regions:
Northeastern Allies (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland), Southeastern Allies
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
Romania, and Turkey), Eastern Partners (Moldova and Ukraine), and Southeastern
Partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia).
As this study is focused on 2028, these divisions do not entirely correlate with the
current status of these countries with respect to NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina
and North Macedonia are currently aspiring members, but are included with the
Southeastern Allies due to both their potential to become Allies by 2028 and because
US forces can operate with them without the same level of political sensitivity as is the
case with Georgia and Ukraine, which are also considered aspiring members of NATO.
Likewise, this study considers Moldova and Ukraine as potential partners: at present,
one political question in both countries is to what extent they should be aligned with
Europe and the United States or with Russia. The US Army must consider the possibility
that it will be called upon to work with either or both in 2028—whether that is actually
the case remains to be seen. Similarly, this study accounts for the possibility that the US
Army would be called upon to partner with any or all of the Southeastern Partners in
2028 without making any prediction as to the likelihood of that possibility.
Footprint also includes the subcategory of the National Guard State Partnership
Program (SPP), which currently covers all but two countries (Greece and Turkey)
within the four activity regions.60 The program is decentralized and enduring, which
are both weaknesses and strengths. The program’s activities cannot be easily scaled up
in response to rapid changes in theater priorities, but neither do they fall prey to the
tyranny of the present fight at the expense of long-term priorities. Even the two strategic
59. Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 29.
60. “State Partnership Program Map,” State Partnership Program, National Guard, accessed
February 18, 2020, https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Documents/J-5/InternationalAffairs
/StatePartnershipProgram/SPP-Map-78.png?ver=2019-12-12-102145-720.
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approaches that adopt a purposefully narrow regional focus (see chapter 5) envisioned
that SPP in the nonpriority areas would continue.
The study team divided the regions among Allies and partners to note the important
policy and legal distinctions between the two groups. Though the relative importance
of any individual country to the United States is the product of many factors, some of
which change over time, in general terms, Allies are more important than partners. In
both armed conflict and competition below armed conflict, the United States is more
likely to expend resources and accept political and operational risk on behalf of an ally
than a partner. In the case of NATO Allies, the Joint Force operates with Allies more
easily due to high levels of interoperability and standing agreements and authorities for
combined action.
These political and military factors also influence Russian actions. From the Kremlin’s
perspective, a greater risk is associated with operating against US Allies—whether
competition below armed conflict or armed conflict—than operating against partners.
This risk does not mean Russia will not conduct aggression against Allies; rather, it
means a higher bar is set for those whom the United States and NATO have pointedly
not offered the same level of assurance. The corollary of this dynamic, however, is when
Russia does act against Allies, it will have factored in this increased level of risk. The
most extreme case would be overt armed aggression against an ally, which would signal
either a supremely confident or desperate regime willing to dare the nuclear umbrella
of extended deterrence. In this most dangerous scenario, deterrence by punishment or
through horizontal escalation is unlikely to succeed, because the Kremlin would have
already either discounted the possibility due to perceived weakness in Western political
resolve or already “priced in” the cost of these measures to the decision.
A different geopolitical dynamic is at work in the partner countries. Though as
chapter 2 demonstrates, Russia believes it has the right to exert influence in all four
regions, it does not accord all of them equal weight. The two partner regions are more
important to the Kremlin, and so US actions there are far more likely to provoke a
response. A policy asymmetry exists between the United States and Russia in the partner
countries, which are the most important to the Kremlin and, as indicated by their nonally status, less important to the United States. Russia has demonstrated significant
resolve to operate in both regions, particularly when it seems they are drawing closer to
the United States, the EU, and NATO.
Additional Investments
This miscellaneous category includes an array of additional resource-intensive options
required either to enable other options in the other categories (for example, munitions
stockpiles, improved lines of communications) or to mitigate weaknesses (for example,
hardening for facilities, increased air defenses). All the options are self-evidently
desirable and would, in an unconstrained environment, be implemented. In reality,
calibrated force posture must reflect a balance of three different types of demand
that they place upon the Army: (1) implementation cost (one-time costs to establish the
capability or activity), (2) sustaining cost (enduring costs to maintain the capability or
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activity), and (3) global availability cost (strategic and operational risk or opportunity costs
associated with not being able to employ the capability elsewhere).61
To provide a rough approximation of affordability and the necessity for difficult
trade-offs, the study team assumed that only one option from each category could be
selected. Though a simplification of both the bureaucratic and political considerations of
resource allocation, the exercise highlights some of the difficult trade-offs. Readers who
are optimistic about future defense appropriations can assume instead that two from
each category can be selected, but they will quickly see that even in that rosy scenario,
there are still hard choices.
These three investments would have a high implementation cost:
• Long-range munitions: The DoD, Congress, and national security observers
acknowledge that current stockpiles of preferred munitions fall well short of the
requirements of even a limited great-power conflict.62 The complexity of modern
supply chains, the lack of excess capacity borne of modern corporate efficiency
practices, the requirement for cutting-edge production expertise and equipment,
and vulnerability to cyber disruption or sabotage, ensure that in a war it would
take many months to significantly increase production. Therefore, for the period
described in The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028, former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s controversial observation “You go to war with the
Army you have” is true. Stationing a long-range fires brigade in Europe makes
little sense if that move is not matched with the investment in enough on-hand
munitions for it to fulfill its critical role in suppressing Russian A2/AD systems.
• Lines of communications improvements: The United States faces a potential enemy
with multiple means to interdict and slow operations in the support areas. To mitigate this threat, The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 notes the importance
of having multiple lines of communication to provide redundancy and complicate
enemy reconnaissance and targeting. Yet, traces of the Cold War remain in the
differential between Western European infrastructure and that of former members of the Warsaw Pact. Projecting and sustaining forces across eastern Germany,
Poland, and into the Baltics and other eastern European countries within a largescale combat operation would be so difficult as to seriously constrain operational
choice even without enemy action. The limited number of crossing points across
the Vistula poses another problem.63 Improving lines of communications across
Europe, but particularly in eastern Germany and Poland, is necessary to provide
the kind of capacity and redundancy envisioned by the concept. This need—along
with the importance of more heavy forces and adequate stockpiles of munitions—
was highlighted by Colby in recent Senate testimony.64
61. Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing, 168–169.
62. Todd South, “What Army Leaders Say Will Make Precision Fires, Missile Defense Ready
for Looming Threats in the Pacific,” Army Times, May 29, 2019, https://www.armytimes.com/news
/your-army/2019/05/29/what-army-leaders-say-will-make-precision-fires-missile-defense-ready-for
-looming-threats-in-the-pacific/; and Implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
63. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis wargame in Washington, DC on January 15–16, 2019.
64. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
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• Dispersal and Hardening: If the United States is going to station military forces
within range of large numbers of adversary weapon systems, it may need to employ
a diverse strategy of active defenses, passive defenses, and either hardening or
dispersal to reduce the effectiveness of such weapons against key sustainment and
command and control nodes. Allied vulnerability to a strike—particularly when
using an approach that relies on APS equipment sets—is destabilizing in a crisis
because it offers Russia an opportunity for a quick win.65
These three investments would have a high sustaining cost:
• Deployment exercises: During his testimony, Colby specifically noted the importance of deployment exercises designed to build real readiness for a high-end conflict with Russia as a necessary step envisioned by the NDS.66 The 2020 Defender
exercise will certainly meet that goal; it will be the largest, most focused such
exercise since the Cold War.67 Yet, one question is whether the immense cost of
continuing such exercises as planned can be sustained. In 2016, the Government
Accounting Office warned that the far less ambitious Pacific Pathways exercises,
although undoubtedly useful in building multinational readiness, might be unsustainable.68 Defender will likely suffer from the same tensions; it will build readiness, provide visible evidence of US and NATO readiness, and reassure Allies
of American commitment. This progress, however, will come at a high cost and,
in the zero-sum realm of budgets, at the expense of other actions, such as other
investments in this section. These costs raise the question of whether the Defender
exercises can and should be sustained into the future as currently planned. The
gains must be weighed against the opportunity costs.
• Enhanced APS status: Rapid APS draw is possible. In the 1990s, the APS in Kuwait
was paired with a Defense Ready Brigade, the lead battalion headquarters and several companies of which were ready to fly within 72 hours of notification. Achieving this responsiveness, however, requires more costly maintenance arrangements
to keep equipment in a hot (ready to draw) status. Achieving this responsiveness
also requires improvement to local transportation infrastructure to accommodate
combat-loaded equipment moving out at faster rates. Finally, all the benefits of
increased readiness for the equipment are lost if units in the United States are
not held at a corresponding state of readiness. The Defense Ready Brigade status
of the 1990s was highly restrictive, impacting both morale and readiness. Units
can only remain at enhanced readiness for limited durations, requiring frequent
rotation which has secondary effects on overall force generation. Without some
reduction in the number of existing rotational deployments, the pool of ABCTs
65. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy; Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics, 5; and
Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing, 115.
66. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy.
67. “Defender-Europe 20,” US Army Europe, n.d., https://www.eur.army.mil/DefenderEurope/.
68. Government Accountability Office, Army Pacific Pathways: Comprehensive Assessment and Planning
Needed to Capture Benefits Relative to Costs and Enhance Value for Participating Units (Washington, DC:
Government Accountability Office, 2016), 14–15.
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(even including the reserve component) would most likely not be able to sustain
heightened readiness status in addition to three rotational commitments.
• Regional expertise: Regional expertise is a broad category that can take many
forms: language proficiency; cultural familiarity; tactics, techniques, procedures,
and fieldcraft applicable to the specific environment; and detailed knowledge of
the capabilities and patterns of operations of Allies, partners, and adversaries. US
Army Special Forces and the French Army’s expeditionary troops demonstrate
not only the operational value of true regional expertise but also the significant
investment required to build it throughout conventional forces.69
These three investments would involve the use of capabilities that have a high
global demand:
• Logistics and mobility capability: As noted at the beginning of the chapter, the
current force posture is insufficient to sustain large-scale combat operations as
described in the MDO concept. Table 1 suggests the scale of the difficulty required
to move an ABCT from a site in Germany to Poland or the Baltic region. The shortage of heavy equipment transporters is a particularly significant limitation but
by far the only shortfall.70 Yet, many of the capabilities required to move and sustain forces at such scale are currently largely or solely resident within the reserve
components. Therefore, increasing capacity in Europe would be doubly challenging in that it would require balancing force structure not only across mission sets
and geography but components as well. Nonetheless, particularly for strategic
approaches that place a premium on dynamic force employment and APS, such
changes are necessary for success.
• Theater air and missile defense: At present, US Army theater air and missile
defense rests upon the twin pillars of the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Air
Defense systems. In Europe, these systems operate in conjunction with the air
defense systems of Allies and partners; 15 nations have or are in the process of
acquiring Patriot.71 These systems also operate in conjunction with Joint systems,
such as Aegis (both ashore and on ship) and air-launched interceptors. Yet, even
with this impressive array of systems, there is a far greater demand for protection
of political, economic, and military assets than can possibly be met by Patriot and
Terminal High Altitude Air Defense. The cost of those systems per intercept is
simply too high to allow significant expansion. Currently, the Army is investigating a number of technologies such as high-energy lasers, microwave weapons,
69. Michael Shurkin, “What It Means to Be Expeditionary: A Look at the French Army in Africa,” Joint
Forces Quarterly 82 (3rd Quarter 2016), 76–85.
70. Ochmanek et al., US Military Capabilities and Forces, 40. See also, Jen Judson, “US Army
Europe Chief: NATO Allies Should Bolster Infrastructure,” Defense News, June 20, 2017, https://www
.defensenews.com/land/2017/06/20/us-army-europe-chief-nato-allies-should-bolster-infrastructure;
and Ben Hodges and Alexander Schaltuper, “In Defence of Logistics,” New Europe, updated February 15,
2019, https://www.neweurope.eu/article/in-defence-of-logistics/.
71. Lidia Kelly, “Poland Signs $4.75 Billion Deal for U.S. Patriot Missile System Facing
Russia,” Reuters, March 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-raytheon-poland-patriot
/poland-signs-4-75-billion-deal-for-u-s-patriot-missile-system-facing-russia-idUSKBN1H417S.
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and hypervelocity rounds that might provide protection against at least cruise
missile attack at cost that would permit widespread deployment.72 Until those systems are fielded, however, even though Russian ballistic and cruise missiles pose a
significant threat, the team does not recommend increased theater air and missile
defense posture in Europe.
• Special forces: Special forces can provide a wide range of valuable contributions in
both competition below armed conflict and armed conflict.73 Special forces also are
some of the most in-demand units with a high operations tempo.74
Table 1. Lift assets required for unit types required in a Baltic scenario75
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CHAPTER 5. A STRATEGIC DESIGN FOR CALIBRATED FORCE POSTURE
The introduction and first three chapters outlined the essential elements of the
problem. The US Army, as part of a Joint and multinational force, must deter or defeat
aggression across the competition continuum in a manner consistent with the dynamic
employment of forces worldwide. Though this statement is derived from the current
NDS, it is entirely consistent with the historic employment of the US Army, characterized
by the pragmatic application of force within a broad range of settings, responsive to
political direction, and also conscious of the need to husband resources.1 Regardless
of the specific points of emphasis contained within the NDS, which is undoubtedly
a reorientation of the DoD, the NDS nevertheless falls within the broad outlines of
traditional American military policy. This continuity makes it as sound a policy basis on
which to base this study as any.
The NDS is unusual in the specificity with which it prioritizes missions and regions.
Previous comparable documents have not been so decisive.2 Nonetheless, the NDS is
not so prescriptive or exact that it does not pass on some hard decisions to the services.
Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best
navigates the tensions between three priorities identified by the NDS and represented
in figure 5. Any acceptable solution must fall within the bounds of all three—none can
simply be disregarded as unimportant—but that does leave scope for hard decisions as
to which elements should be privileged over the others.

Figure 5. Conceptual diagram of strategic trade-offs
Arguably, the bottom apex represents what is the driving constraint: the need to
maintain maximum flexibility in a world where potential threats vastly outweigh
available resources. In practical terms, this entails keeping as large a pool of capabilities
1. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution
to Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 1–58.
2. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy: Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
116th Cong. (January 29, 2019) (statement of Elbridge A. Colby, Director of the Defense Program, Center
for a New American Security).
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as possible in readiness to deploy against a number of possible threats. This potential
for employment allows any given force element to shape competition below armed
conflict and deter armed conflict against multiple adversaries simultaneously. Though
the idea has gained new currency within DoD because of the emphasis on great-power
competition, which makes competition for resources particularly acute, the Army’s
preference has long been for service retained forces. Generally speaking, uncommitted
forces provide greater institutional flexibility.3 This imperative creates a downward
pressure on overseas force structure.
The benefits of retaining geographic flexibility with dynamic force employment, or
in maintaining a minimal contact layer in the terminology of the NDS’ global operating
model, is in tension with the requirement of great-power competition. The scale and
nature of the Russian threat, particularly the ability to mass quickly with interior lines
behind an A2/AD shield, means that forces husbanded in the United States might be
rendered irrelevant because they cannot get to the point of need in time to alter the
strategic balance. Both the authors of the NDS and the congressional commission created
to review the document share this concern.4 This concern is particularly acute for the
Army because it faces greater physical constraints in deployment that force a choice
between being ready for great-power conflict and maintaining flexibility. Some ways to
mitigate this dilemma exist—by employing rotational forces, prepositioned equipment
and supplies, for example—but, as discussed in the previous chapter, these have their
own drawbacks and ultimately can only go so far. The relevance of large-scale, sustained
ground forces is dependent on forward force posture to a greater extent than the
other services.
As noted in Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum, one should not regard
competition below armed conflict and armed conflict as distinct and unrelated entities.
Success in great-power competition depends on competence to do both. The potential for
armed conflict shapes the conditions for competition below armed conflict, strengthening
or weakening positions depending on the circumstances. Similarly, competition below
armed conflict can both set the conditions for success in war and obviate the need for it
by achieving some policy objectives without fighting.5
Despite this tight theoretical relationship between armed conflict and competition
below armed conflict, in the context of ground forces in Europe, no tension exists between
the two. This lack of tension is a consequence of specific geopolitical and military
factors. The most important is that Russia only has the capability to conduct large-scale
operations against US Allies with a reasonable hope of success in Northeastern Europe
due to the combination of local military superiority and geography. The problem of
3. Michael J. Lostumbo et al., Overseas Basing of US Military Forces: An Assessment of Relative Costs and
Strategic Benefits (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 81.
4. Implementation of the National Defense Strategy; and Eric Edelman et al., Providing for the Common
Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC:
US Institute of Peace, 2018), 21–22, 34–35, 41–42.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018). See also J. P. Clark, “Military Operations and the Defense Department,” in Oxford Handbook of
US National Security, ed. Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2018), 292–294.
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deterring and defeating armed conflict is, therefore, relatively straightforward: place
adequate combat power in position to eliminate the force ratios that would make a fait
accompli attack a viable means for Russia to achieve its desired strategic objectives. For
example, Russia has far more opportunities to conduct large-scale ground operations
against partners such as Ukraine and Georgia.6 This threat requires a force posture with
emphasis on MDC2, fires, and heavy maneuver forces concentrated in the area of risk.
In contrast, Russia can conduct competition below armed conflict throughout Europe
and through an array of means—covert and overt—ranging from simple propaganda
from attributed and unattributed sources to the employment of Russian troops and
proxies in intense, if localized, combat. Indeed, this competition below armed conflict is
occurring throughout Europe and the United States. Because competition of that sort is
largely informational and strikes at the political cohesion of NATO, military power can
best support the larger effort by spreading visible presence among many partners.
The interconnection among the elements of the competition continuum means a
buildup of heavy forces in northeastern Europe would have a beneficial effect in the
competition below armed conflict there. With no fear of a Russian escalation to armed
conflict, US Allies in the specific area would be more confident in taking aggressive
actions to push back against Russian activities of all kinds. But in an environment of
limited resources, a greater concentration in the area of Northeastern Allies would
presumably mean less activity elsewhere, which could cause the political and military
elites in those areas to doubt American commitment; therefore, Northeastern Allies
would be vulnerable to Russian political warfare. The consensus among Russian experts
interviewed for this study was the Balkans and Black Sea region are more likely to be the
focus of Russian competition in the upcoming years than the Baltic region.
Therefore, the best force posture to counter competition below armed conflict is
to spread across as wide a geographic area as possible a mixture of mobile maneuver
forces, regionally aligned troops like the security force assistance brigade (SFAB) and
SPP, special operations forces, and a mixture of enablers, particularly intelligence. If the
global operating model and service requirements elsewhere did not exert downward
pressure, both armed conflict and competition below armed conflict could easily be
accommodated in Europe. But to the extent that there is a cap on overseas end strength,
the two elements are in tension. In sum, the question is whether heavy forces should be
focused in support of Northeastern Allies to counter Russian local military superiority or
more mobile forces and enablers should be spread more broadly across Europe.
POTENTIAL STRATEGIC APPROACHES
Chapter 4 provided an overview of the advantages, disadvantages, and considerations
for the most important force posture options. In a world of limitless resources or only
one overarching geostrategic threat, the US Army would want to select some or all these
6. Ben Hodges et al., Securing the Suwałki Corridor: Strategy, Statecraft, Deterrence, and Defense
(Washington, DC: Center for European Policy Analysis, 2018), 3–4; David Ochmanek et al., US Military
Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the US Approach to Force Planning (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 36–38; Ulrich Kühn, Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook
(Washington, DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), 25; and Implementation of the National
Defense Strategy.
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options: MDC2 as well as significant maneuver forces, robust activity with Northeastern
Allies and with Southeastern Partners, money spent on large deployment exercises
and on dispersal and hardening, more logistics and mobility capacity as well as special
forces. Unfortunately, choices must be made among all of these desirable options.
Making these selections individually as isolated, discrete decisions may lead to an
occasionally conflicting series of choices calculated to achieve short-term gain (or avoid
short-term costs) but that are more costly in the long run and, more importantly, fail
to deliver strategic effect. The better course is to assemble packages of complementary
options reflecting a coherent top-down strategic approach. Some of these levers go
together naturally as part of a large strategic approach that tends toward one aspect of
the triangle depicted above.
To create these strategic approaches, the study team created three initial force
postures based on a unifying principle. The team selected those levers that were most
important for that approach and took risk in areas that were not. Within the area of
additional investments, the study team assumed that it could choose only one option
from each of the three categories (high implementation cost, high sustaining cost, and
high demand capabilities). The other major constraint was the assumption that Congress
would allow only two forward stationed BCTs (or equivalent). The first three strategic
approaches were privilege dynamic force employment, privilege global competition, and
privilege armed conflict. The choice of the verb privilege was an acknowledgment that while
one element can be considered more important, an acceptable force posture must strike
an appropriate balance among all three.
As part of the analysis, the study team gauged cost to implement, cost to sustain,
and any other challenges requiring institutional effort to overcome. Privilege armed
conflict was a close approximation of one of the more successful postures used during
the development of the MDO concept. Due to the NDS’ emphasis on great-power
competition, the study team regarded it as an informal baseline in the initial stages of
analysis. But as work progressed, the significant trade-offs, costs, and challenges that
would be required with a full implementation of this strategic approach became clear.
An effort that was too ambitious might cause the Army to fail in implementation. Based
on this realization, the team created two additional strategic approaches—invest in a
multidomain alliance and build visible presence—by breaking privilege armed conflict into
two constituent parts, what we refer to as the “multidomain package” and the “presence
package.” Either of these strategic approaches offers the option of implementing the other
package at some later time, thereby creating the privilege armed conflict posture, only over
a longer period. Creating this posture over a longer period increases the probability of
success by focusing effort and allows adjustments to account for the inevitable changes
in the strategic, political, and fiscal environment.
This chapter will provide brief overviews of each of the strategic approaches, but
appendix 1 contains a comprehensive description of each.
Privilege Dynamic Force Employment
The NDS places an emphasis on an active but relatively thin contact layer to resource
robust blunt and surge forces. This approach (see figure 6) hinges upon the ability to
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project, quickly and reliably, these blunt and surge forces despite an adversary’s ability
to contest strategic lines of communication.

Figure 6. Privilege dynamic force employment
Privilege Global Competition
Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford’s force
development division was for a future Joint Force poised in something similar to a
boxer’s stance that “conserves energy while keeping the fighter balanced, protected,
and ready to throw quick, powerful punches.”7 This strategic approach (see figure 7)
offers visible reassurance to Allies, reflecting the insight that political will more than
military capability is the center of gravity for NATO. This approach also accounts for
continued competition below armed conflict—a far more likely scenario than armed
conflict—while also providing the Army institutional maneuver space to respond in case
of crises elsewhere or to adjust to changes in budget. Yet, in contrast to the “strict NDS”
approach, it recognizes that the meaning of dynamic force employment is quite different
for large-scale, sustained ground operations than for air or naval forces.

Figure 7. Privilege global competition
7. Joseph E. Dunford Jr., “From the Chairman: Maintaining a Boxer’s Stance,” Joint Force Quarterly 86
(3rd Quarter, 2017): 2.
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Major features of this force posture are as follows.
• The Army positions a corps and OFC in Europe but keeps the corps outside of
NATO command structures so that they are available for global use.
• Long-range fires units and munitions are deployed from the United States in time
of crisis.
• The current maneuver force posture of 2nd SCR in Germany and 173rd BCT (Airborne) in Italy is maintained.
• The rotational ABCT location in Poland is transitioned to APS site in addition to
the two ABCTs in APS in Western Europe. The need to draw and deploy up to
three ABCTs quickly in a crisis requires investment in lines of communications,
enhanced APS status, and an increase in logistics and mobility capability. This
requirement accepts risk to the APS sites themselves because the Army does not
invest in dispersal and hardening or air and missile defenses for those locations.
• Army forces conduct activity in aggressive support of policy. Both USAREUR-based
forces (for example, 2nd SCR, 173rd BCT [Airborne]) and CONUS-based forces
(SFAB, rotational units) conduct activities in areas either to counter Russian competition below armed conflict or, when dictated by policy aims, to preemptively
increase influence and undermine Russian influence. The geographic focus of this
aggressive competition will be dictated by circumstances and policy, but would
possibly include activities in the area of Eastern and Southeastern Partners, such as
Ukraine and Georgia. An increase in special forces in Europe would be desirable,
but one feature of this strategic approach is an emphasis on global competition, so
it assumes the high demand for these forces elsewhere precludes such a buildup.
Furthermore, the need to draw APS quickly in a crisis requires this approach to
invest resources in building logistics and mobility capability at the expense of warfighting capabilities.
• The buildup of logistics and mobility capability in Europe might require reallocation of capabilities among the components.
Privilege Armed Conflict
The threat of a fait accompli attack stems not from an overwhelming Russian
superiority but the unique combination of geography and force ratios in the Baltic region.
This approach (see figure 8) narrowly focuses force posture to reduce that specific area
of Russian superiority. It most closely matches the requirements identified during MDO
concept development.
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Figure 8. Privilege armed conflict
Major features of this force posture are as follows.
• The Army commits a field army and OFC to Europe with the intention of integrating them into NATO command structures.
• The Army places the first tranche of long-range fires units in Europe and invests in
sufficient on-hand stockpile to allow these units to enable air and ground maneuver for several weeks of operations. A significant challenge of this option is that it
accepts risk in the Pacific until the second tranche of units and munitions are ready
for deployment. The other major challenge is that stationing a non-INF compliant
system in Europe, particularly in Germany, would require significant effort.
• The 2nd SCR is replaced with an ABCT (or repurposed into a similar armored
cavalry regiment). The 173rd BCT (Airborne) is returned to a CONUS location to
bring an ABCT to Germany. This option brings additional political challenges,
both in bilateral relations with Italy as well as with the need to secure significant
Outside CONUS military construction funds.
• Rotational presence in Poland is maintained and one ABCT set is kept in APS in
Western Europe. Because the latter would be a fourth ABCT and is therefore in
excess of the stated requirement, keeping it in an enhanced APS status is not necessary. Lines of communications improvements are necessary, but because of the
significant costs in other areas required by this strategic approach, Allies must be
relied on to fund these improvements.
• Activity is focused narrowly on that portion of Europe where Russia could succeed in a brief armed conflict against allies. The loss of the Stryker capability in
Europe makes activities with Southeastern Allies and Eastern Partners physically
more difficult. In the case of the former, they are currently accustomed to a certain level of activity that would by design and necessity decrease. This drop-off in
activity could create the perception of less American involvement among political
and military elites, thereby creating favorable conditions for Russian competition
below armed conflict. Activity among Southeastern Allies, Eastern Partners, and
Southeastern Partners would largely be carried out by existing SPP relations and
the Europe-focused SFAB.
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• One advantage of the large forward posture is that there is less need to invest in
deployment exercises and enhanced APS status, allowing additional investment
in regional expertise. When paired with a field army committed to Europe, the
Army capability to compete below armed conflict would be enhanced by greater
understanding and command/staff bandwidth.
• An investment in special forces capability would be required, with the activity
focused on preparations for armed conflict.
Invest in a Multidomain Alliance
This strategic approach implements only the multidomain package of privilege armed
conflict to increase the chance of successful implementation (see figure 9). The package
consists of MDC2 and long-range fires units and munitions. This package best enables
the Joint Force by setting the conditions for gaining air freedom of maneuver and allies
by creating a framework by which they can leverage some of the specific multidomain
capabilities that only the United States can provide. The package accepts the risk
that there will not be sufficient maneuver combat power to deter or defeat a Russian
fait accompli.

Figure 9. Invest in a multidomain alliance
Major features of this force posture are as follows.
• The Army commits a field army and OFC to Europe with the intention of integrating them into NATO command structures.
• The Army places the first tranche of long-range fires units in Europe and invests in
sufficient on-hand stockpiles to allow these units to enable air and ground maneuver for several weeks of operations. A significant challenge of this option is that it
accepts risk in the Pacific until the second tranche of units and munitions is ready
for deployment. The other major challenge is that stationing a non-INF compliant
system in Europe, particularly in Germany, would require significant effort.
• The 2nd SCR is replaced with an ABCT (or repurposed into a similar armored
cavalry regiment). The 173rd BCT (Airborne) remains in Italy.
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• The rotational ABCT in Poland is transitioned to an equipment set that remains in
place with a sustainment package that allows it to be either by rotational forces or
go into an APS-like unmanned status. One ABCT is maintained in APS in Western
Europe. Lines of communications improvements are necessary, but because of the
significant costs in other areas required by this strategic approach it is necessary to
rely on allies to fund these improvements.
• Like privilege armed conflict (and build visible presence), activity is focused narrowly
on that portion of Europe where Russia could succeed in a brief armed conflict
against allies. As with that option, the loss of the Stryker capability would reduce
activity, but the retention of the 173rd BCT (Airborne) would be used to create
slightly more presence in addition to the SPP relations and the Europe-focused
SFAB. Nonetheless, a reduction in activity would lead to a similar opening of
space for Russian competition below armed conflict.
• The buildup of logistics and mobility capability in Europe might require reallocation of capabilities among the components.
Build Visible Presence
This strategic approach (see figure 10) implements only the “maneuver presence
package” of privilege armed conflict to increase the chance of successful implementation.
The package consists of three ABCTs ready for instant employment and a narrow
geographic focus on Northeastern Allies. As opposed to the multidomain package,
which enables Joint and Allied forces, this package improves the Army’s ability to
conduct large-scale ground operations. This package accepts the risk that Russian A2/
AD will be able to isolate ground forces.

Figure 10. Build visible presence
Major features of this force posture are as follows.
• The Army positions a corps and OFC in Europe but keeps them outside of NATO
command structures so that they are available for global use.
• Long-range fires units and munitions are deployed from the United States in time
of crisis.
• The 2nd SCR is replaced with an ABCT (or repurposed into a similar armored
cavalry regiment). The 173rd BCT (Airborne) is returned to a CONUS location to
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bring an ABCT to Germany. This option brings additional political challenges,
both in bilateral relations with Italy as well as with the need to secure significant
Outside CONUS military construction funds.
Rotational presence in Poland is maintained and one ABCT set is kept in APS in
Western Europe. Because the latter would be a fourth ABCT and is therefore in
excess of the stated requirement, keeping it in an enhanced APS status is not necessary. Lines of communications improvements are necessary.
Activity is focused narrowly on that portion of Europe where Russia could succeed in a brief armed conflict against allies. The loss of the Stryker capability in
Europe makes activities with Southeastern Allies and Eastern Partners physically
more difficult. In the case of the former, they are currently accustomed to a certain level of activity that would by design and necessity decrease. This drop-off in
activity could create the perception of less American involvement among political
and military elites, thereby creating favorable conditions for Russian competition
below armed conflict. Activity among Southeastern Allies, Eastern Partners, and
Southeastern Partners would largely be carried out by existing SPP relations and
the Europe-focused SFAB.
One advantage of the large forward posture is that there is less need to invest in
deployment exercises and enhanced APS status, allowing additional investment
in regional expertise. When paired with a field army committed to Europe, the
Army capability to compete below armed conflict would be enhanced by greater
understanding and command/staff bandwidth.
An investment in special forces capability would be required, with the activity
focused on preparations for armed conflict.

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSMENT
To evaluate these different strategic approaches, the study team analyzed each against
a range of criteria and risk factors. The study developed three categories of criteria and
risk factors.
• Strategic and operational factors relate to the impact of the various strategic
approaches on the ability of the Joint Force to achieve military and strategic
objectives.
• Institutional factors assess the impact of the various strategic approaches on the
Army across the entire force, not just in Europe.
• Environmental factors assess the sensitivity of the various strategic approaches to
possible changes in the operational, strategic, and political environment.
Within these categories, the study team developed 17 criteria and risk factors intended
to provide a comprehensive assessment that includes the strategic (S), operational (O),
institutional (I), and environmental (E) factors of any given force posture. We believe this
is one of the most important aspects of the study. One of the study team’s observations
is that too much of the current literature looks solely at one of these areas and ignores
the rest. Developing the perfect strategic force posture for Europe while ignoring the
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long-term effects of that force posture on the Army, its ability to sustain that force
posture, or the impacts of the force posture on other regions is strategic malpractice.
Similarly, a force posture that can be infinitely sustained by the service but fails to
achieve policy objectives is an instance of the institutional tail wagging the policy dog.
Finally, this approach acknowledges the foolhardiness and arrogance of projecting a
single future and then staking everything on the prescience of any group of analysts.
The environmental factors are an attempt to account for the inevitable operational,
strategic, and political shocks ahead. Though, by definition, it is impossible to predict the
unpredictable; if one strategic approach consistently suffers from possible changes in the
environment, then it should be regarded with additional scrutiny before being adopted.
Though the study team sought to develop a comprehensive list of criteria and risk
factors to ensure the full implications of a strategic approach were understood, not
all these implications should be accorded equal weight. The criteria and risk factors
were divided into two categories of importance. The first are those important enough
to influence force posture decisions. The second are those whose impacts should be
understood so opportunities can be leveraged and weaknesses mitigated when possible,
but are not important enough to influence force posture decisions one way or the other.
For instance, one of the criteria was the ability to project forces out of Europe into the
US Africa Command or US Central Command (CENTCOM) areas. Though the team did
not think that criterion should be factored into an eventual decision, knowing whether
a strategic approach would allow Europe-based forces to assist with a noncombatant
evacuation operation in North Africa or the eastern Mediterranean would be important.
That sort of knowledge of the many implications of a force posture can then be used to
mitigate some of the disadvantages of the eventual force posture. In short, focusing on
what is important to drive decisions should not cause us to limit a full accounting of the
many second- and third-order implications.
Appendix 2 provides a full description of each factor, the rationale for its weighting,
and how each strategic approach was evaluated according to that factor. The following
discussion provides a list of the factors and a brief discussion of the most important
aspects of their weighting.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
The study team recommends the following factors should influence decisions.
S1. The ability to defeat, and thereby credibly deter, Russian armed conflict directed
against a NATO ally at acceptable cost. This achieves policy aim while avoiding
Pyrrhic victory.
S2. The ability to compete effectively below armed conflict with Russia.
S3. The extent to which force posture provides escalation advantage and stability
in a crisis by allowing decisionmakers (on both sides) opportunity and time for
restraint but does not force them into making escalatory decisions early in a crisis
and avoids the 1914 syndrome.
S4. The extent to which force posture provokes Russian political and military reactions
without the ability for policymakers to adjust subsequently as necessary.
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S5. The extent to which the force posture enhances the overall political cohesion
of NATO and leads to increased political will and military capabilities of
individual Allies.
The study team recommends the following factors do not influence force posture decisions.
S6. The ability to offer a range of options to respond to Russian aggression against a
European partner (for example, Ukraine, Georgia).
S7. The ability to respond directly or indirectly in case of a crisis or limited conflict
with Russia outside of Europe (for example, mishap in Syria).
S8. The ability of Europe-based forces to project power into the areas of responsibility
of CENTCOM and US Africa Command.
S9. The extent to which the force posture facilitates the ability of partners to contribute
to operations outside of Europe.
The NDS reorients the Joint Force to great-power competition; yet, that is a broad
category that still requires prioritization. Competition with Russia can include armed
conflict under a wide array of conditions (general, limited in Europe or elsewhere, and
involving Allies or just partners), competition below armed conflict (occurs worldwide
and at varying levels of intensity), and cooperation with Allies and partners to advance
US interests vis-à-vis Russia.8 Not all these areas of competition deserve equal weight.
Moreover, national priorities do not necessarily translate to a single service’s force
posture in a specific region. Some elements of competition are best carried out by other
services or governmental departments in some other location. So, what strategic and
operational effects should be the focus of US Army force posture in Europe?
The study team opted for a relatively tight focus on those priority strategic effects
where Army forces are essential to enabling Joint or Allied success. Therefore, deterring
or defeating armed Russian aggression against NATO Allies (S1) was prioritized but
the defense of partners (S6) was not. Competition below armed conflict (S2) is already
occurring on a daily basis and Russia can achieve some strategic objectives without
resorting to fighting, so it was prioritized. Whether in armed conflict or competition
below armed conflict, the political cohesion and military capabilities of allies are essential.
Therefore, the likelihood that a force posture would bolster those factors, while avoiding
free riding (S4) was clearly critical. As noted in chapter 4, some capabilities—particularly
long-range fires—have the potential to create catastrophic instability in a crisis. The
inclusion of crisis stability (S3) in the prioritized criteria reflects the acknowledgment
that military capabilities cannot be viewed in isolation of the real-world dilemmas they
would pose for decisionmakers.
INSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
The study team recommends the following factors should influence decisions.
I1. The degree to which the force posture impacts Army global readiness and force
generation.
8. JCS, Competition Continuum.
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I2. The likely response from the various components, other services, DoD, Congress,
or allies and the degree to which negative responses can prevent successful
implementation.
The study team recommends the following factor should not influence force posture decisions.
I3. The degree to which the force posture entails threat to the force in the form of
decreased morale, retention, and human capital due to high operational strain on
segments of or the entire Army.
The Army should not adopt a force posture that cannot be successfully implemented
or sustained, or that causes unacceptable risks in other geographic regions. Therefore,
the criteria gauging the impact on global readiness and force generation (I1) and
assessing the difficulty of implementing the force posture (which requires input from the
White House, Congress, interagency, DoD, and other services) were obvious decisioninfluencing criteria. Determining whether the extent to which a force posture might
cause damage to the health of the force through operational tempo strain (I3) should
be a decision-influencing factor was more difficult. Ultimately, the study team decided
not to include this in the prioritized criteria, though that should not be misunderstood.
Some study team members doubt the ability of the Army to maintain the current global
demand of the three simultaneous ABCT rotational deployments. This factor, however,
was not rated as decision-influencing because there are a number of alternative
methods to reduce the strain—altering force structure, changing the force generation
model, reallocating tasks among the components, or modifying the other rotational
commitments—so that force posture should be determined more on the strategic and
operational benefits than on operations tempo considerations.
ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
The study team recommends the following factor should influence decisions.
E1. The extent to which the force posture is vulnerable to a significant reduction in
future defense budgets, forcing a future Secretary of the Army to choose between
breaking the strategy and breaking the army.9
The study team recommends the following factors should not influence force posture decisions.
E2. The degree to which the force posture is dependent on the decisions of any single
foreign government (can be rendered invalid by the results of a single election in
a foreign country).
E3. The degree to which the force posture remains operable in case of significant
deterioration of NATO political cohesion.
E4. The extent of strategic and operational risk within Europe in case of a significant
crisis or conflict with China.
9. Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense, 22.
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E5. The extent to which the force posture could become a liability or a barrier to
adaptation in case of a significant change in US policy.
This category features a collection of political and strategic shocks that would
significantly alter the operational environment (and likely also invalidate much of the
current NDS). Certainly, the study team could have developed a more extensive list.
The finding, however, was that most of these large events are so important that there
was actually little real difference in advantage among the strategic approaches. The
small gradations of difference among the force posture options paled in comparison
to the much larger implications of the environmental change. The obvious lesson to be
drawn is that Army force posture should be viewed with proper perspective; it cannot
singlehandedly overcome the adverse consequences of a momentous event like, for
instance, a fundamental change in the European security architecture.
Therefore, only one environmental risk factor was included among those that should
influence force posture decisions: the extent to which a strategic approach was vulnerable
to future reductions in defense budgets (E1). This risk is such an obvious and likely risk
that not including it among the determining factors would seem to indicate excessive
and unwarranted optimism. Any strategic approach that is dependent on roughly the
current or greater level of resources creates the risk of presenting some future secretary
of the Army with the choice between breaking the strategy and breaking the Army in an
effort to maintain unsupportable burden.
RECOMMENDED STRATEGIC APPROACH
Table 2 illustrates that there are no obvious choices. The ultimate choice depends on a
finely balanced weighing of competing valid and important considerations. Throughout
the year, the study team often debated the relative value that should be assigned to each
and, ultimately, never came to a consensus. The following recommendation should be
attributed solely to the principal investigators, though we encourage the readers to make
their own assessments. The study’s framework for developing and assessing strategic
approaches is more important than the authors’ conclusion.
To this point, the study has identified the basic building-block levers of force posture,
assembled them into several strategic approaches, offered a list of criteria and risk factors
to assess those approaches, and winnowed that list down to eight critical factors that
should influence force posture decisions. Resorting to simple quantitative measures by
assigning weights and values to determine the best force posture would be a mistake.
More complex strategic judgment is required.
Our first step was to examine the decision criteria for any strategic approaches that
posed unacceptable risks. This eliminated two. The first was privilege armed conflict on the
basis of its significant implementation risk (I2). Despite its best-in-class ranking in three
categories, we deemed the numerous challenges associated with trying to accomplish
all of these changes at once as too great. The better option would be to focus on the
most important aspects and address the other elements later, rather than trying to do
everything and doing nothing well.
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Table 2. Criteria for assessment
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The second discarded strategic approach was privilege dynamic force employment
due to its high future budget risk (E1). The high cost of maintaining exercises like the
planned Defender series could prove unsustainable in case of a resource downturn.
Such activities have great strategic and institutional value, but they are ephemeral. A
force posture based largely on dynamic force employment can leave the Joint Force, and
particularly the Army, stranded in the United States with little to show for it within a
very short span.
This reduced the field to three options that could be decided on their strategic and
operational merits. Of the five criteria, we gave greater weight to deterring or defeating
armed conflict against allies (S1), competition below armed conflict (S2), and escalation
advantage and crisis stability (S3). The first two were straightforward selections but
the latter requires justification. The rationale was that the strong preference is for
deterring rather than defeating, as even a victory in armed conflict against Russia is
likely to be Pyrrhic with decades of US and Allied military investments literally going
up in smoke, extensive damage to the cyber—and, perhaps, physical—infrastructure
of the United States, and the possibility of wrecking space infrastructure with longterm consequences and nuclear exchange if escalation escapes rational policy control.
Therefore, determining how a given force posture might limit friendly policymakers as
they are trying desperately to deter conflict is essential.
An examination of the remaining strategic approaches through the lens of those
criteria eliminates build visible presence. As shown in table 3, build visible presence had the
worst assessments of options against two of the three focus criteria and its performance
against the rest was only average.
Table 3. Criteria for assessment after eliminating privilege armed conflict and
privilege dynamic force employment

The choice between privilege global competition and invest in a multidomain alliance is not
an easy one. In terms of the three focus strategic and operational criteria, these options
are the most likely and the most dangerous courses of action. Competition is already
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occurring on a daily basis, but the risks of armed conflict extend into the existential.
Proceeding to the rest of the criteria, the introduction of long-range fires would be
considered as provocative by Russia. But not coincidentally, the same action along with
the creation of a MDC2 structure reassures allies and creates a framework for them to
build their capabilities within. The institutional impacts also have a two-sides-of-thecoin dynamic, as the greater proportion of forces in the United States is sustainable and
creates flexibility but at the same time creates vulnerability to decreasing budgets.
Of these two closely matched strategic approaches, the principal investigators
recommend invest in a multidomain alliance. As the name suggests, this strategic approach
enables the Joint Force and multinational partners to get the most of their capabilities.
This approach makes the best use of the Army’s top modernization priority (longrange fires) in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially
catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this
strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in
having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension.
As opposed to build visible presence, this approach also incentivizes allies to invest more
by showing US resolve, but in a manner that does not replicate capabilities that they
can provide. Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later
buildup of heavy forces if conditions still warrant. The main drawbacks to this approach
are it commits a precious three-star headquarters to Europe, as well as the first few
years of production of both PrSM launchers and munitions. These allocations would
be significant against a single strategic competitor, though hardly excessive if the NDS
emphasis on prioritization is to be believed.
As already noted, however, the selection among the proposed strategic approaches
comes down to a fine balancing of many competing demands. A slight reweighting of
factors would lead to a different conclusion. Three alternative conditions worth noting
would lead to the adoption of the other strategic approaches.
• If the combination of the other 1+3 threats (China, North Korea, Iran, violent
extremist organizations far outweigh that of Russia. In this instance, privilege
global competition provides maximum flexibility to respond to those other threats.
That strategic approach competed so well because it is the closest to the current
force posture, which is the product of an array of pressures, most of which still
exist. This “status quo plus” option places a higher emphasis on institutional sustainability and satisfying multiple demands.
• If there is a high likelihood that defense budgets will significantly decline in
the next several years. Privilege armed conflict was eliminated as an option because
it was deemed too difficult to implement so much in a short time. But that bug
becomes a feature if there is only a short window to accomplish (or at least initiate)
significant change. In that case, then the Army loses nothing by trying to accomplish as much as possible. Moreover, as the option with the lowest sustaining cost,
it would continue to provide the greatest strategic and operational effect over time.
• If there is a high likelihood of war with China. Invest in a multidomain alliance is
a multidomain solution that seeks to enable the remainder of the Joint Force. But
little air and naval capability could be enabled in the case of a war with China. In
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that scenario, having the strongest possible presence of ground maneuver forces
to maintain a credible deterrent against Russian opportunism would be best.
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
In the course of the investigation, the study team noted two other elements that fall
outside of any specific strategic approach but that deserve mention.
No nuclear capability for long-range ground-based fires: The withdrawal from the
INF Treaty opens the possibility of extending the range of PrSM beyond 500 kilometers,
which would have significant operational benefits. But this eventuality would come
at the cost of being politically difficult for European partners, where the treaty was
popular. Though no open discussion of making any of the long-range precision fires
systems nuclear-capable is currently occurring, the United States should explicitly state
as much. Whatever theoretical advantages low-yield nuclear weapons from groundbased systems might have, stationing these weapons anywhere they might be useful
would be exceptionally difficult politically.
Candid dialogue among the services and with DoD about the global operating
model against the demands of great-power conflict: The timelines for “blunt” and
“surge” layers as they pertain to air and ground forces are either radically different
(measured, respectively, in weeks or months) or else the majority of the CONUS-based
Army falls into some other category that would be used only in a long, potentially
catastrophic war that the rest of the department’s efforts are meant to avoid. Most
likely only one segment of the Army would actually be able to participate within a
multidomain campaign lasting several weeks before the munitions that are essential
for its execution would be severely depleted. During the long second phase, the Army
surge force would be activated, though the role the Joint Force would play is unclear.
This discrepancy must be addressed because it has profound implications not only for
force posture, but also force structure and generation, readiness models, strategic lift and
munitions stockpile requirements, operational concepts and doctrine, and the allocation
of capabilities among the components. In short, the Joint Force needs an honest appraisal
of how it would fight both a short and a long war. Once some understanding of these two
quite different scenarios has been reached, the Army can then review its force generation
model and Total Army framework in light of those potential requirements and the daily
demands of a world of continual competition.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters and the following appendices provide a wide-ranging
examination of future Army forces posture from various vantages: a survey of various
options, a discussion of organizing principles to guide selection from those options, and
a review of the most important outcomes and risks for consideration when choosing
among those options. That material is offered as a framework for further work and
analysis. Undoubtedly, staffs in the Pentagon and elsewhere can improve upon the
details offered by a small team producing an unclassified report.
Nonetheless, the team believes its overall intellectual approach would benefit the
Army and the DoD more broadly. We sensed a divide between two camps split along
lines evoking historian Isaiah Berlin’s famous illustration of the hedgehog and the fox.1
The defense hedgehogs are eager to focus the military on just one thing: great-power
competition. The NDS is the clearest expression of this view, and the generally high marks
it has received indicate the widespread agreement that a corrective shift in emphasis is
necessary. But in regaining balance, we must not overcorrect, particularly in long-lead
aspects of the defense enterprise like force posture. Taking a maximalist approach in
short-lead activities like training and doctrine is useful in redirecting the force and, if
conditions warrant, can be readily easily reversed by an equally hard approach in some
different direction. But this description does not apply to force posture. Decisions taken
now can foreclose strategic and operational options decades from now. Therefore, one
should include as many different criteria and risk factors as possible. The things that
concerned us in the past might well concern us again in the future and should not be
breezily dismissed.
The defense foxes know many things, perhaps too many things. One can easily get
“lost in the finite,” the mass of details—both actions and constraints—associated with
the present force posture and fall prey to radical oversimplification. The Army is already
stretched taut. The Army has no extraneous units or useless actions; everything serves
some purpose. Moreover, stakeholders such as local communities, commercial interests,
the other services, and multinational partners are accustomed to and have molded
themselves to the status quo. No change can be made that does not have some negative
consequences. But these challenges and drawbacks must be assessed with perspective.
The decline in some activities and the costs imposed on some stakeholders are less
important than others.
The conceptual framework of this study is meant to bridge this divide, representing
the views of both hedgehogs and foxes by providing a full accounting of both the positive
and negative aspects of any single option. As a rule, the team found that any force posture
choice that does not seem hard is not accounting for all of the relevant factors. Any easy
decision to change is looking only at the positive aspects and not acknowledging what
will be lost. Any easy decision to remain the same is not factoring in the opportunity cost
of a foregone improvement.

1. Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1967).
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Deploy from CONUS

In Europe

Limited (SPP & SFAB
only)

Priority (GP & SF)

• Rotational (Pol)
• APS (W Eur)

• 2 x ABCTs (Ger)

• Reallocation of additional
ABCT equipment set
• Reallocation of force
structure among compos
to build-up logistics &
mobility capability
• Possible objections from
Italy to substitution of
SFAB for BCT(A)
• Investment in foreign
infrastructure

Implementation
Challenges

ABCT: armored brigade combat team
APS: Army prepositioned stocks
BCT(A): brigade combat team (Airborne)
BCT: brigade combat team
C2: command post exercises
CONUS: continental United States
Ger: Germany

High

Sustaining Cost

• Changing NATO
command structure
• Basing non-INF system
• Removing Italy IBCT
• Isolation of southeast
allies
• Accept Risk to
INDOPACOM
• Foreign MILCON

GP: general purpose force
IBCT: infantry brigade combat team
INDOPACOM: US Indo-Pacific Command
INF: intermediate-range nuclear forces
LOC: line of communication
MILCON: military construction
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

• Reallocation of additional
ABCT equipment set
• Reallocation of force
structure among compos
to build-up logistics &
mobility capability
• Investment in foreign
infrastructure

Low

High

Moderate

Increase
Low

Invest

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Rely on allies

Invest

Initial Cost
Moderate

Increase

Accept Risk

Invest

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Invest

Accept Risk

Priority when allowed by Limited (SPP & SFAB
policy
only)

Moderate (C2, GP, SF)

Reduced (C2; some
GP)

• APS (Pol)
• 2 x APS (W Eur)

• SCR (Ger)
• BCT(A) (Italy)

Special Forces

Theater Air Missile
Defense

Accept Risk
Increase

Accept Risk

Regional Expertise

Invest

Deployment Exercises

Enhanced APS Status

Logistics & Mobility

Accept Risk

Dispersal & Hardening

Moderate (SPP, SFAB,
SF; regular GP)

Activity: East and
Southeastern Partners
Accept Risk

Moderate (C2, GP, SF)

Activity: Southeastern
Allies

Invest

Moderate (C2 & GP)

Activity: Northeastern
Allies

LOC Improvements

• Rotational/APS (Pol)
• 2 x APS (W Eur)

Rotational/APS ABCTs

Munitions

Deploy from CONUS
• SCR (Ger)
• SFAB (Italy)

Long-Range Fires

Field Army + OFC
integrated into NATO

Multidomain Command No change (deploy corps Corps + OFC available
+ OFC in crisis)
for global use
and Control

Forward Stationed
(Germany/Italy)

Privilege
Armed Conflict

Privilege Dynamic
Force Employment

Privilege
Global Competition

Options

• Removing Italy IBCT
• Isolation of southeast
allies
• Foreign MILCON
• Investment in foreign
infrastructure

Low-Moderate

High

Increase

Invest

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Invest

Accept Risk

Limited (SPP & SFAB
only)

Limited (SPP & SFAB
only)

Priority (GP & SF)

• Rotational (Pol)
• APS (W Eur)

• 2 x ABCTs (Ger)

Deploy from CONUS

Corps + OFC available
for global use

Build Visible Presence

OFC: operational fires command
Pol: Poland
SCR: Stryker cavalry regiment
SF: Special Forces
SFAB: security force assistance brigade
SPP: State Partnership Program
W Eur: Western Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Belgium)

• Changing NATO
command structure
• Basing non-INF system
• Perceived isolation of
southeast allies
• Accept Risk to
INDOPACOM
• Reallocation of force
structure among compos
to build-up logistics &
mobility capability

Low-Moderate

High

Increase

Accept Risk

Invest

Accept Risk

Accept Risk

Rely on allies

Invest

Reduced (SPP, SFAB,
SF; some GP)

Reduced (SPP, SFAB,
SF; some GP)

Priority (GP; most SF)

• Rotational/APS (Pol)
• APS (W Eur)

• ABCT (Ger)
• BCT(A) (Italy)

In Europe

Field Army + OFC
integrated into NATO

Invest in MultiDomain Alliance

APPENDIX 1. COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION OF STRATEGIC APPROACHES

APPENDIX 2. COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED STRATEGIC
APPROACHES BY EVALUATION CRITERIA
To evaluate the different courses of action, the study team analyzed each of the
strategic approaches against a range of criteria to measure the advantages and risks
associated with each option. This appendix provides the full results of that analysis.
The study team used 19 evaluation criteria arranged into 3 categories: strategic and
operational, institutional, and environmental. Under each criterion, the strategic
approaches are listed from most favorable to least favorable with a brief explanation of
the rationale.
To ensure comprehensive treatment, this appendix lists all the pertinent risks
identified by the study team. Not all risks, however, should be accorded equal weight.
Only eight evaluation criteria were identified as sufficiently important to influence
decision making. One should note, and when possible, mitigate, the other risks, but they
are not important enough to influence the determination of the eventual force posture.
The ratings are subjective assessments produced by a small team on a wide range of
complex topics. The ratings are given with a full rationale to allow readers to draw their
own conclusions and to serve as a start point for further analysis to refine ratings.
STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
The study team recommends the following factors should influence decisions.
S1. The ability to defeat, and thereby credibly deter, Russian armed conflict directed
against a NATO ally at acceptable cost. This achieves policy aim while avoiding
Pyrrhic victory.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches provides the
operational conditions for success as defined in wargaming for multidomain operations (MDO).
The focus of that wargaming was to defeat Russian objectives within weeks of a “cold-start,” fait
accompli seizure of anything from a portion of a single ally to a wholesale seizure of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania. The requirement for responsiveness within a matter of weeks is a key element
of this criterion, as it effectively excludes any forces or materiel coming by sea. If the acceptable
time period is defined as several months instead of several weeks, the divide between the various
options is significantly reduced. The study team believes the requirement for weeks is valid due to
the enormous cost and risk involved in anything longer. This requirement is also necessary if the
Army is to have a significant presence within the larger combined/Joint blunt and surge layers as
described by the Global Operating Model. If not, then the Army blunt layer would not arrive until
after the Joint/combined surge is attrited and has expended its munitions. Of course, requirements
for deterrence are not the same as defeat, though the two are closely linked and for the purposes
of this study and are considered roughly equivalent. Deterrence requires an adversary perceive
that an attack will either be defeated or too costly given the objective. As noted in chapter 2, the
study found that the Russians will likely only attempt to seize territory in the event it perceives an
existential threat, suggesting in this context Russia will be willing to pay a high price, narrowing
the distinction between deter and defeat.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: Defeating a Russian attack against a NATO ally is
arguably the US Army’s most important mission. This scenario, though highly unlikely, is also
easily the most dangerous: Accepting a fait accompli would seriously weaken the United States’
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standing in the world, while even a successful campaign against Russia would be enormously
costly in every sense, risk catastrophic nuclear or cyber warfare against military and civilian targets,
and create an unparalleled opportunity for other strategic competitors to achieve gains elsewhere.
Aside from these obvious points, the study team was surprised by the near unanimity among Allies
that this criterion should be the focus, despite the acknowledgment of its low probability. In part,
the rationale for planning against this scenario is that despite its remote probability, if the Russians
perceive NATO is unprepared, it becomes more likely. The concern about such an attack was a
recurring theme, not only among Estonian and Polish interlocutors, but also in the UK, where there
has long been a focus on competition below armed conflict, an aspect made particularly real by the
Salisbury chemical weapons attack. In short—at least for Allies across the depth of the northern
tier of NATO—American leadership is judged by the ability to defeat overt armed aggression.
Therefore, this ability has some secondary effects upon competition below armed conflict, in which
the perception of will and strength sets the broader context.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Privilege armed conflict (Low Risk): The combination of on-hand multidomain capability and
maneuver presence provide a credible deterrent. The low residual risk reflects some shortfalls
in enablers and support forces.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Moderate Risk): The multidomain capability enables the air
component, which is critical to friendly operations and what Russia perceives as the primary
threat. The lack of maneuver forces, however, does create an opportunity for Russia, particularly
if they have decisive political decision making and good operations security.
Build visible presence (Moderate Risk): The presence force package adds considerable
capability and is equal to invest in multidomain alliance in its deterrent effect. This package is
less effective in defeating Russian aggression within armed conflict, however, because there
is greater overall gain to be had by enabling the Joint Force and Allies with the multidomain
package. Also, the likely necessity of accepting risk with enablers and sustainment to field
more armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) would create a brittle force that would be at risk
in sustained combat.
Privilege global competition (High Risk): The forward-based multidomain command and
control (MDC2) ability provides the appearance of ability to counter anti-access/area-denial
(A2/AD), and therefore has some deterrent value. But in realistic capability, this approach
would likely not yield full multidomain capability until several weeks into the war. By this
time, attrition and munitions shortfalls would have weakened the rest of the Joint Force.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): The lack of forward presence makes
this approach extremely sensitive to any delays in political decision making, intelligence
failures, or Russian political warfare, as well as physical and virtual attacks against vulnerable
transportation, supply, and communications nodes.

Primary variable that could alter assessment: Will Russia continue to have significant forces in or
on the border of Ukraine? Put differently, does Ukraine become a quagmire that restricts Russian
operational freedom of maneuver? If so, then this factor becomes much less urgent.
S2.

The ability to compete effectively below armed conflict with Russia.

Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches enables
competition below armed conflict with Russia both in Europe and across the globe directly, and
also through the dual effects on enabling direct military activities and indirectly by enhancing the
political cohesion and will of US alliances and partners. Due to the nature of the threat for most
allies, the latter element is far more important. The majority of US Army capabilities are simply not
relevant to countering the majority of Russian competitive activities, and those that are relevant
are already fully engaged.
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The US Army’s main contribution is to add to a general climate of reassurance and security within
the ally, in which Russian political warfare, disinformation, and coercion are ineffective. For a
number of reasons, partners are far more vulnerable to more assertive, violent competition below
armed conflict, such as the use of proxies or direct involvement by Russian military “volunteers.”
For those countries, the US Army’s role in competition below armed conflict can also be direct
military action.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: Competition below armed conflict with Russia occurs
on a daily basis now and will continue as long as the Kremlin regards the United States as a hostile
power and an obstacle to its ambitions. Without resorting to armed conflict, Russia can achieve
some of its strategic objectives and put US interests at risk. Moreover, to the extent that Russian
actions weaken the political cohesion of NATO and destabilize US Allies and partners, they can
create conditions that make armed conflict more likely.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Privilege global competition (Moderate Risk): The combination of a visible higher headquarters
stationed in Europe, a light- and medium-weight force posture that can more easily operate
across Europe, and an expansive activity footprint across the breadth of Europe would
contribute significantly to the perception of US resolve and commitment.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Moderate Risk): Similar to the previous strategic
approach, but with a slight degradation because of the lack of an operational headquarters
and the potential dip in activity due to the loss of the 173rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT)
(Airborne). This approach assumes that a US-based security force assistance brigade (SFAB)
that is still aggressively conducting activities in Europe is under privilege global competition.
If no SFAB were operating full-time in Europe, then the two strategic approaches would be
tied in terms of the amount of risk.
Privilege armed conflict (High Risk): Within the Northeast Allies, the strength of the US
commitment would make Russian competition below armed conflict much less effective. The
cost of this narrow geographic focus, however, would be to cause other Allies and partners to
feel somewhat abandoned because they would see a reduction in the level of activity to which
they are accustomed. This perceived reduction would be particularly acute in Romania, where
the withdrawal of the US Marine Corps presence was mitigated by assurances of continued US
Army activity. Because the consensus among experts on Russia consulted for this study was
that the Black Sea region and Balkans are far more likely targets for future Russian competition
below armed conflict, the increase in the Baltic Sea region does not compensate for the increased
risk to southern Europe.
Build visible presence (High Risk): Within the area of the Northeast Allies, the greater visible
American commitment would allow for generally more effective competition below armed
conflict. In all the other regions, however, the decline in activity creates space for Russian
aggression below armed conflict.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Very High Risk): Similar to the previous strategic approach,
with the difference that build visible presence better provides maneuver forces, which due to
their visibility are more potent symbolic manifestations of American commitment. The field
army does offer some capability.

S3. The extent to which force posture provides escalation advantage and stability in
a crisis by allowing decisionmakers on both sides the opportunity and time for restraint.
This advantage and stability disincentivizes making escalatory decisions early in a crisis,
avoiding the 1914 syndrome.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches requires
senior civilian and military decisionmakers to make escalatory decisions within the heightened
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tensions of a crisis. This factor also accounts for the vulnerability to a strike from Russia during the
early stages of a crisis, which applies because the greater the vulnerability to such a strike, the more
pressure on friendly decisionmakers to make quick decisions on actions that significantly alter the
military balance in the theater at a time when the political balance is likely strained.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: In thinking about a great-power war for nearly a
year, two things were apparent to the study group. First, the group identified the need to avoid
it altogether because of the terrible risks associated with a war on even relatively favorable terms
to the United States. Second, due to the immense risks involved, the road to such a conflict would
begin with an opportunity magnified by a series of miscalculations. This factor assesses the extent
to which those conditions are in place. Arguably, this factor is even more important than the actual
ability to fight a great-power conflict because the general consensus of the study team was that
perceived lack of friendly political will, rather than any hard weighing of military correlation of
forces, would lead to armed conflict.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Privilege armed conflict (Low Risk): With both the multidomain capability and maneuver
force presence necessary to deter (as forecasted in MDO development already in theater), a
large movement of ground forces from the earliest indications of trouble is not needed.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Moderate Risk): This strategic approach would require the
early decision to deploy one and possibly two ABCTs (if a rotation force is not in place at the
time), causing some additional risk in comparison to privilege armed conflict, but as similar
capabilities are already in place this is not regarded as being as difficult a decision for US policymakers as it is for Allies, and provocative for Russia. The key unique capabilities provided
by the United States—MDC2 and long-range fires—are already in place, offering a greater
margin of error.
Build visible presence (High Risk): This approach is accompanied by a significant increase in
risk compared to invest in a multidomain alliance because this option requires a very early
decision to deploy an offensive system—long-range fires with a large munitions stockpile—
designed to undermine Russia’s A2/AD system.
Privilege global competition (Very High Risk): This strategic approach requires the deployment of long-range fires units with a large munitions stockpile and three ABCTs falling in on
prepositioned equipment. This option requires policymakers to begin this process months in
advance of the beginning of a war and provides an extensive period of vulnerability within
which Russia could attack at significant advantage.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): Similar to privilege global competition, but with the requirement also to deploy a corps headquarters, adding more risk.

S4. The extent to which force posture provokes Russian political and military reactions
without the ability for policymakers to adjust subsequently as necessary.
Description: This factor has two components. The first is the degree to which it would be viewed
as provocative by Russia. The second, and more important, element is the degree to which that
initial degree of provocation can then be modified.
The analysis in chapter 2 suggests that the most provocative lever is aggressive military activity
in the regions of Eastern and Southeastern Partners. The next most provocative action is the
deployment of long-range fires units; the reaction to the deployment of Aegis Ashore provides a
rough idea of how Russia might respond.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: Whether to provoke Russia is a policy decision outside
of a service purview. But adopting a force posture that is particularly difficult for policymakers to
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adjust subsequently (whether to apply more or less pressure) is contrary to the flexibility desired
in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

Privilege global competition (Highly Provocative but Responsive): Operating aggressively
with partners like Ukraine and Georgia is probably the most provocative action that the US
Army can undertake, but this force posture allows those actions to be easily scaled as desired.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Somewhat Provocative but Responsive): Similar to
“privilege global competition” but with a slightly more balanced footprint, this strategic
approach is slightly less provocative.
Build visible presence (Not Provocative but Not Responsive): Though this force posture
provides more ready ground maneuver forces than others, it must be viewed in historical
and strategic context. Armies do not invade Russia with three-plus heavy brigades. In terms
of ready offensive capability, this force posture does little to change the correlation of forces,
and by focusing activity in areas that are of less sensitivity, it is the least provocative. This
strategic approach also makes it difficult to increase pressure by operating in the area of
Eastern and Southeastern Partners, because the best forces for these missions—2nd Stryker
Cavalry Regiment (SCR) and 173rd BCT (Airborne)—have been withdrawn.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Provocative and Not Responsive): The introduction of longrange fires units is provocative and cannot be easily modified to lessen pressure, as increasing
maneuver forces allows more pressure. The 173rd BCT (Airborne) does offer some Europeanbased troops that can be readily deployed into the area of any ally or partner, if desired.
Privilege armed conflict (Provocative and Not Responsive): This strategic approach combines
the provocative aspects of invest in a multidomain alliance with the inflexibility of build
visible presence.

S5. The extent to which the force posture enhances the overall political cohesion of
NATO and leads to increased political will and military capabilities of individual Allies.
Description: This factor has two components. The first is the degree to which the factor fosters
political cohesion within NATO by offering credible and meaningful reassurance. The second
is the factor’s effect on Allies’ military capability, which could be to enhance by enabling their
capabilities or to detract by encouraging free riding.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: The political cohesion of the Alliance is, arguably,
the most important factor of all, though it is necessary to keep the importance of US Army force
posture by shaping the degree of political cohesion in context. But much deeper factors influence
that aspect.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Invest in multidomain alliance (Net Gain): This force posture provides capabilities that only
the United States can provide within a command framework (field army) that encourages
Allies to do more. The one drawback is a decrease in activity in the area of Southeastern Allies.
Privilege global competition (Slight Net Gain): This strategic approach offers a slight improvement in capability that would be broadly shared among Allies.
Privilege armed conflict (Slight Net Gain): This strategic approach offers strong reassurance but
risks free riding by Northeastern Allies while also doing little to reassure Southeastern Allies.
Build visible presence (Mixed Result): This strategic approach mainly benefits Northeastern
Allies but does so in a way that replicates capabilities that they can produce for themselves.
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5.

Privilege dynamic force employment (Slight Net Loss): This strategic approach spreads activity broadly across Europe but mainly with forces that come for only short periods, so there is
little framework for Allies to build upon.

The study team recommends the following factors should not influence force posture decisions.
S6. The ability to offer a range of options to respond to Russian aggression against a
European partner (for example, Ukraine, Georgia).
Description: This criterion assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches enables
a range of options to friendly policy makers for operationally and strategically effective military
actions to counter Russian overt aggression against an Eastern (Ukraine or Moldova) or Southeastern
Partner (Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Georgia) within the territorial area of that partner. In addition to
enabling intervention in a conflict, this capability also indirectly expands friendly decision space
in competition below armed conflict and provides the United States with better escalation parity
in a crisis.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: The US Joint Force’s difficulty in generating a
range of acceptable, meaningful options for policymakers during the Russian seizure of Crimea
and later intervention in eastern Ukraine are often cited as the prime examples of why the US
military should, as described in the NDS, expand the competitive space. Whether a policymaker
would choose to exercise those options, the US military should certainly seek to provide the ability
to take action. Merely the ability to do so would influence Russian decision making and so have a
beneficial effect on competition below armed conflict.
In reviewing the options for US Army participation, however, the team concluded that none of
the force posture options provided an advantage sufficient to merit this factor influencing force
posture decisions. A wide range of possible scenarios exists, but the United States would have
greater scope to pursue horizontal escalation and asymmetric responses, particularly in the case
of incremental destabilization activities like those currently being conducted against both Ukraine
and Georgia. This greater strategic scope and the great disparity in the relative ease with which US
and Russian ground forces can project into and sustain operations in these areas, means that a direct
response from US Army forces would be, at best, a supporting effort. This role is not important
enough for the ability to act in defense of non-Allies to influence the choice of strategic approach.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Privilege dynamic force employment (High Risk): The Stryker BCT (SBCT) offers some options
for Eastern Partners, and the proposed focus of the Italy-based SFAB on Southeastern Partners
would increase the ability to integrate select US Army enablers there rapidly.
Privilege global competition (High Risk): The same as the previous option with a slight degradation due to the possible lack of engagement without an in-theater SFAB. For example, a
US-based but Europe-focused SFAB could, depending on many variables, be as effective as
one based in Europe.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Very High Risk): The concentration of ABCTs and activity for
Northeast Allies provides few options for action on behalf of partners.
Privilege armed conflict (Very High Risk): Similar to the previous but with slightly greater risk
due to the even more tailored focus on Northeast Allies.
Build visible presence (Very High Risk): By design, the force optimized to armed conflict in
support of Northeast Allies offers few options.
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Primary variable that could alter assessment: Future US and NATO relations with Turkey could
alter this assessment. If Turkey were to shift decisively toward Russia in its relations, then all US
forces (not just ground forces) would be unable to intervene effectively on behalf of Southeastern
Partners, rendering all the strategic approaches equally irrelevant.

S7. The ability to respond directly or indirectly in case of a crisis or limited conflict
with Russia outside of Europe (for example, mishap in Syria).
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches provides the
ability for forces in Europe to contribute directly to a reaction or indirectly through the threat or
employment of horizontal escalation.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: The US Army force posture should provide these
options, but none of the capabilities that could do so (a deployable corps, long-range fires units,
the 173rd BCT [Airborne]) could not potentially be replicated by Joint capabilities or the same
capabilities coming from the United States. Depending on the amount of warning, Europe-based
forces might be more responsive in terms of time, but this advantage is potentially outweighed by
the political difficulties of conducting nonalliance operations from within Europe.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Privilege global competition (Acceptable): A deployable corps and airborne BCT can be
deployed elsewhere. An SBCT offers limited ability to conduct increased activity throughout
Europe, though in comparison to Joint capabilities that could be brought to play against Russia
by threat or actual employment this would only offer a marginal improvement.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Reduced): An SBCT and SFAB offer some capability to
increase pressure through actions in partner areas that are sensitive to Russia.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Reduced): Long-range fires units can strike directly at important Russian capabilities, but doing so in reaction to a limited conflict elsewhere would be politically difficult for Allies. The BCT (Airborne) offers additional direct response capability.
Privilege armed conflict (Significantly Reduced): As noted above, long-range fires units offer
significant capability to strike at valuable Russian capabilities but whether Allies would allow
firing from their territory would depend on the situation.
Build visible presence (Significantly Reduced): This strategic approach only offers a corps
headquarters for deployment.

S8. The ability of Europe-based forces to project power into the areas of responsibility
of US Central Command (CENTCOM) and US Africa Command.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches provides the
ability for forces in Europe to project into CENTCOM and US Africa Command.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: The premise of dynamic force employment is
that forces should primarily be deployed from continental United States (CONUS) with only the
minimal contact layer forward; therefore, there should be little need for forces from Europe to
deploy elsewhere. Additionally, as Russia is the primary threat driving force posture in Europe,
deploying forces from there in a contingency involving some other threat without creating some
degree of opportunity for Russian aggression would be difficult. Long-range fires being deployed
from Europe to anywhere but the Pacific would be an unlikely scenario.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Privilege global competition (Some Capability): The corps headquarters and 173rd BCT
(Airborne) could both be readily deployed.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Some Capability): The 173rd BCT (Airborne) could be
readily deployed.
Build visible presence (Limited Capability): The corps headquarters could be readily deployed.
Privilege armed conflict (No Capability): No readily deployable units exist.
Privilege dynamic force employment (No Capability): By design, there are only the minimal
contact forces in theater.

S9. The extent to which the force posture facilitates the ability of Allies and partners
to contribute to operations outside of Europe.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches provides the
ability to integrate Allies and partners into US-led operations outside of Europe.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: Though this was a major task of United States
Army Europe (USAREUR) during the 2000s, the threat from Russia makes it unlikely that Allies or
partners would be able to contribute enough forces to out-of-area operations to make a significant
difference. Furthermore, the most important force posture asset in the integration of Allies and
partners was the Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels. That capability is common
to all approaches. Therefore, the primary distinguishing variable is the extent of activity across
Europe, which influences the extent to which Allies and partners are accustomed to operating with
US forces.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1. (tie) Privilege global competition (Acceptable): Activity is spread across all partners
and Allies.
1. (tie) Privilege dynamic force employment (Acceptable): Activity is spread across all partners
and Allies.
3. (tie) Invest in multidomain alliance (Significantly Reduced): Activity is largely confined to
Northeastern Allies.
3. (tie) Privilege armed conflict (Significantly Reduced): Activity is largely confined to
Northeastern Allies.
3. (tie) Build visible presence (Significantly Reduced): Activity is largely confined to
Northeastern Allies.

INSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
I1. The degree to which the force posture impacts Army global readiness and force
generation.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches reduces
overall global readiness and force generation by imposing a high demand to maintain force posture
in Europe. The three principal measures are the size of the costs to sustain the force posture, the
necessity for rotational forces, and the requirement for high-demand assets to be committed solely
to Europe.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: The Army cannot adopt a force posture that is ideal
from the strategic and operational standpoint but that it cannot sustain, not only against current
demand but also over the inevitable peaks and ebbs of global demand in the decades ahead.
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Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Privilege global competition (Limited Impact): This force posture requires only moderate
annual sustaining costs, requires no rotational units, employs logistics and mobility units that
with a reallocation among the components would not cause shortfalls elsewhere, and allows
the Europe-based corps and operational fires command to deploy elsewhere as necessary.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Some Impact): This force posture requires only low-to-moderate annual sustaining costs, has the option of a rotational unit when circumstances dictate,
employs logistics and mobility units that with a reallocation among the components would
not cause shortfalls elsewhere, and commits a field army with operational fires command
to Europe.
Build visible presence. (Increased Impact): This force posture requires only low-to-moderate
annual sustaining costs, requires one rotational ABCT as well as an increase in special operations forces, and allows the Europe-based corps and operational fires command to deploy
elsewhere as necessary.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Increased Impact): This force posture has a high annual
sustaining cost, provides the option of a rotational unit when circumstances dictate, employs
logistics and mobility units that with a reallocation among the components would not cause
shortfalls elsewhere, and requires no Europe-based MDC2.
Privilege armed conflict (Increased Impact): This force posture requires only low annual sustaining costs, requires one rotational ABCT as well as an increase in special operations forces,
and commits a field army with operational fires command to Europe.

I2. The likely response from the various components, other services, the DoD,
Congress, or allies and the degree to which negative responses can prevent successful
implementation.
Description: This factor assesses the degree of implementation risk associated with each strategic
approach in the form of opposition from within the Army or from other services, the DoD, other
governmental agencies, the administration, Congress, or multinational Allies and partners. The
other principal driver of implementation risk is a high implementation cost, which by displacing
funding from other activities and programs can cause internal and external opposition.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: The Army does not have full control over Army force
posture; there are many stakeholders who can withhold cooperation to weaken, modify, or block
force posture initiatives. Even if the Army is successful fully implementing a desired change,
doing so might still require an inordinate amount of senior leader and staff effort to overcome
stakeholder resistance.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

2.

Privilege global competition (Low Risk): The creation of an Army pre-positioned stocks
(APS) ABCT in Poland requires the diversion of that equipment from some other theater (for
example, CENTCOM) or unit (for example, repurpose National Guard ABCT to IBCT). The
creation of more on-hand logistics and mobility capability could require a reallocation of
units among the components. The need to improve lines of communications to facilitate rapid
deployment requires a politically difficult investment in foreign infrastructure. The moderate
implementation cost might cause some conflict over diverted resources.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Low-Moderate Risk): The creation of a hybrid rotational
or APS ABCT in Poland requires the diversion of that equipment from some other theater (for
example, CENTCOM) or unit (for example, repurpose National Guard ABCT to IBCT). The
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3.

4.

5.

creation of more on-hand logistics and mobility capability could require a reallocation of units
among the components. Italy might object to the substitution of an SFAB for the existing 173rd
BCT (Airborne), which the Italian government continues to host under the original NATO
Southeastern Task Force agreement. The need to improve lines of communications to facilitate
rapid deployment requires a politically difficult investment in foreign infrastructure.
Invest in multidomain alliance (High Risk): Changing NATO command structures to integrate
the field army and operational fires command will require significant effort and entails some risk
that the proposal will be modified in a way that impairs effectiveness. Basing nonintermediaterange nuclear force (INF) compliant long-range fires units in Europe will be politically sensitive
for Allies and likely be opposed with Russian misinformation and manipulation; within DoD,
there will be pressure to place these units in the Pacific instead. The reduction in activity with
Southeastern Allies could lead to some multinational difficulties, such as reduced support for
US initiatives like the restructuring of command arrangements or efforts to improve access
throughout the area. This force posture also requires Allies to invest in improving lines of
communications; this will require senior leader effort. The creation of more on-hand logistics
and mobility capability could require a reallocation of units among the components. The high
implementation cost will cause some conflict over diverted resources.
Build visible presence (High Risk): The removal of the BCT from Italy and reduction in activity
with Southeastern Allies could lead to some multinational difficulties, such as reduced support
for US initiatives like the restructuring of command arrangements or efforts to improve access
throughout the area. The return to two ABCTs in Germany would require some appropriations
for foreign military construction, which requires congressional engagement. The return to two
ABCTs in Germany would also require a politically difficult investment in foreign infrastructure
to improve lines of communications. This investment would be even harder in light of the high
implementation cost, which would require the diversion of resources from existing programs
and activities.
Privilege armed conflict (Very High Risk): Changing NATO command structures to integrate
the field army and operational fires command will require significant effort and entails some
risk that the proposal will be modified in a way that impairs effectiveness. Basing non-INF
compliant long-range fires units in Europe will be politically sensitive for Allies and likely
be opposed with Russian misinformation and manipulation; within DoD, there will be
pressure to place these units in the Pacific instead. The removal of the BCT from Italy and the
reduction in activity with Southeastern Allies could lead to some multinational difficulties,
such as reduced support for US initiatives like the restructuring of command arrangements or
efforts to improve access throughout the area. This force posture also requires Allies to invest
in improving lines of communications; this would require senior leader effort. The return to
two ABCTs in Germany would require some appropriations for foreign military construction,
which requires congressional engagement. This would be even harder in light of the high
implementation cost, which would require the diversion of resources from existing programs
and activities.

The study team recommends the following factor should not influence force posture decisions.
I3. The degree to which the force posture entails threat to the force in the form of
decreased morale, retention, and human capital due to high operational strain on
segments of or the entire Army.
Description: This factor measures the degree to which Europe force posture leads to a high
operations tempo that adversely impacts the health of the force. The main contributing element is
the need for rotational forces, which entails extended deployments (currently nine months) and a
reduced pool of forces for other contingencies as for each rotational unit there are several preparing
for or recovering from their own rotations. Lesser drivers of operational tempo strain are extensive
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activity in areas distant from unit home stations and the commitment of high-demand units like
special forces, theater air and missile defense, and high-level headquarters.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: The study team regarded this as a critical element
for the Army, but ultimately decided not to make it a decision-influencing criterion because there
are a number of better alternative methods to reduce the strain—altering force structure, changing
the force generation model, reallocating tasks among the components, or modifying the other
rotational commitments—so that force posture should be determined more on the strategic and
operational benefits than on operations tempo considerations.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Privilege Global Competition (Very Low Risk): This force posture would require units from
Europe or CONUS to conduct regular activity in areas (Southeastern Allies, Eastern Partners,
and Southeastern Partners) away from their home stations.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Low Risk): This force posture would require units from
Europe or CONUS to conduct regular deployment exercises and activity in areas (Southeastern
Allies, Eastern Partners, and Southeastern Partners) away from their home stations. The ability to place the ABCT set in Poland in either rotational or APS status provides some ability to
adjust activity in accord with global demand.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Moderate Risk): The ability to place the ABCT set in Poland
in either rotational or APS status provides some ability to adjust activity in accord with
global demand. The commitment of a field army to Europe places strain on other three-star
headquarters.
Build visible presence (Moderate Risk): Maintaining a persistent ABCT rotational presence in
Poland is a significant commitment. The increased special forces presence causes some additional strain elsewhere.
Privilege armed conflict (High Risk): Maintaining a persistent ABCT rotational presence in
Poland is a significant commitment. The increased special forces presence causes some additional strain elsewhere. The commitment of a field army to Europe places strain on other threestar headquarters.

Primary variable that could alter assessment: How busy will the Army be in 2023, in 2028, or in
2033? A significant increase or decrease from current demand and/or in the size of the force will
have a significant impact on operational tempo.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRITERIA AND RISK FACTORS
E1. The extent to which the force posture is vulnerable to a significant reduction
in future defense budgets, forcing a future Secretary to choose between breaking the
strategy or breaking the army.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches would
become unsustainable if there were a significant decline in resources. The key determinant is the
sustaining cost, as this would be most directly affected by such a change.
Rationale for designation as key criterion: Budget uncertainty has been one of the Army’s greatest
problems in past years and the basic political and other environmental factors underlying this
trend have not changed. Over the course of the study, senior leaders have repeatedly emphasized
the need to account for this possibility in any strategic approach.
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Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Privilege armed conflict (Low Risk): By placing the forces required to defeat and deter armed
conflict in Europe and narrowly focusing activity in areas close to unit bases, this force posture
has low sustaining costs.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Moderate Risk): With a robust forward presence, a focus on
activity close to unit home stations, and the ability to adjust the status of the ABCT in Poland
between rotational and APS according to circumstances, this force posture is relatively resilient
to changes in funding.
Build visible presence (Moderate Risk): With a robust forward presence and a focus on activity
close to unit home stations, this force posture is relatively resilient to changes in funding.
Privilege global competition (High Risk): This force posture entails moderate costs to sustain
a high level of activity (though, generally, of a small footprint) across a wide geographic area,
which makes it vulnerable to decreases in funding.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): This force posture entails high
sustaining costs to maintain a high level of deployment exercises and activity, including large
and expensive exercises like Defender. This force posture is highly vulnerable to resource
disruptions.

The study team recommends the following factors should not influence force posture decisions.
E2. The degree to which the force posture is dependent on the decisions of any single
foreign government (can be rendered invalid by the results of a single election in a
foreign country).
Description: The problems for Pacific posture caused by the election of Rodrigo Duterte in the
Philippines illustrate the extent to which force posture is not dependent on any single government;
in a time of upheaval, forecasting the trajectory of politics in any country is difficult. In a crisis or
conflict, a foreign government could significantly impede military deployment and operations with
reluctant, half-hearted cooperation in logistics, movement, and intelligence or by placing caveats
on operations within its territory. This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic
approaches can be disrupted by a single foreign election.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: Even many of the smaller NATO Allies have some
significant capability located in their territory or are part of critical logistics and transportation
networks. Theoretically, creating diversity and redundancy in locations and movement routes so
that no single points of failure exist is desirable. Yet, the current military infrastructure reflects
decades of US and Allied investment—most of it at times of much higher defense spending—
shaped by powerful domestic and Alliance political considerations. Germany is essential for any
significant military activity and no feasible amount of spending or political capital will be able to
avert that dependency. Depending on the scenario—armed conflict or competition below armed
conflict and location—other countries could be essential. In many instances, full cooperation from
Poland would be necessary. Nonetheless, the inevitable dependence on Germany and the wide
range of possible contingencies with such varied demands means that it is not worthwhile to
account for this factor in deciding force posture. All of the strategic options are highly vulnerable
to this risk.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

Privilege global competition (High Risk): The focus on competition below armed conflict means
many of the envisioned activities are light footprint options that are not dependent on significant cooperation from a range of countries. But because of the context, the envisioned activities
are also somewhat vulnerable to Russian information operations and political warfare.
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2.

3.

4.

5.

Build visible presence (High Risk): Because of the narrow geographic focus, this force posture
is highly dependent on the cooperation of Germany and Northeastern Allies. This dependence
is somewhat mitigated by the historical relations between these Allies and Russia and their
vulnerability to Russian aggression.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): Rapid, large-scale deployments depend
on full utilization of logistics and transportation network capacity. The reluctance of Allies to
make these networks available to military traffic at the expense of civilian and commercial
needs could impair dynamic force employment.
Privilege armed conflict (Very High Risk): Because of the narrow geographic focus, this force
posture is highly dependent on the cooperation of Germany and Northeastern Allies. This
dependence is somewhat mitigated by the historical relations between these Allies and Russia
and their vulnerability to Russian aggression. The integration of the MDC2 headquarters into
NATO creates additional risk.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Very High Risk): Because of the narrow geographic focus, this
force posture is highly dependent on the cooperation of Germany and Northeastern Allies.
This dependence is somewhat mitigated by the historical relations between these Allies and
Russia and their vulnerability to Russian aggression. The integration of the MDC2 headquarters into NATO creates additional risk. Finally, because this force posture is built to enable
Joint operations, disruption to US Air Force access to airfields would also have a significant
impact on overall operational effectiveness.

E3. The degree to which the force posture remains operable in case of significant
deterioration of NATO political cohesion.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches provides
an ability to act with a small “coalition of the willing” in case of a significant decline in NATO
political cohesion.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: Due to the persistence of force posture for years
and decades, one must acknowledge the possibility of this kind of fundamental strategic shift.
Though some force postures would be better than others under those conditions, the study team
concludes this change would make the US position in Europe so untenable that it should not be
factored into a force posture decision.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.

4.

Privilege global competition (High Risk): The emphasis on competition below armed conflict
and a relatively light footprint already tailors this force posture to those conditions when partners are likely to be receptive to support and does not require large movements of forces.
Build visible presence (Very High Risk): This force posture places large ground maneuver
forces in the territory of Allies that would be most threatened by Russia, and so this force posture is less vulnerable to degradation in the overall Alliance. Nonetheless, supporting these
forces for very long would be difficult.
Privilege armed conflict (Very High Risk): This force posture places large ground maneuver
forces in the territory of Allies that would be most threatened by Russia, and so this force posture is less vulnerable to degradation in the overall Alliance. Nonetheless, supporting these
forces for very long would be difficult. Furthermore, while this posture provides more US
multidomain support in position to assist these forces, the integration of the MDC2 leaves it
vulnerable to disruption by putative Allies with pro-Russian policies.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): The rapid deployment of large-scale
forces to Europe requires an effective alliance to have any chance of success.
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5.

Invest in multidomain alliance (Very High Risk): This force posture is predicated on enabling
Joint and multinational capabilities. The deterioration of NATO would have a significant negative effect on both.

E4. The extent of strategic and operational risk within Europe in case of a significant
crisis or conflict with China.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches would be
invalidated by a crisis or conflict with China.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: A significant crisis or conflict with China would
create a window for Russian opportunism. Yet, none of the feasible Army force postures are likely
to address this problem satisfactorily the demands on the remainder of the Joint Force would be so
significant that Army forces on their own are unlikely to alter the operational balance significantly.
Therefore, the relative superiority of force posture options in this extreme case should not be
determinative.
Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Privilege armed conflict (Moderate-High Risk): The most robust force posture offers the best
possibility of success. Nonetheless, a significant commitment of the other services’ capabilities,
munitions, and intelligence to the Pacific would still create a highly unfavorable correlation
of forces for armed conflict. Russia would also have significant scope for competition below
armed conflict due to the focus of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources on China.
Build visible presence (High Risk): Though without the benefit of long-range fires as with privilege armed conflict, the emphasis on ground maneuver forces would provide some residual
deterrence capability.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Very High Risk): The emphasis on enabling the Joint Force in
this strategic approach would be largely invalidated if there were very little Joint Force left
to enable.
Privilege global competition (Very High Risk): The demands of moving forces to the Indo-Pacific would leave no spare strategic lift capacity to respond to developments in Europe, even if,
as would be likely, there were available ground forces in the United States.
Privilege dynamic force employment (Very High Risk): The demands of moving forces to the
Indo-Pacific would leave no spare strategic lift capacity to respond to developments in Europe,
even if, as would be likely, there were available ground forces in the United States.

E5.

The extent to which the force posture could become a liability or a barrier to
adaptation in case of a significant change in US policy.
Description: This factor assesses the extent to which each of the strategic approaches would be
difficult to alter in case of future changes in US policy.
Rationale for designation as non-key criterion: This factor was not recommended for consideration
in decision for pragmatic rather than conceptual reasons. A central premise of the NDS is current
policymakers must make hard choices among threats and missions with which they agree. Put
differently, the NDS is a document that stresses decisiveness in setting priorities. This factor ranks
the relative ability to recover in case those present decisions prove wrong. History will judge the
wisdom of the present course, but recommending a factor to influence decision that is so antithetical
to existing strategy would be pointless.
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Ranking of strategic approaches:
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Privilege dynamic force employment (Flexible): This strategic approach is expressly built to
maximize flexibility by minimizing commitments; this feature also makes it flexible in case of
policy change.
Build visible presence (Somewhat Limiting): The addition of a Europe-based corps and operational fires command creates additional structure that would be difficult to reduce or alter in
the future. The change from an SBCT and an IBCT in two different countries to two ABCTs
in just one country is a slight improvement in terms of flexibility, as Europe is the most likely
theater for employing ABCTs. Allowing the other types to employ elsewhere creates some
measure of flexibility.
Privilege Global Competition (Somewhat Limiting): Similar to build visible presence, but with
the need to deal with two different countries in case of a desire to alter BCT distribution in
the future.
Invest in multidomain alliance (Limiting): The integration of the MDC2 makes it very difficult
to alter in the future. The placement of a high-value system like long-range fires also is difficult
to alter once implemented.
Privilege armed conflict (Highly Limiting): The integration of the MDC2 makes it very difficult
to alter in the future. The placement of a high-value system like long-range fires also is difficult
to alter once implemented.
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APPENDIX 3. ASSUMPTIONS
The study employed the following assumptions in determining its findings. To
qualify for inclusion, the assumptions here needed to be (1) necessary to complete the
planning task at hand; (2) valid (likely to be true); (3) but not likely to be verified in the
course of planning.
• The Army will create the force structures (for example, field armies) as described
in the multidomain operations (MDO) and echelons above brigade concepts.
• The Army modernization priorities will be fielded.
• The Army will not create additional ground combat vehicles to create another
brigade combat team (BCT) set; all equipment must come from within the existing
Total Force fleet within units, equipment activity sets, and prepositioned stocks.
• The current bases in Germany could accept a second mounted BCT with only a
modest (and therefore politically feasible) amount of military construction.
• The risk involved in any US-Russian conflict is so great that Russia would never
conduct a sudden surprise attack based solely on the conditions of US/NATO
military vulnerability. Therefore, any conflict would be preceded by a crisis period
of days, weeks, or months of heightened political tensions that would buy some
time for focused intelligence gathering and military preparations.
• Prepositioning equipment for long-range capable fires brigades is not an option
because all of the initial production will be allocated to building the training
base and creating deployable units; there will be no overage to devote to creating
additional equipment sets that would not be in constant use.
• The Army National Guard will provide a baseline of engagement with all Allies
and partners, and a continental United States (CONUS)-based but Europe-focused
security force assistance brigade (SFAB) will conduct activities across Europe,
unless otherwise stated in the strategic approach.
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APPENDIX 4. RUSSIA’S LONG HISTORY AND THE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
Understanding Russia’s geopolitical perspective begins with an acknowledgment of
its historical exposure to foreign invasion and resulting deep-rooted security paranoia.1
The history of Russia’s Slavic population begins with the eastern migration of Vikings,
the Varangian Rus, who consolidated into quasi-independent city-states throughout
Eurasia between the seventh and ninth centuries. Russia, Ukraine, and the larger Slavic
Eurasia’s shared historical identity begins when Prince Vladimir of Kiev (notably the
present-day Ukrainian capital), who married Princess Anna of the Byzantine Empire
(present-day Greece and Turkey) was baptized into Christendom at the ancient Crimean
city of Sevastopol, and consolidated the Slavs into a single monarchy in the late tenth
century. In the thirteenth century, Genghis Khan’s Mongols conquered present day
Russia, occupying the Slavic people’s homeland for approximately 200 years.
Recognizing the indefensibility of the central Eurasian plain, the political and
religious seat of the Slavic people moved from Kiev to Moscow in the mid-fourteenth
century and the Grand Duchy of Moscow liberated the Slavic people from the Mongols
in the fifteenth century. But to their south, the Russian Slavs foresaw a new threat. The
Islamic Ottoman Empire sacked Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul and then the head
of the Christian church) in 1453 and conquered most of the Balkans. In the process they
converted Hagia Sophia, at that time the greatest cathedral in the Orthodox Christian
world, into a mosque. Although Ivan III the Great now envisioned Moscow as the third
Rome and the center of the Christian world, for the next 150 years the Russian Empire
was largely stagnant.
From the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, Russia would experience multiple
waves of territorial collapse and subsequent expansion as it battled neighboring powers,
beginning with the Poles, who occupied Moscow from 1610 to 1612. Domestically, Russia
struggled to consolidate power among a feuding aristocracy, raiding borderland tribes,
and peasant revolts. Numerous monarchs found themselves torn between attempts to
modernize Russia into the cultural and educational norms of an enlightened Europe, but
found their attempts rebuffed from both outside and within. The first of these would-be
reformers and the creator of modern Russia, Peter I the Great (1682–725), who launched
a dual approach of territorial expansion in all directions and internal Westernization,
intended to transform his dynasty into a European power. Peter I repelled another attack
on Moscow, this time by the Swedes of Charles XII. To the west he secured central and
eastern Ukraine following the Battle of Poltava, he attacked the Ottomans to the south,
and Asian tribes in Siberia to the east.
1. R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1993); John M. Qualls, “Current US Policy of Provoking Russia is Fundamentally
Flawed,” Military Review 89, no. 1 (January–February 2009); Peter Conradi, Who Lost Russia?: How the World
Entered a New Cold War (London: Oneworld, 2017); R. Craig Nation, The History of Russia (lecture series,
US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, January 2019); and “A Brief History of Russia,” University
of California San Francisco, n.d., https://web.archive.org/web/20190404222049/missinglink.ucsf.edu
/lm/russia_guide/historyofrussia.htm.
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Catherine II the Great continued Peter’s imperial work and attempts at joining
Europe’s burgeoning enlightenment movement. She secured the northern Caucasus and
Black Sea region, but after observing the chaos of the French Revolution and Russia’s
own peasant uprisings, Catherine quickly abandoned egalitarian reforms in favor of the
stability that increased authoritarianism brought.
Following a brief truce with France and an alliance against the Prussians and British,
Alexander I (1801–25) fought against Napoleon’s ill-fated campaign of 1812 where
both nations incurred heavy casualties at the Battle of Borodino before Russian forces
withdrew from Moscow. Following a brief occupation, Napoleon retreated to Poland,
harassed the entire way. Russia arose from the Napoleonic Wars as an unquestionable
continental military power and, throughout the nineteenth century, sought to absorb
non-Slavic borderland tribes from the Muslim periphery of the Ottoman Empire and
Central Asia.
During the Crimean War (1854–56), Russia faced a combined alliance of Ottomans,
French, and British attacking throughout the Balkans and into the Black Sea region. The
war—which proved both economically and politically costly for Russia—culminated
with a yearlong siege, and Russia’s subsequent loss of the critical Crimean port of
Sevastopol. Fifty years later, Russia retreated from Japan after losing two fleets in the
Russo-Japanese War, leading to increased popular disenchantment with the czar. Less
than a decade later, Russia’s mobilization plans in support of Serbia, following the
assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, triggered Germany’s
Schlieffen Plan. World War I was an unintended and devastating war; a 2001 study by
the Russian military historian G. F. Krivosheev estimated Russia suffered a total of 9.2
million casualties and prisoners of war, with war deaths reaching 2,254,369.2
Political fallout from “the Great War” exacerbated an ongoing social crisis. Both rural
peasantry and urban industrial labor felt disaffected from Russia’s monarchy, the last of
whom, Tsar Nicholas II, abdicated the throne during the February Revolution—leading
to Lenin’s accession and the October Revolution. Russia’s civil war, the lingering effects
of WWI, and a global depression destroyed Russian society. Before Russia could recover,
it faced another European invasion, this time from Nazi Germany. Americans tend to
focus on the US contributions to WWII—North Africa, Italy, the Normandy invasion,
and Western Front battles that resulted in more than 250,000 Americans killed—but
often lose sight of the vital Russian efforts on the Eastern Front. Repelling German
invasions and enduring bombardments of its homeland, Russia suffered more than 26
million killed (approximately 9 million service members and 17 million civilians). More
than a footnote in Russia’s history books, “The Great Patriotic War” was one of a long
line of bloody fights for its very existence.
Following WWII, the United States emerged from its geographic isolation relatively
unscathed. The United States’ military manufacturing base transitioned to a commercial
export engine servicing Europe and Asia; the dollar became the world’s currency, giving
the United States unprecedented monetary leverage for the remainder of the twentieth
2. Nadege Mougel, REPERES Module 1-1-1 Explanatory Notes: World War I Casualties,
trans. Julie Gratz (Scy-Chazelles, FR: Robert Schuman European Centre, 2011), http://www
.centre-robert-schuman.org/educationnal-tools/teaching-europe/reperes-explanatory-notes-forteachers?langue=en.
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century. But Russia was socially and financially devastated; the Communist Party
under Stalin sought to pool the nation’s resources in a highly controlled state economy.
Maintaining the Soviet territorial gains of WWII was seen as an absolute necessity to
provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) strategic depth, a buffer to protect
its homeland from further incursions. Even in the twenty-first century, the significance of
this insecurity should not be minimized, and it is a central lens through which Russians
collectively view the world.
NATO EXPANSION
Given this early history, Russian opposition to NATO expansionism should be
unsurprising. As Soviet client states began a process of secession in 1989 and President
Mikhail Gorbachev made a deliberate, but difficult, decision to allow the Warsaw Pact to
dissolve, Russia looked for reassurances from its Cold War rival. On May 17, 1990, thenSecretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner stated, “the fact that we are ready not to
place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security
guarantee.”3 Taking this assurance, Russia turned its focus from security concerns
to the monumental task of unwinding 74 years of totalitarian control in favor of what
Gorbachev hoped would be the benefits of free-market reforms.
Seven years later, NATO backpedaled from its 1990 position to a more ambiguous
declaration that it would not permanently station additional “substantial combat forces”
on the territories of former Soviet states, given the “current and foreseeable security
environment.”4 That environment changed drastically in the subsequent decade and the
West moved the proverbial goal posts again. With Russia facing economic and social
collapse, its already-weakened military engulfed in fighting Chechen separatists, and
in the wake of Russia’s embarrassing inability to protect its longtime ally Serbia from
NATO bombing, the United States encouraged expanding NATO membership. In 1999
the central Eurasian countries of Hungary, Poland, and Czechia gained membership
over Russia’s disapproval.
In 2003, the United States and the UK invaded Iraq without UN approval (and against
the desires of UN Security Council permanent members France, Germany, China, and
Russia), citing a new policy of preemptive self-defense.5 The following year, the United
States added further insult to injury by further expanding NATO membership to
Slovakia; the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; central Eurasian countries of
Bulgaria and Romania; and the former Yugoslavian province of Slovenia.
In 2007, Putin protested NATO expansion as a “serious provocation,” and asked to
“whom is this expansion intended?”6 A rhetorical question, Putin assumed the premise
3. Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy” (speech, Munich Security
Conference, Munich, February 10, 2007).
4. “Official Text: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and
the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France,” NATO, updated October 12, 2009, https://www.nato.int
/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.
5. Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, “The UN Security Council and Iraq” (UN University
Working Papers Series no. 01, UN University, New York, November 2013).
6. Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference.”
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behind NATO to be that asserted by the Alliance’s first secretary general, British General
Hastings Ismay: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down,” a
stance shared by no few pundits in the West.7 Despite Putin’s protestation, Croatia and
Albania were admitted into NATO in 2008.
At the Bucharest NATO summit the same year, the United States and Britain
advocated for a pathway to admit Georgia and Ukraine, a step Germany and France
argued against as being too provocative toward a resurgent and increasingly incensed
Russia. Both are border nations with significant Russian security interests. Georgia is
strategically located in the Caucasus region between the Caspian and Black Seas in a
vital energy corridor that is also pressured by Iran and potentially under the influential
path of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.8 Ukraine has historical, religious, and economic
ties with Russia dating back to its inception. Crimea has a population that is more than
50 percent ethnic Russian and is home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol, Russia’s
only warm-weather deepwater port. NATO continued tightening the noose on Russia.
Putin declared in absolute terms that NATO would not gain access to the Russian
heartland. Even Gorbachev—who established an unprecedented partnership with
President Ronald Reagan, bravely, albeit unintentionally, dismantled the Soviet Union,
and put Russia on a trajectory for Western integration—proclaimed in 2008:
Russia has long been told to simply accept the facts. Here’s the independence of Kosovo for you.
Here’s the abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the American decision to place missile
defences in neighboring countries. Here’s the unending expansion of NATO. All of these moves
have been set against the backdrop of sweet talk about partnership. Why would anyone put up
with such a charade?9

The threat of NATO expansion is not simply a matter of Russian misperceptions or
Putin seeking to deflect blame for internal trials toward external threats. As far back as
1947, George F. Kennan explained Soviet tactics by writing, “it became necessary to justify
the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad,” and many
skeptics still discount Russian security concerns as domestic concern deflections.10 As
an impassioned Putin declared to the UN General Assembly in March 2018, the United
States and its Allies “are still dominated by their Cold War-era bloc mentality and the
ambition to conquer new geopolitical areas.”11 He asked why NATO still exists, let alone
expanded, “considering that the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist, and the Soviet Union

7. Victor Davis Hanson, “Lord Ismay, NATO, and the Old-New World Order,” National Review, July 5,
2017, https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/07/nato-russians-out-americans-germans-down-updated
-reversed/; and Kori Schake, “NATO Without America,” American Interest, May 25, 2017.
8. “What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?,” Economist, May 15, 2017, https://www.economist.com
/the-economist-explains/2017/05/14/what-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.
9. Mikhail Gorbachev, “Russia Never Wanted a War,” New York Times, August 19, 2008, https://www
.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/opinion/20gorbachev.html.
10. Mr. X [George Frost Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947).
11. Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly” (speech, Manezh Central Exhibition
Hall, Moscow, Russia, March 1, 2018).
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had disintegrated.”12 Putin and other conservative voices in Russia have undoubtedly
drawn a line in the sand and will use their recently reestablished military might to
stop further encroachments on what little remains of their strategic buffer. Russia feels
that NATO and the United States have been continually dishonest regarding any past
notions of cooperative intentions. Instead of allowing Russia to integrate with the west,
the United States has enacted a foreign policy explicitly intended to keep them out. Putin
criticizes the United States, the EU, and NATO for creating a “false choice” of West
versus East instead of allowing common space for economic and security cooperation,
an accusation the United States rebuts.13
Following NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders, encircling the Russian enclave
of Kaliningrad with the admission of Latvia and Lithuania to the Alliance, the fear of
a limited Russian invasion into the Baltic states has arisen. In theory, Russia could be
incentivized to secure its access to Kaliningrad militarily under the guise of protecting
ethnic Russians residing in the Baltic states, a justification Putin used in reference to
Ukraine. Although Russians do account for approximately 25 percent of Estonia and
Latvia’s populations, it is a false comparison with Ukraine. Ethnic Russians in the Baltic
states proudly practice their language, culture, and maintain cross-border economic
and familial ties. In these countries, ethnic Russians are urban dwellers, consolidated
primarily to Riga, Latvia (about 40 percent of the city’s population); Daugavpils, Latvia
(about 80 percent); and Narva, Estonia (about 80 percent).
Russians have genuine political grievances with limited or no citizenship, especially
when that manifests as no formal voting or political representation; however, an
important distinction is that they are advocating for greater inclusion in their nations of
residence, not exclusion and subsequent annexation by Russia. Observing the conditions
in Crimea and the Donets Basin likely gives Baltic Russians even more reason to enjoy
the residency they currently enjoy.
DEMOCRATIC COLOR REVOLUTIONS
Further feeding into Russian security paranoia are concerns about its own political
stability. Stark differences in US and Russian world views become very apparent in
interpreting the so-called color revolutions of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and
the more recent Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa and the Levant. To many in
the United States, the revolutions represented the inevitable rise of liberal democratic
passions against oppressive regimes. The revolutions may be temporarily destabilizing,
but in the long run (as Francis Fukuyama and other neoconservatives would contend)
they will eventually produce a peaceful and more interconnected world order.14
In 2007, and ironically before its incursions into Georgia or Ukraine, Putin chastised
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, for “interfering in the
internal affairs of other countries,” and deemed the West irresponsible for attempting
12. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
13. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
14. Charles R. Kesler, “Democracy and the Bush Doctrine,” Claremont Review of Books 5, no. 1 (Winter
2004/05).
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to determine how “states should live and develop.”15 Putin’s contradictions of words
and his own deeds are worth noting, but so is his perspective that nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and Department of State democratic reform initiatives are statesponsored—and heavily financed—political interventions by a foreign power in the
domestic affairs of his country. Russia sees Western attempts to spread their version of
liberal democracy and free market principles as actions that undermine Russia’s economic
and security interests within its historical sphere of influence and, more importantly, its
own domestic political stability.16 General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff
of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, has described “hybrid warfare” as a US and
NATO strategy of using military force to promote economic interests “under the slogan
of protecting democracy or instilling democratic values in some country.” He further
described “nonmilitary forms” of confrontation “shifting in the direction of extensive
employment of political, economic, diplomatic, information, and other nonmilitary
measures, implemented with the involvement of the protest potential of a population.”
Gerasimov proposed that Russia implement “new-type warfare” (now known as the
“Gerasimov doctrine” by Western analysts) as a response to US confrontations below the
threshold of armed conflict.17
For example, Russia views US Secretary of State James Baker’s visit to Tbilisi and
rebuke of Eduard Shevardnadze during Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003–4) as further
exemplifying US meddling in the domestic politics of another nation.18 The 2004 Ukraine
Orange Revolution protested the election of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych;
the government buckled under popular protest and following a reelection, pro-Western
candidate Viktor Yushchenko rose to power. In 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution
drove Askar Akayev to seek sanctuary in Moscow. While the United States courted
revolutionaries and celebrated a bow wave of liberal democracy, Putin lamented his loss
of political influence and continued Western “meddling” in former Soviet Union states.
In the mind of Putin’s Secretary of the Security Council, the United States attempted
to “redesign the post-Soviet space in America’s interests.” In Russia’s worldview, “the
US created the conditions and pretexts for the colored revolutions and financed them
lavishly,” with Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Nikolai Patrushev listing US
Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State, and Pentagon
contributions to Ukraine totaling $5 billion over the last two decades.19
Uprisings in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria in 2011—known as the “Arab Spring”—
upended the secular control of Pan-Arab nationalists, created a power vacuum filled by
Islamic extremist groups, and threatened Russian interests in the region. US financial
15. Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference.”
16. Putin, “Speech at the Munich Conference.”
17. Valery Gerasimov, “Contemporary Warfare and Current Issues for the Defense of the Country,”
trans. Harold Orenstein, Military Review 97, no. 6 (November–December 2017).
18. Peter Conradi, referenced by Matthew Olson, Deterrence and Reassurance in the Baltics—A Balanced
Approach, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1, 2018), http://
publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3586.pdf.
19. Nikolai Patrushev, “Ukraine Crisis—The View from Russia,” Guardian, October 25, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war. See also Conradi,
Who Lost Russia?, 167.
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contributions in support of these democratic movements and NATO’s relentless air
campaign against Libya resulted in Muammar al-Qaddafi’s brutal killing at the hands
of a mob, and Hosni Mubarak’s humiliation in a courtroom cell. Fueled by Western
democratization principles and funded by various NGOs, USAID, and Department of
State initiatives, the 2016 Russian National Security Strategy accuses the United States of
hubris and ill-intended consequences: “instead of democracy and progress, there is now
violence, poverty, social disasters, and total disregard for human rights.”20 In each case—
not to mention the 2003 Iraq invasion—Putin and many other Russian statesmen see the
US hand in bringing down sovereign governments as forms of malign statecraft, open
military invasion, or simply ignorant blunders. Seventeen years removed from the 9/11
attacks, Russians view US actions as misguided hegemony and reckless foreign policy
and fears that Moscow is next.
ISLAMIC TERRORISM
Threatened by NATO military might on its doorstep, Russia also faces a growing
Islamic threat from abroad and within. Russia believes US policies since 9/11 have made
the “global terrorist threat much worse, spreading it to new regions around the globe.”21
Conflict between Western liberal beliefs and Islamic extremism can trace its modernday foundation to two seminal events in 1979. The first was the Iranian Revolution
precipitated by a collection of Shia Islamists, leftists, and students who joined forces to
overthrow the Western-aligned monarchy of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in favor of
a totalitarian theocracy led by Ruhollah Khomeini. For the past 40 years or so, Iranian
proxies have incited violence in the region, notably in Israel; Lebanon; southern Iraq;
and, today, in northern Syria.
The second event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–1989), which incited
a global network of Sunni Muslim mujahideen, well-financed by Persian Gulf States and
armed by the United States, to fight the Soviet Union and its client communist state.22
Al-Qaeda arose from the ashes of Russia’s Afghan War in the 1980s, and later turned
their attention to US targets, including embassies in Nigeria and Kenya, as well as the
attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. Russia has,
in fact, not forgotten the US role in arming and financing an organization that would
come back to haunt America on 9/11. Putin acknowledged the mistakes of past Soviet
dogma and recognized his own country’s ill-fated ideological zealotry with communism
and expansionist tendencies in his 2015 UN speech, stating, “we remember examples
from our Soviet past, when the Soviet Union exported social experiments, pushing
for changes in other countries for ideological reasons, and this often led to tragic
consequences and caused degradation instead of progress,” but also noted that the
United States was “equally irresponsible to manipulate extremist groups and use them
to achieve your political goals, hoping that later you’ll find a way to get rid of them or
20. Vladimir Putin, Russian National Security Strategy (Moscow, Russia: The Kremlin, December 31,
2015).
21. Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.”
22. Michael Rubin, “Who is Responsible for the Taliban?,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, March
2002, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/who-is-responsible-for-the-taliban.
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somehow eliminate them.”23 Russia lost a reported 13,833 soldiers in 10 years of fighting
in Afghanistan, almost 6 times the number of casualties the United States lost in its own
Afghanistan War.24
In the 1990s, Russia eagerly contributed peacekeepers to the Bosnian conflict,
working directly with NATO in a short-lived sign of solidarity for creating stability in
a region long plagued by ethnic and religious conflict given its divide of west from east
and Christianity from Muslims. But Russia’s endorsement waned in the late 1990s when
NATO initiated its air campaign against Serbia. Kosovo had been the ancestral homeland
of the Serbs since 1190 and Russia viewed US actions as openly siding with Albanian
Muslim jihadists over Russia’s fellow orthodox Slavs.25
Closer to home, Russia was dealing with a festering Islamic secessionist movement
on its own soil. Between 10,000 and 15,000 Russians have died fighting two wars in
Chechnya since 1994. The Russians viewed their operations as a campaign against
political separatists and Islamic extremists who demonstrated an active threat to
populations within Russia.
Another fleeting moment of solidarity between Russia and the United States occurred
following 9/11. President Putin was the first international leader to call President Bush
to offer condolences and support. Russia provided intelligence, overflight permissions,
and tacit support to US basing in Central Asia where Russia still had significant clout.
But this Russo-American unity in the global war on terrorism was to be a short-lived
honeymoon. Their individual interests again diverged as Russia adamantly opposed US
intention to invade Iraq. Ironically, the United States was Saddam Hussein’s principal
supporter during the Iran-Iraq War, and Russia was concerned that the proposed US
invasion of Iraq would violate a UN member’s sovereignty, was premised on ill-founded
intelligence, would create chaos in an already fragile geopolitical region, and was
another sign of unchecked US military interventionism. Furthermore, Russia believed the
United States was deflecting blame for the 9/11 attacks and broader Wahhabi extremism
from Saudi Arabia. Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were Saudi, their Wahhabi
brand of Sunni Islam originated in Saudi Arabia, and a large majority of al-Qaeda and
consequently Chechen funding largely originated from there.26
From Moscow’s perspective, radical Islam threatens “the very integrity of the Russian
state.”27 Through immigration (both legal and illegal) and a high birthrate (relative to
Slavs), Russia’s Muslim population has grown 40 percent since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, now representing 15 percent of the total Russian population. In 1990 Russia had
23. Vladimir Putin, “Address to the UN General Assembly” (speech, UN Headquarters, New York,
NY, September 28, 2015).
24. George Michael, “Is a Greater Russia Really So Bad?,” Military Review 95, no. 1 (January–February
2015): 105.
25. Qualls, “Current US Policy,” 115.
26.
Unclassified Version of DCI Testimony: Hearings before the Joint Inquiry into
Terrorist Attacks against the United States (June 18, 2002) (statement of George J. Tenet,
Director
of
Central
Intelligence),
graphic
#385295AI
6-02,
https://www.cia.gov/news
-information/speeches-testimony/2002/DCI_18_June_testimony_new.pdf.
27. Ilan Berman, Implosion: The End of Russia and What it Means for America (Washington, DC: Regnery,
2013), 39, quoted in Michael, “Greater Russia,” 105.
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500 mosques, compared to 8,000 in 2008. By some estimates, Russia is on a glide path
to be a majority Muslim state by the middle of the century with significant domestic
and geopolitical implications.28 Today, more than 2.5 million Muslims live in Moscow
alone, more than any European city other than Istanbul, Turkey, and more than in any
other non-Islamic country.29 Fueled by economic stagnation and ethnic isolation, over a
thousand domestic terrorist attacks have occurred in Russia since 2001 accounting for
over 3,067 civilian deaths.30 In this light, Russia has a vested interest in the rise of the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and other terrorist groups, and the future of Afghanistan
and Syria (given regional interests, terrorist movements, and refugee migrations that
influence Russa’s border countries and domestic Muslim population).
CONCLUSION
As the United States considers its strategy to counter malign Russian activities and
strengthen a combat capable military presence in Europe, it must account for Russia’s
security interests and recent actions through the lens of Russia’s history and worldview.
Russia’s actions in the past decade might appear patently revanchist and potentially
bellicose; however, Russia has neither the intent nor the means to resurrect the Soviet
Union of yesteryear. While their national identity yearns for global significance, President
Putin is a pragmatic opportunist with measured objectives.
Thucydides suggests the actions of a state can be traced to one of three motives: fear,
honor, and interest. In Russia’s case, its defensive-minded security paranoia is deeply
rooted in its historical exposure to outside invasion, which accounts for its negative
perception of NATO expansion since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw
Pact. In addition to their physical security, Putin and Moscow’s political elites are fearful
for their own political security and what they deem would be devastating instability in
their absence. Through this lens they view the power of various color revolutions and
the Arab Spring as a predictor of their own precarious positions.31
Russia is also prideful. Putin personally exemplifies the machismo characteristic
of the Slavic/Eastern culture and as such views honor as a transactional commodity,
of which Russia’s stores have been depleted by US action. Through this cultural
understanding one can make sense of brazen cyber meddling and political assassination
attempts, reckless military flybys, declarations to protect Russian diasporas, and intertheater missile launches. Putin is not driving his own foreign policy so much as reacting
to perceptions of US policy.
28. Michael, “Greater Russia,” 104.
29. Michael, “Greater Russia,” 104.
30. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, “Russian Terrorism,”
Global Terrorism Database, n.d., http://globalterrorismdatabase.com/rf/rfexcel.html.
31.
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Russia acts in its own interests, which unsurprisingly do not always align with US
visions of hegemony. Most important is economic security and its relation to Russia’s
physical and political security. Other interests include supporting the Assad regime
and maintaining basing access to the Mediterranean and Black Sea, expanding its
anti-access capabilities considering US global strike technologies, ensuring a credible
nuclear deterrence policy, and working to maintain political and economic influence on
its periphery.
Russia under President Putin is resurgent. In 20 years, Russia has resurrected
its economy, its military, and its political stature from the brink of collapse to that of
a regional influencer. But as this paper argues, Russia is not revisionist or, as some
have described, revanchist. Russia is not resurrecting the Soviet Union. Moreover, as
noted in the main text, Russia’s future will likely be marked by economic decline and
dwindling populations. These trends, however, will only make Russia more dangerous.
As the above history indicates, the Russian people share the same sense of geographic
insecurity and political humiliation as their government. These points thus suggest that
demonstrations of global power and confrontation with the West, especially in Eastern
Europe, will only serve to bolster the popularity of any future Russian government.
Problems for the Russian government at home could thus lead to greater problems for
the United States abroad.
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